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Abstract 
 
This thesis investigates the technological imaginary of human enhancement: how it has 
been conceived historically and the scientific understanding that has shaped it. Human 
enhancement technologies have been prominent in popular culture narratives for a long 
time, but in the past twenty years they have moved out of science fiction to being an 
issue for serious discussion, in academic disciplines, political debate and the mass media.. 
Even so, the bioethical debate on enhancement, whether it is pharmacological means of 
improving cognition and morality or genetic engineering to create smarter people or 
other possibilities, is consistently centred on technologies that do not yet exist.  
The investigation is divided into three main areas: a chapter on eugenics, two 
chapters on cybernetics and the cyborg, and two chapters on transhumanism. All three 
areas of enhancement thinking have a corresponding understanding of and reference to 
evolutionary theory and the human as a category. Insofar as ‘enhancement’ is a vague and 
relative turn, the chapters show how each approach wrestles with how to formulate what 
is good and desirable. When this has inevitably proven difficult, the technologies 
themselves dictate what and how ‘enhancement’ comes about. Eugenics treats the 
human in terms of populations – as a species, but also in abstract categories such as 
nation and race. I follow the establishment of eugenics from the development of a 
statistical understanding of measuring human aptitude, with emphasis on the work of 
Francis Galton and the formulation of the regression to the mean. The following two 
chapters on cybernetics and the cyborg analyses how the metaphor of the body as 
machine has changed relative to what is meant by ‘machine’: associated with Cartesian 
dualism, cybernetics marked a shift in how we understand the term. Through a reading 
of the original formulation of the cyborg, I connect it to evolutionary adaptationism and 
a cybernetic ‘black box’ approach. The last two chapters look at a more recent approach 
to enhancement as a moral imperative, transhumanism. Since some transhumanists seek 
to ground themselves philosophically as the inheritors to Enlightenment humanism, the 
concept of ‘morphological freedom’ is central, representing an extension of humanistic 
principles of liberty brought into an age which privileges information over matter. The 
final chapter looks at how the privileging of information leads to a universal 
computational ontology, and I specifically look at the work of Ray Kurzweil, a prominent 
transhumanist, and how the computationalist narrative creates a teleological 
understanding of both human worth and evolution. 
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Introduction 
Liberty, Progress, and the need for enhancement 
 
 
 
Contemporary enhancement technolog ies  
Designer babies. An old debate has recently flared up regarding the uses of a new enzymatic 
technology. The so-called CRISPR/Cas9 technique can edit the base pairs of the DNA 
molecule with a previously unmatched efficiency and precision, and promises not only a 
more efficient way to study the function of genetic development in model organisms 
such as E. coli, D. melanogaster or C. Elegans, but also a more viable approach to gene 
therapy, which has been on the horizon for decades but with limited success.1  
Gene therapy is the alteration of DNA in somatic cells, particularly for the 
correction of simple genetic disorders, such as phenylketonuria, which typically manifest 
as missing or faulty protein coding sequences in the DNA of somatic cells. While such 
therapy does not necessarily cure genetic disorders, it nevertheless promises relief from 
diseases which can be debilitating if a patient receives regular treatment. 
But CRISPR/Cas9 can also be used to alter germline DNA. In such a case, the 
genetic sequences in spermatocytes or ovae is altered, which means that if these gametes 
are used for reproductive purposes, all of the cells in the body will contain the altered 
DNA sequence. Though the term ‘genetic engineering’ is older, ethical worries over it 
arrived once the first technique for altering DNA arrived in 1972.2 Yet following the 
                                                
1 Prashant Mali, Kevin M. Esvelt and George M. Church, ‘Cas9 as a Versatile Tool for Engineering 
Biology’, Nature Methods, 10 (2013), 957–63. 
2 The warning actually arrived slightly before the technique was published: Theodore Friedmann and 
Richard Roblin, ‘Gene Therapy for Human Genetic Disease?’, Science, New Series, 175 (1972), 949–55, was 
published in March. David A. Jackson, Robert H. Symons and Paul Berg, ‘Biochemical Method for 
Inserting New Genetic Information into DNA of Simian Virus 40: Circular SV40 DNA Molecules 
Containing Lambda Phage Genes and the Galactose Operon of Escherichia Coli’, Proceedings of the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 69 (1972), 2904–9, was published in October. The first 
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early warnings, genetic engineering remained elusive despite repeated assurances that new 
techniques would finally make it possible. In recent years, however, the early promise has 
come to look increasingly viable. Already, gene therapies for a handful of genetic diseases 
have become available. CRISPR/Cas9 appears to be the technique which finally spurs 
the promise into action, and the ethical debate on genetic engineering, which has been 
steadily churning since 1972, has reached new heights of public involvement. 
In April 2015, a group of American scientists wrote an open letter warning that one 
should be careful with how the technique was used, and called for a moratorium on 
experimentation on human germ cells.3 Only three weeks later, however, a group of 
Chinese scientists published a paper which revealed that they had carried out a germline 
experiment on human foetuses which were otherwise not viable.4 Despite their findings 
that the technique itself had too many errors for it to be usable, they received near-
universal condemnation, and a new worry over the prospect of ‘designer babies.’ 
Nevertheless, several laboratories, both British and American, are seeking to do research 
on human foetuses using the Cas9 technology. 
 
Self-constructed cyborgs. In 1998, Kevin Warwick, a professor of cybernetics at 
Reading University prone to bombastic self-publicity stunts, proclaimed himself the 
‘world’s first cyborg’ after he had implanted an RFID chip (short for Radio Frequency 
Identification, pronounced ‘arphid’) in his arm, something which allowed a limited 
interaction with the computer network at his laboratory through his presence alone. In 
his proclamation, Warwick apparently disregarded that a number of already existing 
                                                                                                                                      
mention of ‘genetic engineering,’ referring to eugenic selection and genetic counseling, came before the 
discovery of the structure of DNA, in Curt Stern, ‘Selection and Eugenics’, Science, 110 (1949), 201–8 (p. 
208). 
3 David Baltimore and others, ‘A Prudent Path Forward for Genomic Engineering and Germline Gene 
Modification’, Science, 348 (2015), 36–38. 
4 Puping Liang and others, ‘CRISPR/Cas9-Mediated Gene Editing in Human Tripronuclear Zygotes’, 
Protein & Cell, 6 (2015), 363–72. 
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medical technologies, such as advanced types of pacemakers and Cochlear implants, are 
information-mediating feedback technologies, and had thus already created thousands of 
cyborgs, even if those with such implants did not identify as such. But this was only the 
first step in what he called ‘Project Cyborg.’ His next experiment was to implant an 
electrode array which monitored the action of the median nerve in his arm, the output of 
which was sophisticated enough to control a robotic arm through moving his own. 
There are now numerous prosthetic limbs being developed that are neurally integrated, 
allowing for a much greater degree of freedom in controlling the prosthetic than 
traditionally more inert prosthetics. These, however, are only in the early stages of 
development, yet are perceived as the early stages of cyborg prosthetics that could 
possibly exceed the functionality of existing human limbs.5 
Another self-proclaimed cyborg is the artist Neill Harbisson, who claims to be the 
first to be recognised by a government as such, claiming that he was allowed to wear a 
head-mounted camera and a set of headphones on his passport photo. Harbisson, who 
was born colour-blind, has developed a device suspended above his head that films what 
is in front of him and translates the visual signal’s colours into sound. In the passport 
photo it looks like he is wearing his gear, but he claims that he has now surgically 
attached it to his cranium so the sound is transmitted to him by resonating through the 
bones of his head. However, I am sceptical of Harbisson’s claims. There are no 
photographs of where the device is supposed to attach to the skull, and the passport 
picture is now out of date – in a recent online video where Harbisson talks about 
national identity, he shows viewers a new passport photo but strategically hides the top 
of his head.6 
                                                
5 Kevin Warwick, I, Cyborg (London: Century, 2002). 
6 Neil Harbisson, ‘I’m Catalan (Sóc Català)’, YouTube 
<https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCVQHalfDP9oU8fpB6N-nfWw> [accessed 3 October 2015]. 
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As with Warwick, Harbisson’s story has been widely publicized;7 if his story is true, 
he is an example of a growing, if marginal, community of self-styled ‘bio-hackers’ who 
also call themselves ‘grinders,’ a name taken from the comic book Doktor Sleepless.8 In 
Doktor Sleepless, the grinders augment their bodily senses with a number of fanciful, if 
low-key procedures. Outside of the fictional realm, the self-styled grinders are effectively 
an extension of the body modification community, which practices various aesthetic 
bodily alterations like tattooing, piercing and scarification, but also more radical surgical 
interventions. As of yet the scope of the grinder community is rather limited: the main 
augmentations number only two real operations, the RFID implant and the implantation 
of magnets in the fingertips, something which is supposed to give one the ability to sense 
electromagnetic forces. But the point is not what the grinders can already do, but what 
they wish for. According to a bio-hacking forum, grinders ‘practice functional 
(sometimes extreme) body modification in an effort to improve the human condition. 
We hack ourselves with electronic hardware to extend and improve human capacities.’9  
 
Noo-pharmakon. Since the 1950s, psychopharmacology has grown into a major industry 
that advocates not just the treatment of mental illness or the ‘normalisation’ of 
individuals’ mental states, but also the overall improvement of mental function. Early on, 
the bronchodilator benzedrine (an amphetamine also marketed as an appetite 
suppressant for dieters) was commonly used recreationally, and the perception that it was 
being abused led to it becoming a prescription drug in the late 50s. Another drug, 
iproniazid, was used to treat psychotic patients, but was also hailed as a ‘psychic 
                                                
7 For example, Stuart Jeffries, ‘Neil Harbisson: The World’s First Cyborg Artist’, The Guardian, 6 May 2014, 
section Art and design <http://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2014/may/06/neil-harbisson-
worlds-first-cyborg-artist> [accessed 25 September 2015]. 
8 Warren Ellis and Ivan Rodriguez, Doktor Sleepless (Rantoul: Avatar Press, 2008). 
9 ‘Who We Are’, Biohack.me, 2015 <http://wiki.biohack.me/> [accessed 25 September 2015]. 
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energizer’ before it was taken off the market due to concerns regarding liver toxicity 
(apparently, euphoric patients tended to overdo the dosages).10 
There is a similar trend today. Stimulants, such as methylphenidate and 
amphetamines are routinely prescribed to those diagnosed with ADHD, but there is a 
growing culture, especially among university students, to take these as ‘study drugs’ to 
improve focus and reduce fatigue when studying. The drug modafinil, originally 
prescribed to treat narcolepsy, is used off-script to reduce fatigue from lack of sleep, but 
has also been studied for its effects on increasing focus. In the United States, modafinil 
has been approved for the treatment of ‘shift-work sleep disorder’ which affects those 
who are forced to work and sleep at irregular hours. These drugs, known as 
‘nootropics,’11 are only the best known in a host of drugs and other substances that are 
explored for cognitive enhancement purposes. 
 In the 2011 film Limitless, Eddie Morra, a procrastinating writer incapable of 
finishing his novel takes the compound NZT-48, which vastly increases his intelligence, 
leading him to greatly improve his life, at the cost of addiction.12 The fictional drug has 
proved inspiring to people who want similar effects; modafinil is sometimes touted as the 
real-world counterpart of NZT-48. A plethora of online discussion forums provide 
advice on ‘stacks’ of multiple drugs for improving mental function, and give anecdotal 
reports of what they think has increased their intelligence, all for the purpose of 
improving their minds.13 But where psychedelics were used in the counter-culture of the 
1960s to, in Aldous Huxley’s phrase, open the ‘Doors of Perception’ to spiritual 
                                                
10 Edward Shorter, Before Prozac: The Troubled History of Mood Disorders in Psychiatry (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2009). 
11 The -trope suffix comes from its use in chemistry, hence ‘nootropic’ means a chemical which alters the 
structure of the mind. 
12 Neil Burger, Limitless, 2011. 
13 Among the most popular are the ‘Brain Health’ forum on the longevity discussion forum Longecity, and 
the nootropics ‘subreddit’ on the social link-aggregator Reddit: ‘Brain Health’, Longecity 
<http://www.longecity.org/forum/forum/169-brain-health/>; ‘Reddit: Nootropics’, Reddit 
<https://www.reddit.com/r/nootropics>. 
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experiences, today’s pharmacological psychonauts participate in a broader culture of self-
policing efficiency and productivity. Recently, there has even been an attempt at 
rehabilitating LSD, the poster child for drop-out drugs: ‘micro-dosing’ LSD has been 
touted as a cognitive enhancer that improves mood and focus, without the psychedelic 
effects from more traditional dosages. Tellingly, the first thing Eddie Morra does after 
taking NZT-48 is to clean his messy flat. But in the world outside fiction the effects of 
the cognitive enhancers and nootropics are frequently contested. 
 
This project began with an interest in the intersection between science fiction and 
the discourse on human enhancement technologies, specifically the bioethical debate, 
and these are just three examples of a growing fascination with technological 
enhancements of the human body, where the body is increasingly seen as a plastic entity, 
readily augmented for functional purposes. Genetic engineering has been a central topic 
in the bioethical debate for decades; the moral status of would-be nootropics are avidly 
discussed. But why, I wondered, are human enhancements even being discussed? Of the 
enhancements that bioethicists discuss, none actually exist: of the examples above, 
neither genetically engineering ‘designer babies’ nor pharmacological cognitive 
enhancement are yet possible. The ‘cyborgs,’ with their RFID chips and fingertip 
magnets, can hardly be said to improve anyone’s life. Yet there is an on-going debate 
based on a number of technological promises: genetic engineering, cognitive and moral 
enhancement, neural implants, intellectual augmentation or computer simulations of 
human minds. These are science fictional ideas: even if technologies are thought to be 
possible, they are still speculative. 
As Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr. has argued, the present has become so infused with 
science fictional narratives that ‘science-fictional habits of mind’ have become 
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normalised.14 According to Darko Suvin’s highly influential concept of the ‘novum,’ 
science fiction mediates the future narrative through a technological novelty which has 
deep societal repercussions.15 My novum, or novums, are the technologies that in some 
ways propose to improve the human itself. Human enhancement is the subject matter of 
numerous works of science fiction, and indeed many of the works of science fiction that 
have shaped the wider cultural consciousness of the genre are also concerned with 
central ideas within human enhancement, from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein (1818) to 
Aldous Huxley’s Brave New World (1931) or recent films, such as the Wachowskis’ The 
Matrix (1999). But what I explore in the following pages are not works of science fiction 
in the sense of a narrative artistic genre which concerns itself with speculative 
technologies and scientific discoveries; rather, I look at certain fictions of science and 
technology: new scientific knowledge enables belief in novel technological possibilities, but 
moreover, the belief that it is likely that they will be made. My novums are not proposed 
by writers of fiction, but proposed either by those involved in scientific research or 
technological innovation themselves, or others working within those discourses.  
In this respect, I hold that ideas concerning enhancement technologies arise in the 
context of technological possibility spaces: new scientific findings and technological 
innovations which establish a new perception of what is possible. Proposals for 
enhancement technology arise following innovations in biological theory that at once 
propose morphological plasticity in the human as a species, and that qualitative 
improvement – however defined – can be performed on the basis of this plasticity. But 
crucially, the visions of technological novums are proposed in the spirit of betterment; 
                                                
14 Istvan Csicsery-Ronay, Jr., The Seven Beauties of Science Fiction (Middletown: Wesleyan University Press, 
2008), p. 2. 
15 Darko Suvin, Metamorphoses of Science Fiction: On the Poetics and History of a Literary Genre (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1979), pp. 63–84. 
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not only of the human body, of abilities, but as necessities for the development of better 
societies, evidence of progress. 
As an impulse, technological enhancement clearly carries appeal for some, but to 
others it becomes a fully-fledged ideology: a vision of a necessary future; a political 
programme; a religion. In this thesis I look at three ideas of enhancement technologies: 
eugenics, the cyborg, and transhumanism. While breeding desirable humans had been 
suggested previously, technological enhancement of the body was only fully conceived 
following Charles Darwin’s theory of natural selection in evolution. With it, the human 
species and its capacities were accepted to be the result of a natural process, in which 
species transformed into others according to the needs of their environment. As such, 
eugenics was the first enhancement ideology proper, formulated in terms of both the 
innovations it built on, and the limitation in its lack of knowledge. The appeal to 
evolution is a unifying principle across the enhancement technologies I look at. My 
second topic, the cyborg, was expressed as a possibility of evolving ourselves through 
integration with technology. But as an idea, I show that this could not be expressed 
without two prior technological ideas concerning the body: firstly, that the body is a 
machine; but secondly, that the body is a cybernetic machine. My last topic is 
transhumanism, the banner under which proponents of enhancement ideas have come to 
rally. As a maturing cluster of enhancement ideas, transhumanism has been increasingly 
coherently articulated in terms of ethical arguments and grounding principles, but as a 
movement it is a result of speculations on the possibilities of information technologies: 
computation and information theory create a specific idea of how enhancement can be 
achieved. But the technological context for advocating enhancements only goes so far.  
The other question I ask, then, is why would one want to enhance at all? In the 
topics I look at, both political and spiritual reasons are given. As a whole, these three 
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approaches all express the possibility for improving the human body, that evolution can 
be directed, and that enhancement is necessary for progress. 
 
Progress ,  t e chnology and enhancement 
Closely aligned with the idea of civilisation, the Idea of Progress signifies the belief in a 
trajectory from barbarism and superstition towards reason and understanding; as J. B. 
Bury aptly described it,  
The idea of human Progress then is a theory which involves a synthesis of the past 
and a prophecy of the future. It is based on an interpretation of history which 
regards men as slowly advancing – pedetemtim progredientes – in a definite and 
desirable direction, and infers that this process will continue indefinitely.16  
As Robert Nisbet notes, Progress ‘is inseparable from a sense of time flowing in unilinear 
fashion.’17 This sense of history as the trajectory of time is necessary because Progress is 
a qualitative evaluation of the present relative to a perception of the past; and if we 
believe that the present is better than the past, it is natural to believe that the future will 
be even better. 
While some, like Nisbet, have argued that a concept of Progress has been a constant 
and intrinsic aspect of Western culture since antiquity, we find a modern understanding 
of universal Progress articulated by the philosophers of the French Enlightenment. 
Progress was central to the thinking of Turgot and Voltaire, but the most explicit 
formulation of a universal progressivism which includes all of human activity is found 
with Marie Jean Antoine-Nicolas de Caritat, the marquis of Condorcet’s Sketch for a 
Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, written when Condorcet (as he is usually 
referred to) was in hiding from the Jacobin terror, just before his death in prison, in 
1794. The Sketch is famous for its attempt at writing a universal history that paints 
humankind as advancing from a state of barbarism as superstition towards rationality and 
                                                
16 J. B. Bury, The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry into Its Origin and Growth (London: Macmillan, 1920), p. 5. 
17 Robert Nisbet, History of the Idea of Progress (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 5. 
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enlightenment – a march of progress. Central to this forward march is science; but as 
Condorcet was writing in a time of great political upheaval, attempts at implementing 
new ideas of liberty and universal equality were taking place, and he saw these as equally 
applicable to universal progress. In other words, progress was not only the steady 
accumulation of knowledge, but also that the ways in which society was being organised 
was, in some objective way, appreciably better. There was a historical process, or law, 
that tended towards ever improving conditions. Thus, in Condorcet’s view the historical 
past showed that the human condition had objectively improved in what he saw as the 
civilised states of the West, and that the liberal ideas that were being expressed at the 
time were not only future possibilities, but constituted an inevitable future for all of 
mankind. 
Condorcet’s hopes for the future of mankind was not limited to political ideals, 
however, and he also speculated on the future possibilities to be achieved for the physical 
constitution of mankind; as he writes in the tenth section of the Sketch: 
The improvement of medical practice, which will become more efficacious with 
the progress of reason and the social order, will mean the end of infectious and 
hereditary diseases and illnesses brought on by climate, food, or working 
conditions. It is reasonable to hope that all other diseases may likewise disappear 
as their distant causes are discovered. Would it be absurd then to suppose that this 
perfection of the human species might be capable of indefinite progress; that the 
day will come when death will be due only to extraordinary accidents or to the 
decay of the vital forces, and that ultimately the average span between birth and 
decay will have no assignable value?18 
We may well regard Condorcet’s views on progress as prophetic. While medical 
knowledge was expanding, the practical reality of eradicating disease was nowhere in 
sight. The nature and causes of the spread of disease was unknown and surgery was 
unanaesthesised, making it both painful and deadly. By comparison, the triumphs of 
medicine in the nineteenth and twentieth century has ensured that several diseases have 
been eradicated completely or nearly so, while others that would formerly have killed you 
                                                
18 Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Caritat, Sketch for a Historical Picture of the Progress of the Human Mind, trans. 
by June Barraclough, Library of ideas (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1955), pp. 199–200. 
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are now easily treatable. Surgery is regularly performed, painlessly and successfully, 
cancers can be cured and child mortality has dropped precipitously. In comparison with 
his own day, Condorcet’s hopes for the progress of medicine seem ever more achievable. 
But ever since Progress was formulated as central to Enlightenment ideals, it has been 
criticised: can we speak of social progress after the holocaust? Bury’s history of the idea 
was also a rejection of it, having seen the death toll incurred by the trench warfare in the 
Great War. Nevertheless, the appeal of Progress makes it resurface again and again. 
Things will be better; we are heading towards and ideal state. It is a utopian idea, 
however firmly rejected, that will not die, and as such the progress of science, as an 
accumulation of knowledge and an increased capacity for technological novelty, is a 
central factor in making a utopian state coming about. 
Human enhancement as a progressive idea, then, is also utopian. In Utopia (1516), 
Thomas More described a fictional society by that name in a critique of the social order 
of his day; but while utopia literally means ‘no place,’ it is conflated or combined with its 
homonym eutopia – ‘good place.’ As Lyman Tower Sargent writes, utopia ‘has come to 
refer to a non-existent good place.’19 It is, then, both a political and a moral appeal: a 
utopia describes a social organisation in which it is possible to lead a good life, and has a 
rich history both in political and literary writing. But as Michael Hauskeller has argued, 
while the utopian impulse was traditionally concerned with social organisation, Francis 
Bacon’s New Atlantis (1627) ‘marked the transition from the traditional social and 
political utopias to the modern technoutopia.’20 The utopias of human enhancement 
which I explore are leavened with the promise that the good life can be achieved through 
technologies that affect the human body itself. And by the progressivist narrative, the 
                                                
19 Lyman Tower Sargent, Utopianism: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 
2. 
20 Michael Hauskeller, ‘Reinventing Cockaigne: Utopian Themes in Transhumanist Thought’, Hastings 
Center Report, 42 (2012), 39–47 (p. 42). 
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enhancement utopians claim that interventions in the human body will come, and not 
only are they possible, they are inevitable and necessary. In this respect, Bert Gordijn has 
expressed the utopian perception of the possibilities of medical advances: if only ‘the 
human genome [were] completely decoded, the most elusive physiological processes 
understood, then medicine would be in a position to liberate us from all the ills of our 
bodily existence, if not immediately then certainly eventually.’21 Certain knowledge leads 
to technological capacity, and freedom. 
In Gordijn’s analysis the utopian hope for the future of medicine rests upon a break 
with its classical understanding, which was concerned with restitutio ad integrum, or the 
restoration to the whole, to bring the sick body back to health. In his words, the classical 
ideal today is increasingly having to share attention with a new ideal of transformatio ad 
optimum, or ‘reshaping man to attain the optimum result or even perfection’ (p. 250). 
While self-transformation is an ancient ideal, achieved through regimented behaviour, 
training and practice, the distinguishing factor is that there is an increasing belief that it 
can be achieved through interventions on the body. The achievement of the perfect or 
the ideal is believed to be done through technologies, existing and imagined. 
But what constitutes a technological enhancement? Is it constrained to physical 
augmentation alone, or can we take a broader, technical view which includes technical 
behaviour, whether self-directed or imposed through scientific models? Monastic 
practices, for example, were intended to regulate a monk’s daily activities, the 
community’s activity towards productive behaviour, but was also a vehicle for achieving 
transcendence. The regimented monastic life is secularised in self-help literature: 
regulating one’s behaviour carefully will lead to a transformational outcome for the 
                                                
21 Bert Gordijn, Medical Utopias: Ethical Reflections about Emerging Medical Technologies (Leuven; Dudley, MA: 
Peeters, 2006), p. 3. Subsequent references are given after quotations in the text. 
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better, whether in business or relationships. These practices, then, are technical, intended 
to enhance oneself, what Michel Foucault called the ‘technologies of the self.’22 
 We can also take this view to the many modes of organisation and practice in 
societies. Schooling is intended to improve reasoning and knowledge to prepare the 
students for independence in adult life. Musical training entails a rigorous system of 
guided practice to master highly specific techniques on the intended instrument. An 
example frequently cited in contemporary enhancement debates is its role in sports. The 
most obvious example, taking performance enhancing drugs, whether for muscular 
strength or endurance, is subjected to moralistic claims of cheating and sanctions to limit 
their use, and so on. The use of drugs is enhancing, as they convey clear effects that 
would not otherwise come about without their use. But athletes also regiment their 
training and diet in order to achieve their athletic goals, and practicing of sport-specific 
techniques is intrinsic to achieving success. There are , in other words, technical elements 
across the spectrum of enhancing sports performance, but some are more accepted than 
others.  
 As such, regimentation and technique takes part in a more foundational approach 
of control – not in the sense of a governing body controlling an individual, a community, 
or a society, but the implementation of practices intended to control one’s behaviour 
towards the optimal praxis for a discipline or discourse. We therefore get a reciprocal 
relationship between control and technique: deliberate control is an intrinsic aspect of 
technical practice, while technique is inherently foundational for control purposes. Thus, 
it is arguably true that technical behaviour is prevalent across all levels of societal and 
individual behaviour, indeed, that control and the elaboration of control techniques in 
order to regiment both the individual and the community is a necessary component for 
                                                
22 Michel Foucault, Technologies of the Self: A Seminar with Michel Foucault, ed. by Luther H. Martin, Huck 
Gutman, and Patrick H. Hutton (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1988). 
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the development of any form of culture. But furthermore, any technology, as far as it is 
used to extend our native capacities, can be said to be enhancing. This is a much too 
broad view of what constitutes the technical praxis of human enhancement, as it would 
make the history of technical human enhancement equal to the history of human 
cultures. 
 It is difficult to define what is meant by technological enhancement. As the 
editors of a collection on the ethics of human enhancement ethics point out, ‘In one 
sense, all technology can be viewed as an enhancement of our native human capacities, 
enabling us to achieve certain effects that would otherwise require more effort or be 
altogether beyond our power.’23 Even more radically, along the lines I expressed above, 
‘At the limit of this line of reasoning, all learning could be viewed as physiological 
enhancement, and all physical and organizational capital could be viewed as external 
enhancements.’24 But even though such a broad technical view is too universal to be 
useful, they decline to make any further definitions: the enhancement debate constitutes 
itself by the issues that are raised as problematic. Similar problems arise when 
enhancement technologies are approached from the enhancement end. 
In the introduction to another, similar collection, the authors outline four definitions 
of enhancement, where Gordijn’s argument is typical for an approach that distinguishes 
between treatment and enhancement. In this account, enhancement is couched in terms 
of medical interventions, and as such that enhancement goes beyond the remit of 
medicine, which serves to heal, not improve. Other definitions are the ‘sociological 
pragmatic approach,’ which describes enhancement as a culturally situated idea of what 
constitutes enhancement, and as such, that the goal to improve is a relative category; the 
                                                
23 Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu, ‘Human Enhancement Ethics: The State of the Debate’, in Human 
Enhancement, ed. by Nick Bostrom and Julian Savulescu (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 1–23 
(p. 2). 
24 Bostrom and Savulescu, p. 3. 
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‘ideological approach,’ in which possible technological outcomes are assigned moral 
status according to an arbitrarily defined value-framework; and the ‘functional approach,’ 
in which enhancements are defined in terms of how they directly augment function or 
capabilities, but also in terms of what are the normal capacities of the human species, or 
the ‘species-specific function.’25 
The authors promote a fifth approach, what they call the ‘welfarist account of 
human enhancement.’ In this, they avoid an appeal to species-specific and functional 
approaches, and do not make a distinction between therapy and enhancement. They 
define enhancement as ‘Any change in the biology or psychology of a person which 
increases the chances of leading a good life in the relevant set of circumstances’ (p. 7). 
Their claim is that their account is inherently normative in that they appeal to general 
wellbeing, and that they therefore avoid criticisms which have been made against other 
definitions. In this approach, they determine (based on the dictionary definition) that 
enhancement means an increase in value, and therefore propose that enhancements 
should be judged according to the probability that it would lead to an increase in 
expected value, a decision theory concept for calculating the best choice according to its 
expected worth. 
Ultimately, however, I cannot see how they avoid the objection raised from the 
sociological approach. Value is not an ontological category; it does not avoid relative 
definition. In the welfarist approach, they assign value to ‘all-purpose goods,’ defined as 
‘traits that are valuable regardless of which kind of life a person chooses to live – 
valuable on all plausible conceptions of well-being’ (p. 11). One such is intelligence, 
which they use to launch a surprising claim, that disability is ubiquitous. The basis for 
this is that they say modern society requires an IQ over 120 for full participation, but, as 
                                                
25 Julian Savulescu, Anders Sandberg and Guy Kahane, ‘Well‐Being and Enhancement’, in Enhancing 
Human Capacities, ed. by Julian Savulescu, Ruud ter Meulen, and Guy Kahane (Chichester; Malden: Wiley-
Blackwell, 2011), pp. 1–18 (pp. 3–6). Subsequent references are given after quotations in the text. 
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most people have an IQ below that by definition, they are therefore in practice disabled. 
An IQ of that level is required, for example, to go to university and be able to have a 
pick of careers, which is a life denied most people. 
In my view, however, such an argument is disingenuous: they first claim that a 
measure of intelligence is an objective good, but then make an argument in terms of 
relative entities, i.e., the organisation of society and the values that are applied to people 
by institutions. In their claim that there are objective, inherently good traits, they are 
treating the good as an objective entity, yet define it by its relationship to other entities, 
the validity of which they accept. In the lack of interrogating the structure they place 
their good within, they make an argument based on an acceptance of the status quo; one 
might say that in proposing to improve that which is constructed as good relative to the 
institutions that benefit from them, one is acting on the behalf of the institutions – the 
organization of society – rather than the individuals they say should be enhanced. 
Additionally, if it is a diagnosis of a societal ill, the solution is odd, as it proposes to do 
something which is not currently possible, whereas reforming institutions is. I will not 
dwell further on the bioethical debate on enhancement, but I will make an additional 
point about enhancement.26 
To propose the enhancement of something is to conceive its present quality as 
somehow insufficient relative to a higher standard, and to bring it towards that standard. 
There are two ways of deciding such a standard, empirically or by an ideal, a perfection. 
An empirical standard for a quality can be to assign it a value at a level which is judged to 
be representative for its kind, e.g., by an average. Or, the standard can be set to what is 
                                                
26 The ethical literature on enhancement is crowded; two classic works are Erik Parens, Enhancing Human 
Traits: Ethical and Social Implications (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1998); and Allen E 
Buchanan and others, From Chance to Choice: Genetics and Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2000). The texts already mentioned are in recent collections which include different positions: Julian 
Savulescu and Nick Bostrom, Human Enhancement (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and 
Julian Savulescu, Ruud ter Meulen and Guy Kahane, Enhancing Human Capacities (Chichester; Malden: 
Wiley-Blackwell, 2011). 
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the quality’s highest observed value. Thus, by the empirical standard, the enhancement of 
intelligence could be to raise someone’s intelligence to the average, defined as 100 IQ 
points, or to raise their intelligence to the highest level ever measured. By comparison, 
the ideal is a fiction, an imagined possible.  
Martin Foss contends that the idea of Perfection found in Western philosophy and 
religion is the ‘conformity of a reality to its concept’, that is, that any form of perfection 
can only obtain if there is a prior idea or conception of what perfection is.27 Thus the 
enhancement towards an ideal is to bring something towards a state which has never 
been observed, only imagined. It is the aspiration to an ideal, arbitrarily defined; to raise 
someone’s intelligence quotient to, say, 5000 points. As Foss further observes, the 
‘conformity of a thing to its concept will be most exact whenever the thing has been 
constructed after the model of the concept. Perfection, therefore, will occur most 
generally as the conformity of execution to purpose. Purpose, end is the essence of 
perfection.’28 
Enhancement is a difficult category to define and creates trouble for those that try 
to build their foundations on solid ground. Thus the appeal to an ideal opens for another 
approach for why it should be done: the freedom of the individual to act as they choose; 
but also the freedom to become what they wish. 
 
The shackles  o f  ephemeral  l i f e  
The transhumanist philosopher Nick Bostrom, who I will revisit multiple times in later 
chapters, has written an allegory, a kind of just-so story, to illustrate the relationship 
between ethics, common sense, and radical medical interventions to extend healthy lives. 
In the allegory, Bostrom tells of a nation under the spell of a tyrannical dragon which 
                                                
27 Martin Foss, The Idea of Perfection in the Western World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946), p. 8. 
28 Foss, p. 8. 
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every night demands a tribute of 20,000 people to feed it. As time passes, the population 
adopts coping strategies: inventing stories of a life after death, having more children to 
ensure a steady and growing population; all the while building a logistical infrastructure 
which ensures the steady supply of people for the dragon’s unceasing appetite. But the 
dragon grows fatter and fatter, and its demands increase with the rise in population. 
Soon, it demands 80,000 tributes every night. Dragonologists study means for making 
the process of sacrifices to the dragon more efficient, yet its demands instils a permanent 
fear in the population, as everybody knows that one day it will be their turn. Ultimately, a 
group of anti-dragonists rise and propose to kill the dragon; after meeting with some 
initial resistance, they ultimately succeed, and in the end a projectile is constructed which 
takes the dragon’s life. As the people celebrate the demise of the dragon, they also lament 
that they did not take action earlier.29 
The dragon, of course, is death itself, and the nation’s reaction to it is the 
complacent relationship we have to death; if only we could muster our forces and rise up 
against death, we might one day defeat it. In the second half of the article, Bostrom spells 
out his reasons for telling the story, based on what he sees as the deficiencies of the 
ethical opposition to life extension: for him, bioethical reasoning is essentially self-
serving, and creates an endless list of justifications for maintaining the status quo, never 
challenging it. Death is bad, and we should fight it, aspire to abolish it altogether – or at 
the very least, to postpone it so that we have the ability to live our lives to a much fuller 
degree. 
Bostrom’s tale is an illustrative example of the general attitude among proponents 
for human enhancement. In casting death as a real entity, it becomes something tangible 
which can be fought, but obscures the reality that death is not an entity in itself, but a 
state of not being alive. As such, death is the name we give to a transition between two 
                                                
29 Nick Bostrom, ‘The Fable of the Dragon Tyrant’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 31 (2005), 273–77. 
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states some entities can pass between, from being alive to being dead. But while 
Bostrom’s dragon, just like everyday language, conflates death with its myriad possible 
causes (a thing can ‘be the death’ of someone), it is not clear whether he is rallying 
against the many possible causes of death or the elimination of death as the state beyond 
life. Not that Bostrom does not understand this distinction, of course – his allegory is 
meant to illustrate his own stance in a debate. But even if Bostrom means to defeat 
death, whether construed as its cause (whether from serious trauma, disease, or the 
shortening of telomeres hindering the continued replication of DNA), or as a transition 
towards non-life, he frames it as something oppressive that we can – and should – be 
liberated from. 
This attitude towards liberty is evident in the many hopes of transhumanists, the 
banner many proponents of enhancement gather under. It includes not only their wish 
for longevity as the freedom from death, but more generally the freedom from the 
shackles of our material reality, whether this is expressed in terms of our need to get 
sustenance from our environment, to the limitations placed upon our bodies’ capacities, 
that we are placed on a single planet without the ability to live (or go) anywhere else in 
the universe, up to the perceived shackles placed on our minds by our physical 
embodiment. Unsurprisingly, then, transhumanists are often politically aligned with right-
libertarianism, and perceive any national level of organisation as the curtailing of 
freedom. And the liberation from such perceived limitations, whether they are political 
or corporeal, these freedoms from, will lead to the freedom to live in a way that maximises 
our potential; not only the potential we are born with, but the potential we can be 
endowed with through new and future technologies. To the transhumanists, technology 
is not viewed as something potentially dangerous which enframes us, instrumentalising 
us according to its own intrinsic purposes, but a means towards ultimate liberation, both 
spiritual and corporeal. 
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The question of liberty is central to the debate on human enhancement, but we 
could say that the focus tends to slip between negative and positive liberties, as Isaiah 
Berlin describes in his celebrated essay. ‘Positive liberty,’ Berlin writes, ‘is simply the area 
within which a man can act unobstructed by others. If I am prevented by others from 
doing what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree; and if this area is contracted 
by other men beyond a certain minimum, I can be described as being coerced, or, it may 
be, enslaved.’30 The negative conception of liberty is a freedom from coercion, usually 
articulated in terms of the authority the state has over the individual, and that individuals 
should be free to engage in any activity they wish, so long as they do not themselves 
curtail the liberty of others. 
In the bioethical debate on enhancement, proponents will argue on the basis of 
negative liberties: enhancement technologies, as a matter of personal choice, should be 
allowed on the principle of freedom from coercion. But, I argue, transhumanists wish for 
enhancement technologies on the grounds of Berlin’s positive liberty. This concept is 
less clear, harder to grasp; Berlin says it ‘derives from the wish on the part of the 
individual to be his own master’ (p. 43). As such, it is defined not by the external forces 
that put limitations on you, but by the individual’s experience of agency and self-mastery: 
‘I wish, above all, to be conscious of myself as a thinking, willing, active being, bearing 
responsibility for my choices and able to explain them by reference to my own ideas and 
purposes’ (p. 44). This is not to be confused as a reformulation of negative liberty, but 
that it is a drive of the will towards one’s ‘true’ purposes. When such true purposes are 
conceived of as universal, they become more important than negative liberties, because 
resistance to them can thus be construed as irrational. The danger, thus, becomes 
tyranny, as negative liberties become irrelevant in the face of destiny and coercion is 
                                                
30 Isaiah Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, in The Liberty Reader, ed. by David Miller (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2006), pp. 33–57 (p. 34). Subsequent references are given after quotations in 
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redefined as acting in people’s own best interests. Bostrom’s accusation is that, in the 
attempt to foster an acceptance of death, bioethicists enforce a tyranny of complacency. 
The irony is that he believes himself to know the actual truth. 
Berlin dismisses constraints on inherent capacity, and the inability to ‘jump more 
than ten feet in the air, or cannot read because I am blind, or cannot understand the 
darker pages of Hegel, it would be eccentric to say that I am to that degree enslaved or 
coerced’ (p. 34). But the proponents of enhancement hold otherwise, since modern 
technology gives us the capacity to change our capacities. They thus expand coercion to 
be something done not only by the state or other people, but also by nature and biology. 
In its ultimate expression, one which rarely enters the enhancement debate (possibly for 
strategic reasons), enhancement technologies are expressed as instruments for a spiritual 
liberation, where the individual is free to express their true purposes without the shackles 
that nature has imposed on them. 
The permutations of progress and liberty run alongside my investigation throughout 
the following chapters. As such, my guiding questions are: Firstly, what are the 
conditions in which different types of technological enhancement are seen as viable? And 
secondly, in what ways have the proposals been legitimated? Are the answers to the 
second questions dependent on the situations of the first? My approach to answer these 
questions is multifaceted: I look at scientific innovations, philosophical backgrounds and 
fictional appeals. As a history of (speculative) science and technology, I look at the 
conditions that allow for them to be imagined. As a cultural history, it looks at the 
development of a cultural idea which has lingered at the fringes of mainstream scientific 
discourse, and whose appeal, especially in the past fifty years, to a large degree overlaps 
with the appeal of science fiction, a genre which enhancement narratives both inspire 
and are inspired by. 
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Three ages  o f  enhancement te chnology :  Eugenics ,  cyborgs ,  transhumanism 
The following five chapters follow a roughly chronological logic. In my first chapter, I 
examine the early formulation of eugenics, from 1865 to 1911. I argue that eugenics was 
possible due to new forms of knowledge: a combination of evolution and population 
statistics. But it was also formulated due to a lack of knowledge of the mechanisms of 
inheritance, Mendelian genetics and the structure of DNA. I argue that statistical 
modelling, thinking of people in terms of entire populations and especially the discovery 
of the regression to the mean, are the necessary components for eugenics. Regression 
analysis allowed for a way to conceive how to alter the composition of populations; 
however, it entailed the control of reproduction, a problem the early eugenicists saw as a 
limitation. Their idea was twofold: firstly, educate people on the necessity of eugenic 
reproduction; but secondly, in an echo of Comtean positivism, it was suggested that 
eugenics should form the basis of a new religion. 
My second and third chapters are concerned with the cyborg, or the direct 
technological augmentation of the body itself. As technological enhancement requires 
the alteration of bodily function, the cyborg is the first thorough proposal for how it 
would be done. In the second chapter I therefore look at the foundational metaphor that 
makes this possible, that the body is a machine. I compare the difference between the 
machine bodies of the 1920s and the cyborg of 1960, and subsequently turn to 
Descartes’s philosophy of the animal machine and the automaton to establish that the 
idea of the machine itself is historically contingent. Having established that the cyborg, 
notwithstanding its name, is necessarily contingent on cybernetics, in the third chapter I 
look at cybernetics and its critical history, where I attempt a corrective to the prevalent 
view of the cyborg as a military entity. As the cyborg was claimed to be both a cybernetic 
organism and an avenue for ‘participant’ evolution, I look at how cybernetics influenced 
evolutionary theory, particularly through its reintroduction of teleology into scientific 
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explanation. I finish the chapter with a reading of the paper where the cyborg was first 
proposed to establish a discrepancy between the stated spiritual liberation its authors 
claimed for space travel and the bleak scenario they actually paint. 
In the fourth and fifth chapters, I turn to transhumanism. First, I establish the 
history of the word’s usage, first articulated as religious transcendence, then as a eugenic 
evolutionary humanism, and see how both conceptions plausibly feed into contemporary 
definitions. I then look at two technological proposals that preceded the transhumanist 
movement, but which are central to its current constitution: cryonics and mind 
uploading. In the fifth chapter, I use the transhumanist author Ray Kurzweil as a 
springboard to discuss numerous speculative enhancement technologies, all grounded in 
a computational ontology. As Kurzweil’s cosmology is informational to the core, the 
apparent capacity of information to dissolve and reconfigure matter towards increased 
complexity and order leads Kurzweil to develop a theory of material transcendence. 
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CHAPTER ONE: Eugenics 
The Statistical improvement of the human species  
 
 
 
Introduct ion 
This chapter investigates eugenics and how Francis Galton conceived it in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries as both a theory and practice of the improvement of 
populations. Galton, inspired by his half-cousin Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution by 
natural selection, was the first to undertake a scientific study of the heredity of ability and 
genius. Through that pursuit, he was instrumental in establishing population statistics as 
a mature science, and also developed the understanding of the distribution of hereditary 
traits in populations. The cross-fertilisation between these pursuits eventually came to be 
known as eugenics, or the pursuit of improving or developing the potential of entire 
populations.  
In the examination of eugenics this chapter approaches the concept in two broad 
ways in order to articulate it as a technology of human enhancement. In this regard, my 
focus is by necessity Francis Galton, since the term was coined by him, but also because 
the scientific disciplines adjunct to eugenics were both studied, developed and even 
pioneered by him. I first outline the problems of the term ‘eugenics’ in itself; as will 
become clear, it is a nebulous term, and its historical usage has varied greatly. I then look 
at the history of evolutionary biology in close relation to Galton’s own writing about it 
and the prospect of hereditary improvement. I go on to outline Galton’s development of 
the statistical concept of the regression to the mean, and how this profoundly shaped his 
thinking both on populations as distinct units and the ‘agencies under social control’ that 
were central to eugenics as a biopolitical creed. Finally, I examine the concepts ‘negative 
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eugenics’ and ‘positive eugenics’ as the technological aims of eugenics in order to 
contextualise it in terms of the overarching theme of this project, where I consider it to 
be the first historical expression and development of a technology of human 
enhancement.  
The phrase ‘technology of human enhancement’ raises many questions, and they 
are also pertinent here. What do these words, ‘human,’ ‘enhancement’ and ‘technology’ 
mean, particularly in relation to eugenics? Can eugenics truly be considered an 
enhancement technology? If so, how and what did it aim to enhance, how was it a 
technology? In answering these questions I hope to develop a perspective on both what 
it means to consider the human and humanity, technology, and enhancement, in order to 
provide perspective to the conditions of enhancement that have arisen since the eugenics 
project was abandoned, both in contrasts and similarities.  
To begin answering these questions, I investigate a number of things related to the 
early days of eugenics. I pay particular attention to Darwinian evolution and population 
statistics, both the advances, but also some of the theories that were later found to be 
false; I look at the social contexts that gave rise to the formulation of both scientific and 
political proposals, and the corresponding movements and individuals that were central 
to early eugenic thought, along with the ideas that shaped the ways in which one thought 
of heredity. While eugenics promoted itself as a science of heredity – and genetics has a 
great debt to the early pioneering work of eugenicists, in particular the work carried out 
at the Eugenics Laboratory at UCL – my focus is not the minutiae of those statistical 
investigations. The eugenic practices throughout the twentieth century, from forced 
sterilisations to arranged marriages and outright breeding programmes, also fall outside 
of the scope of my project.  
As my position here is articulated as part of my larger project, the technologies of 
human enhancement, my conclusions about eugenics, as a project that intersects the 
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evolutionary insight that species are plastic and the statistical analysis of populations, are 
necessarily situated in this context. The proliferation of perspectives in the interpretation 
of what is meant by eugenics, whether they refer to its causes, effects or supporting 
ideologies, should therefore not be considered to be overshadowed by my own 
interpretation, but to be complimentary to it; any interpretation will subordinate its 
subject to a governing principle which disregards some aspects of a more complex 
whole. As such, one of my main conclusions about eugenics reflects this. Through its 
aim to quantify and improve upon populations in order to understand them, eugenics 
also limited that understanding through its method, entailed an epistemological 
reduction: the subordination of a complex whole to its quantifiable aspects and their role 
in relation to a group.  
The outline of early, or Galtonian, eugenics should therefore be considered not 
only as a natural development resulting from the establishment of evolutionary biology 
crossed with certain socio-cultural determinants and biases, such as concerns about class, 
race, degeneracy and national efficiency – the context which eugenics is now commonly, 
and rightly so, understood as arising within – but also as a technological expression of 
the maturation of statistics into a scientific mathematical discipline. While this study is 
about human enhancement technologies, it is also about the imagined technologies of 
evolution itself, and as such it provides a conceptual link with transhumanism, which I 
develop further in chapter four.  
 
Well-born sc i ence or i l l - formed idea? 
Diane B. Paul notes that while there is a general consensus that eugenics has been 
discredited, ‘there is no consensus on what eugenics is.’1 This is reflected in the manner 
                                                
1 Diane B. Paul, Controlling Human Heredity, 1865 to the Present, The Control of Nature (Atlantic Highlands: 
Humanities Press, 1995), p. 4. 
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by which it came to be employed, for while Francis Galton was something of a social 
conservative, both Conservatives and Fabian socialists in Edwardian Britain supported 
eugenics. 2  Eugenic social policies would later be implemented in diverse political 
climates, such as the United States, the Scandinavian countries, Brazil, Canada, Japan 
and, most famously, in Germany, as well as many others. The history of eugenics today 
has become a history that details not only how it was used to oppress minorities, but also 
of the often regional practices which were less focused on the extermination of 
undesirable characteristics and minorities, and more on the well-being of a population in 
terms of its overall improvement. How can such varied and seemingly contradictory 
approaches to the regulations of reproductive technology be in agreement with a single 
concept? The answer is hinted at when one considers the contraction of meaning the 
contemporary understanding of the word has acquired since it was first popularised, in 
both colloquial and academic contexts. By necessity, the spectre of Nazi eugenics haunts 
any understanding of the word. One consequence is a confusion in how the term has 
been applied in recent discussions, creating a variety of meanings at odds with each 
other, and sometimes even with themselves. Paul explains that  
The eugenic label is often restricted to policies that are coercive. These definitions 
create a sharp distinction between eugenics and medical genetics. Other definitions 
erase this distinction. A spate of recent books and articles has warned of eugenics 
as the unintended result of individual choices.3 
In the early twentieth century, as eugenics gained a public audience, a crucial distinction 
which separated it from genetics was the difference in the focuses of the two. In its early 
days, genetics was associated with the approach taken to heredity by William Bateson, 
who originally coined the word in 1905. Bateson studied individual heredity and was 
strongly influenced by Gregor Mendel which he helped popularise in the Anglophone 
                                                
2 Though some accounts claim the Fabians acted in class self-interest in their opposition to laissez-faire 
economics, rather than representing a true belief in social equality; see Donald A. MacKenzie, Statistics in 
Britain, 1865-1930: The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
1981), p. 35. 
3 Paul, pp. 3–4. 
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world. Due to his interest in statistics and biometrics, Galton was interested in 
understanding heredity in populations, and was therefore concerned with the distribution 
of traits across populations. This difference in approach was not limited to a disparity of 
interest, however, as each side believed the others’ to be erroneous, and Karl Pearson, 
Galton’s protégé, carried out a vicious debate with Bateson over who was in the right. To 
some degree, of course, they both were, but it was only once R. A. Fisher synthesised 
Mendelian genetics with biometrics, in a series of papers published from 1918 onwards, 
that the antagonism of the two schools abated.4 
According to Marius Turda, while the early scholarship on eugenics had a 
somewhat narrow focus on the so-called ‘racial hygiene’ of the Nazi regime, it has 
developed into a more nuanced area of study that examines eugenics in more complex 
terms. Where in the beginning eugenics was mainly associated with ideas of human 
perfectibility in class and racial struggles, but also as a product of these, it has come to be 
understood as a cluster of ideas representative for its age: 
But eugenics was equally a social and cultural philosophy of identity predicated 
upon modern concepts of purification and rejuvenation of both the human body 
and the larger national community. It is only recently that scholars have begun to 
approach eugenics as a cluster of diverse biological, cultural and religious ideas and 
practices that interacted with a variety of social, cultural, political and national 
contexts.5 
Thus the historical understanding of eugenics has developed from being seen as the 
isolated practice of an extremist fascism, to showing that it was an amalgamation of a set 
of ideas that, while being inherently tied to ideas of biological heredity and human 
perfectibility, were vague enough to garner support across political affiliations, and that 
at times it held support from a surprising variety of political orientations.  
                                                
4 Fisher’s synthesis culminated with The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 
1930), also one of the central documents in establishing the Modern Synthesis of evolution. 
5 Marius Turda, Modernism and Eugenics (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 1. 
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The development of the theory of eugenics is also necessarily associated with the 
development of biological theories of inheritance. Galton was an early supporter of his 
cousin’s theory of natural selection in evolution and also investigated Darwin’s proposed 
mechanism of hereditary transfer. However, the development of eugenics is equally 
associated with Galton’s interest and research into statistics. In the United Kingdom, 
some of the best-known theorists and promoters of eugenics were the same that 
developed statistics into a mature science. Galton was a pioneer statistician, especially 
celebreated for the discovery of the regression to the mean in the late 1870s, and he 
established the field of anthropometry, which came to be known as biometrics. In the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, Karl Pearson developed both Galton’s ideas 
on statistics and biometrics further, and was one of the principal agents in establishing 
statistics as a mathematical discipline. At his death in 1911, Galton had attested a grant to 
UCL to establish the first university department of statistics and biometrics, requesting 
that Pearson be its director and the first Galton Professor of Eugenics.6 From there, 
Pearson actively promoted eugenics as a project of enhancing national efficiency through 
the quantification of ability in the population. Finally, in the 1920s R. A. Fisher, arguably 
one of the foremost statisticians of the twentieth century, established population genetics 
by the synthesis of Mendelian genetics with biometry, and together with J. B. S. Haldane, 
as well as others, helped to develop the Modern Synthesis of evolution – and between 
the World Wars the two of them were both prominent and vocal eugenicists. 
As such, the waxing and waning of eugenics in Britain also charts the maturation 
of two sciences through three generations, from the late nineteenth to the mid-twentieth 
century. Though there were, and still are, proponents of eugenics after World War II, its 
prominence and popularity in the early twentieth century had collapsed by the late 1950s. 
                                                
6 Despite Galton’s opposition to Bateson’s Mendelist genetics, the chair has since been renamed as the 
Galton Professor of Genetics. 
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At the height of its public popularity it was supported by scientists and statesmen alike, 
including Bertrand Russell, Winston Churchill and Theodore Roosevelt. With the 
revelations of the Nuremberg Doctor’s Trial in 1947, eugenics became associated with 
the many atrocities carried out by the Nazi regime, and the public view of eugenics 
irrevocably deteriorated. There remained only a small core of supporters. 
In 1957, C. P. Blacker, a former General Secretary of the Eugenics Society, 
advocated that the society ‘should pursue eugenics through less obvious means, that is by 
a policy of crypto-eugenics’, rather than to advocate outright public support for it.7 A few 
years later, it was decided to rename the society to the Galton society, still its current 
name. Blacker’s position is somewhat emblematic of the eugenics movement from the 
moment it started gaining popular momentum in Britain following the Second Boer War 
and the subsequent craze for national efficiency. While one of the primary tenets of 
eugenics emphasised education on heredity so that people could make informed 
decisions about their own reproductive choices, Galton also placed an outright focus on 
how marriage as a social institution acted as an unconscious control on people’s 
preferences in procreation. Recognising the role of religion and morality in dictating 
marriage customs, Galton suggested that eugenics could ‘find a welcome home in every 
tolerant religion.’8 In this respect, while Galton emphasised the importance of educating 
the population in genetics for their own good, he also believed that religion was a largely 
unconscious social framework in which people made their decisions concerning marriage 
and having children. By establishing eugenics as a part of common religious mores, 
eugenic attitudes would be adhered to unconsciously. 
                                                
7 F. Schenk and A. S. Parkes, ‘The Activities of the Eugenics Society.’, The Eugenics Review, 60 (1968), 142–
61 (p. 154). 
8 Francis Galton, ‘Eugenics as a Factor in Religion’, in Sociological Papers 1905, 3 vols. (London: Macmillan, 
1906), II, 52–53 (p. 52). 
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Recalling Diane Paul’s words, there is little doubt that eugenics has been employed 
in various ways as a catch-all for ideas surrounding hereditarian science and ability. It was 
never precisely defined by those who advocated it; this was possibly a deliberate linguistic 
tactic, but it is also plausible that its vagueness was correlated to its uncertain scientific 
groundings, which mixed then as-yet unproven biological theories with a scientific tool-
box that had yet to be fully developed or accepted.  
 
Eugenics :  Def ini t ions o f  a sc i ence  and pract i c e  
Francis Galton defined eugenics several times over; the first occurrence comes in his 
monograph Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development (1883), where he defines and 
explains its intended meaning in a footnote:  
 That is, with questions bearing on what is termed in Greek, eugenes, namely, good 
in stock, hereditarily endowed with noble qualities. This, and the allied words, 
eugeneia, etc., are equally applicable to men, brutes, and plants. We greatly want a 
brief word to express the science of improving stock, which is by no means 
confined to questions of judicious mating, but which, especially in the case of man, 
takes cognisance of all influences that tend in however remote a degree to give to 
the more suitable races or strains of blood a better chance of prevailing speedily 
over the less suitable than they otherwise would have had. The word eugenics 
would sufficiently express the idea; it is at least a neater word and a more 
generalised one than viriculture which I once ventured to use.9  
The particle ‘gene’ refers, of course, to the Greek word for origin, genesis, and is also the 
foundation for what William Bateson would later call genetics; whereas ‘eu-’ is associated 
with good. Hence ‘eugenics’ is intended to mean someone who has good origins or is 
well-formed. Further to this, we can note that the Greek eugenes, which originally meant 
‘well-born’ could mean ‘of noble birth’ in the aristocratic sense. Thus the emphasis on 
hereditary transmission of superior qualities was thoroughly implied in Galton’s 
neologism from the beginning. Derived from the Greek word we have the given name 
Eugene and its variants, presumably given to a cherished child; the Catholic church has 
also had four Popes named Eugene. 
                                                
9 Francis Galton, Inquiries into Human Faculty and Its Development (London: Macmillan, 1883), pp. 24–25 n1. 
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While Marius Turda associates the neologism with a Victorian fondness for 
ancient Greek culture,10 it is just as likely that Galton wished to emphasise that it should 
be taken seriously scientifically. As he intended eugenics to be a scientific discipline in its 
own right, appending the suffix ‘-ics’ to eugenes more clearly denoted it as such.11 Galton’s 
earlier name was ‘viriculture,’ but signifies it to be more of a practice than systematic 
study – or the awkward word ‘stirpiculture’ formed from the Latin for ‘stock.’ 
Incidentally, the American socialist utopian John Humphrey Noyes had proposed the 
word 'stirpiculture' even before Galton had ventured to give his nascent science a name, 
though Galton later mistakenly claimed that word as his own, but that he had discarded 
it. Noyes, who was explicitly inspired by Galton for his stirpiculture, founded the 
Christian Oneida community, where he reportedly put his ideas into practice.12  
The idea behind eugenics was old: that appearance and abilities are inherited, and 
that like begets like, are common, everyday intuitions, as are the class-based assumptions 
about being from a good family or ‘stock’, that there is something essential that gets 
passed on across generations, and that environment and privilege alone are not the only 
factors at play. Hence, ideas similar to eugenics have been aired since antiquity, for 
instance in Plato’s Republic or in Tommasi Campanella’s City of the Sun. But Galton’s 
neologism imbued a new scientific legitimacy to an old idea, and shifted the approach 
from chance and anecdote to measurement and the discovery of causal factors in 
heredity. As such, this scientific study opened for the possibility of control – that one 
could induce a child to be well-born, through scientific understanding and an appropriate 
                                                
10 Turda, p. 9. 
11 ‘-ics’ is a somewhat curious suffix; in English, the related ‘-ic’ marks that a word is an adjective of Greek 
or Latin origin, as with the German ‘-ik’ or the French ‘-ique’. It appears the nounal ‘-ics’ is uniquely 
English, and originally was a plural form of ‘-ic’ that referred to a collection or work on a subject of such 
an origin, such as with Aristotle’s Physics. The nounal forms in French and German preserved the adjectival 
spelling. Hence in English, ‘-ics’ eventually came to signify an area of study, like the related suffix ‘-logy’. 
This observation is also relevant to consider in terms of the similarity between the words ‘technology’, 
‘technics’ and ‘technique’. 
12 John Humphrey Noyes, Essay on Scientific Propagation (Oneida: Oneida Community, 1870), p. 7. 
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manner to achieve it. One can say that the intention was to bring the phrase ‘good 
breeding’ from the euphemistic and intuitive into the factual and definite. 
The creation of the term thus marked an innovation in taking ideas concerning 
heredity away from superstition, intuition and speculation, to become an object of 
rigorous study. However fraught that discipline and its practitioners might have been 
with their own biases, it nonetheless required a rigour beyond intuition and assumption. 
But even from the start the conceptual content of the name led to difficulties for its 
adherents, and in many ways came to frustrate their attitudes and approaches as to what 
they were attempting to achieve. The prefix ‘eu-’ provided a consistent problem in the 
definition of what eugenics was, since it can be understood in relative terms and thus be 
subjective to whoever defines it. As C. P. Blacker remarked in 1945, the definition of 
‘good’ was one that had consistently dogged the members of the Eugenics society: ‘A 
difficulty which has from the first presented itself to eugenists has been the definition of 
the particle “eu” in the word eugenics. Who are the people whom we regard as 
eugenically desirable? Who are the fit?’13 Galton himself acknowledged this problem in a 
definition he proposed in a lecture given to the Sociological Society during its inaugural 
session in 1904: 
Eugenics is the science which deals with all influences that improve the inborn 
qualities of a race; also with those that develop them to the utmost advantage. The 
improvement of the inborn qualities, or stock, of some one human population, will 
alone be discussed here. 
What is meant by improvement? What by the syllable Eu in Eugenics, whose 
English equivalent is good? There is considerable difference between goodness in 
the several qualities and in that of the character as a whole. The character depends 
largely on the proportion between qualities whose balance may be much 
influenced by education. We must therefore leave morals as far as possible out of 
the discussion, not entangling ourselves with the almost hopeless difficulties they 
raise as to whether a character as a whole is good or bad.14 
                                                
13 Charles P. Blacker, Eugenics in Retrospect and Prospect, The Galton Lecture, 1945 (London: The Eugenics 
Society and Cassell, 1950), p. 28. 
14 Francis Galton, ‘Eugenics; Its Definition, Scope and Aims’, in Sociological Papers 1904, 3 vols. (London: 
Macmillan, 1905), I, p. 45. 
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Ultimately, Galton defined eugenics as ‘the study of agencies under social control that 
may improve or impair the racial qualities of future generations, either physically or 
mentally’,15 and it was this definition that would come to be the official definition for the 
Eugenics Laboratory at UCL that Galton established. Later eugenicists would have their 
own definitions; while seemingly a concept that appears ideologically constrained to a 
controlling view of state power or biopolitics, it has nonetheless been historically 
theorised and enacted in societies of great political diversity and degrees of personal 
liberty. Today, it has become a word of denigration, and is applied as a word of 
accusation against government policies on reproduction, such as in Troy Duster’s 
Backdoor to Eugenics;16 others, like Nicholas Agar or David Galton (unrelated to Francis), 
have tried to liberate it from the malevolent connotations it gained after World War II 
and the increasing animosity towards it that built from the 1950s.17 
While the term is used in these polemical texts in a way that renders its meaning 
largely implicit, or by providing a definition without discussing the lexical ambiguities in 
its historical usage, such ambiguity has not been overlooked in the historical scholarship 
on eugenics. Marouf Hasian, Jr. claims that despite acknowledgement of the problems of 
defining eugenics there is a tendency among scholars to depend too strictly upon the 
official definitions rather than to try to determine what eugenic ideas actually signified in 
public and political consciousness: 
Most researchers who have explored the arguments employed by eugenicists often 
cope with this ambiguity by accepting one or two definitions of eugenics as 
representing the thinking of most eugenicists for a period of years. By spotlighting 
the writings of the major eugenics leaders – Galton, Pearson, Davenport, and 
Laughlin – scholars have attempted to uncover the most semantically pure 
expression of eugenical ideas and then treated applications of those ideas in the 
                                                
15 Francis Galton, Memories of My Life, 2nd ed. (London: Methuen, 1908), p. 321. 
16 Troy Duster, Backdoor to Eugenics, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
17 Nicholas Agar, Liberal Eugenics: In Defence of Human Enhancement (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004); David J. 
Galton, In Our Own Image: Eugenics and the Genetic Modification of People (London: Little, Brown, 2001). 
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political or public sphere as deviations from the pristine ideals of these 
eugenicists.18 
Hasian’s study is rhetorical, with an emphasis on the contexts the term has been 
employed in by the public and politicians, rather than as by the scientific community. He 
shows that eugenics has been understood in numerous ways, by scientists, politicians and 
the public, and lists eight related, but dissimilar meanings. In truth, even that list is 
probably not exhaustive, given that Galton’s definitions alone carried semantic 
differences. Even so, eugenics was first and foremost a concern with ability and heredity, 
and since it originally had been so vaguely defined, it became a blanket term in public 
and political usage involving issues concerning race, class, efficiency, and other factors 
concerning the national composition. But one lesson is clear: the semantic ambiguity of 
what is good – which has been elusive to philosophers for millennia – makes it an empty 
container in which one can pour almost any liquid and claim it is ambrosia. In this 
respect, given eugenics’ relationship to species, populations and evolution, it is more 
pertinent to ask who it is good for – who does eugenics benefit? 
The eugenicists deemed themselves as scientists of populations, concerned not 
with individuals but of aggregates of them. According to Troy Duster, ‘The word 
population has a specific and technical meaning for the geneticist. At the broadest level, 
it is any interbreeding aggregate – thus, a species. But species have subpopulations that 
interbreed only among themselves.’19 I might add that in the mathematical, statistical 
treatment of populations, the individual is only interesting for how its attributes compare 
in relation to the whole. The larger a population is, the more accurate its statistical 
treatment is, which also makes each of the individuals that constitute it less relevant. As 
mentioned, eugenics predates genetics by twenty-two years, and William Bateson’s 
                                                
18 Marouf A. Hasian, Jr., The Rhetoric of Eugenics in Anglo-American Thought, The University of Georgia 
Humanities Center Series on Science and the Humanities (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1996), p. 
29. 
19 Duster, p. 8. 
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‘genetics’ was concerned with the heredity of the individual. But while Duster’s definition 
was arrived at at a later date, it is helpful because it sets into relief the early attempts at 
formulating a proper science of heredity, which is at times difficult to disentangle from 
the history of eugenics. Looking at a recent encyclopaedic definition, for example, we see 
that ‘The term eugenics has been applied to theories and practices ostensibly designed to 
improve the human condition from the genetic point of view.’20 Yet despite that the 
word ‘eugenics’ predates ‘genetics,’ our current understanding of what is meant by 
‘genetics’ differs from what was meant by William Bateson in 1905, but the implication 
of the definition given here is that one would need genetics before one could arrive at 
eugenics. Since, as mentioned, the modern concept of genetics is indebted to Fisher’s 
synthesis of Mendelism’s individual inheritance with biometrics’ population inheritance, 
the encyclopaedia definition is virtually tautologous. 
And contrast the encyclopaedia definition to those proposed by Galton – the 
improvement of the ‘human condition’ contra ‘race’ or ‘stock’. Are the objects of 
improvement really the same? Improving the human condition is laudable, but hardly 
commensurate with forced breeding programmes. Galton's use of the words ‘stock’ and 
‘race’ indicates a slippage of meaning that has prevailed ever since eugenics arose. Race 
and stock are, originally, botanical metaphors (race, from Latin radix, root; stock, a 
Germanic word referring to a tree stump or log), and either term can refer to both 
populations and individuals. Today, ‘race’ has negative connotations due to its 
association with social hierarchies and prejudiced assumptions based on physical 
appearance. In the nineteenth century, however, it also referred to population aggregates 
of varying sizes: people of nations as well as from continents, but also from smaller 
geographical areas, such as the inhabitants of a valley or a city. But etymologically, it is a 
root, and we might easily see its relation to the idea of a common ancestor from which 
                                                
20 ‘Eugenics’, The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (Chicago; London: Encyclopædia Britannica, 2010), p. 725. 
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the individual has inherited their characteristics. The word race thus implies an ideal type, 
an original, from which the group as a whole descends.  
Similarly, the word stock can also refer both to the individual and the population 
(though possibly awkwardly so to modern ears). The OED lists several definitions 
relating to heredity that were current in the late nineteenth century: ‘The source of a line 
of descent; the progenitor of a family or race’; ‘A line of descent; the descendants of a 
common ancestor, a family, kindred’; but also a ‘race, ethnical kindred; also, a race or 
family (of animals or plants); a related group, “family” (of languages). Also […], an 
ancestral type from which various races, species, etc. have diverged.’ 21  ‘Stock’ can 
therefore refer to the ancestors, the line of ancestors, and the descendants. This was, 
then, the language in which the discourse on heredity was couched. Charles Darwin used 
the words stock and races frequently and interchangeably in the Origin of the Species (1859), 
so it is perhaps unsurprising that one of his enduring metaphors for natural selection and 
speciation is the Tree of Life. In both root and stock it reproduces the already prevalent 
vocabulary; this was the language of evolution and heredity, and therefore also of 
eugenics. 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection is a necessary to understand where eugenics 
comes from, but it is only half of the story to realise that humans have evolved, and can 
evolve further. As Galton pioneered a statistical approach to heredity, the ‘agencies 
under social control’ that Galton had referred to effectively depended on the science that 
enumerated matters of the state. There is thus a linguistic connection between the origin 
of species and statistics via the ambiguity of the words stock and race. Both words refer 
to individual or ideal types, but also to aggregates: populations, families, groups of 
descendants. To answer the question of who benefits from eugenics, then, we can again 
                                                
21 ‘Stock, n.1 and Adj.’, OED Online (Oxford University Press) 
<http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/190595> [accessed 25 July 2015]. 
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revisit the encyclopaedia definition from above: where the laudable improvement of the 
‘human condition’ sounds like a solitary, spiritual pursuit and the domain of mystics and 
philosophers, it should actually be the improvement of Galton’s ‘race’ or ‘stock’. More 
aptly, it is the improvement of human populations. As much as eugenics is morally 
suspicious, its domain is less in ethics and more in politics. Galton’s eugenics was never 
truly about an abstraction such as the human condition, or even the human species as a 
whole. Though eugenics was at first a fringe idea shared among a small number of 
Victorian scientists which became a social movement, and eventually a state-sponsored 
practice, it was always an idea in service of the nation. 
Statistics, as the science of the state, developed in the nineteenth century from 
being a relatively simple approach for quantifying state matters, such as actuarial tables, 
to become a sophisticated mathematical toolset. That statistics was used in the 
formulation of eugenic arguments is evident, but I argue that it is not just an adjunct to 
the argument, but intrinsic to developing the specifics of the eugenic argument itself. In 
this respect Geoffrey Searle articulates a common understanding of eugenics: ‘Eugenics, 
it seemed, would advance by the practical application of the knowledge of heredity which 
genetics was making available. Eugenics would then stand to genetics in rather the same 
relationship that engineering does to mathematics.’ 22  Yet he also underlines its 
relationship to measurement and statistics: ‘To Galton, eugenics always meant applied 
biometry.’23 Neither statement is wholly true, for the fact was that eugenics, by its own 
definition, was meant to be both theory and application. That it would eventually be 
understood mainly as an authoritarian ideology of population control is not just borne of 
historical circumstances but also due to its problematic foundation. The particle ‘eu’ 
represents a problematic subjectivity to a supposedly objective science. 
                                                
22 Geoffrey R. Searle, Eugenics and Politics in Britain, 1900-1914, Science in History, 3 (Leyden: Noordhoff 
International Pub, 1976), p. 8. 
23 Geoffrey R. Searle, Eugenics and Politics in Britain, 1900-1914, p. 7. 
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Galton and Darwin:  Heredi ty  and evolut ion 
Francis Galton (1822-1911) was the quintessential Victorian gentleman-scientist. With an 
incomplete education, first in medicine and then in mathematics, he was nonetheless 
keenly interested in the scientific developments of the day and he was able to pursue 
them because of the fortune left to him from his father. As one of Galton’s biographers 
point out, ‘most scientists were not so lucky. T.H. Huxley, lacking a fortune, had to work 
hard to support himself and his family as a scientist and a teacher.’24 His wealth enabled 
him to travel extensively in his youth, and later to independently carry out novel 
experiments for which he would otherwise have depended on sponsors. Above all, it 
seems he was interested in counting and measuring, recalling in his autobiography that, 
while travelling in Africa, he would measure the Hottentot women at a distance with a 
sextant, and that he devised a way to determine how bored people in an audience were 
by counting their fidgets.25 
Galton’s scientific interests were promiscuous, wide-ranging, and while he often 
made original contributions to fields outside of eugenics and statistics, these were often 
the idle inquiries of an amateur. His predilection for measurement and enumeration 
eventually led him to create a scheme that rewarded families for filling out questionnaires 
about their family history, and to establish an ‘anthropometric laboratory’ to conduct 
measurements and compile statistics of the vital characteristics of the test subjects. At his 
death, childless, he bequeathed his fortune to establish a professorship in eugenics in his 
name at University College London. And while his scientific training was never 
completed, he nonetheless took a great interest in a number of fields: he started with 
                                                
24 Nicholas W. Gillham, A Life of Sir Francis Galton: From African Exploration to the Birth of Eugenics (Oxford  ; 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 3. ‘Scientist’ was originally intended to be pejorative, 
meaning someone who also had to make a living from their studies. 
25 Francis Galton, Memories of My Life, p. 278. 
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meteorology, which developed his interest in statistics. Galton’s biographer Michael 
Bulmer provides a following list of his scientific activities: ‘He explored South West 
Africa, discovered and named the anticyclone, and wrote a book on fingerprints, in 
addition to his work on anthropometry, psychology, and photography.’26 This impressive 
catalogue of interests could be construed to bear testament to Galton’s dilettantism. Yet 
Galton made important scientific contributions; after his interest had turned to heredity, 
he developed what he called anthropometrics (later biometrics), which was the field 
where many of the novel contributions from the list stemmed from. 
At his mother’s behest, Galton had first begun studying medicine at King’s 
College. His mother, the daughter of the famous physician Erasmus Darwin, had wished 
for him that he should follow in the footsteps of his illustrious grandfather. His fellow 
descendant of Darwin and half-cousin Charles, however, strongly suggested to Galton 
that he enrol at Cambridge to study mathematics. Darwin had originally studied medicine 
as well, but became disenchanted and transferred to Cambridge in order to become a 
clergyman. There, however, he befriended the professor of botany, John Stevens 
Henslow, who was also the man who gave Darwin the opportunity to join the Beagle on 
its voyage around the world.27 
Darwin was Galton’s senior by 13 years and a fellow of the Royal Society. His 
experiences at Cambridge had been a success and greatly shaped Darwin’s scientific aims 
and ambitions. Galton’s experiences at Cambridge would not be quite the same as 
Darwin’s. Where Darwin had formed a strong bond with a professor, Galton found no 
comparable mentorship.28 He did, however, form close friendships with a number of 
highly gifted students who later were to become prominent men in Victorian England; 
                                                
26 Michael Bulmer, Francis Galton: Pioneer of Heredity and Biometry (Baltimore  ; London: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2003), p. xv. 
27 Gillham, p. 32. 
28 Gillham, p. 28. 
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according to Gillham, ‘Galton’s friends were uncommonly talented and it is no wonder 
that he regarded his university, not to mention his fellow students, highly.’29 Though 
Galton did not find the same focus at Cambridge as Darwin, he would nonetheless refer 
to his university days with fondness. He came to see that his ambitions in mathematics 
outstripped his ability, something that led him to have a breakdown. Whereas he had 
entered Cambridge with great ambition, he left without competing in the mathematical 
tripos with a pass degree; the plans to resume his medical studies were abandoned 
following his father’s death in 1844. 
After Cambridge came what Karl Pearson would describe as his ‘fallow years’,30 
due to both the lack of biographical information, but also because Galton did not 
publish anything for over ten years. By the end of this period he began travelling 
extensively in Africa, and in 1850-51, he led an expedition to South-Western Africa 
(today Namibia), from which he published Narrative of an Explorer in Tropical South Africa,31 
a travel narrative which started him on his scientific career. In 1855, he wrote The Art of 
Travel,32 a guidebook to travelling, with copious advice on planning expeditions. The 
book was a success and went through several editions, the last one in 1872. 
While Galton is today arguably best known for his establishment of eugenics, it 
must be emphasised that Galton’s eugenics is inseparable from his discoveries in 
statistics, contributions which have had a lasting impact. According to Ruth Schwartz 
Cowan, ‘there is only one science in which Galton truly deserves the appellation 
“founding father”: that is the science of statistics, or, more appropriately, biostatistics.’33 
                                                
29 Gillham, p. 43. 
30 Karl Pearson, The Life, Letters and Labours of Francis Galton, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1914), I, pp. 196–213. 
31 Francis Galton, Narrative of an Explorer in Tropical South Africa: Being an Account of a Visit to Damaraland in 
1851 (London: Murray, 1853). 
32 Francis Galton, The Art of Travel: Or, Shifts and Contrivances Available in Wild Countries (London, 1855). 
33 Ruth Schwartz Cowan, Sir Francis Galton and the Study of Heredity in the Nineteenth Century, History of 
Hereditary Though, 3 (New York: Garland, 1985), p. 145. 
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The main contributions he made were the regression to the mean and the correlation 
coefficient, which are closely related to one another. According to Stephen Stigler, the 
discovery of the regression to the mean ‘should rank with the greatest individual events 
in the history of science – at a level with William Harvey’s discovery of the circulation of 
blood and with Isaac Newton’s of the separation of light.’ 34  Galton’s statistical 
discoveries, however, were made in the development of his eugenic ideas, as methods to 
deal with some of the problems he encountered; his statistics were, essentially, shaped by 
his approach to the problem of heredity, which he had become deeply interested in 
following the publication of his cousin’s Origin of the Species in 1859. 
It was the statistical discoveries that would lead him to the eventual definition of 
eugenics, since he came to understand that his ideal of establishing protocols for the 
betterment of the race was more difficult than he had at first imagined. In other words, 
statistical thinking profoundly shaped the early Galtonian concept of eugenics and the 
later concepts of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ eugenics, concepts that shaped the discussion 
around eugenics ever since they were launched. I will return to positive and negative 
eugenics in the section on technology, but to understand eugenics, it is first essential to 
understand the fundamental way of thinking which lies within Galton’s contribution to 
statistics.  
Ever since Pearson’s biography of his mentor, the claim has been repeated that 
Galton, as the perennial dilettante, was motivated in his statistical theorising primarily by 
his prior belief in the imperative of guiding procreation to the benefit of the nation. 
There is certainly some truth to this, as the germinal expression of eugenics is found 
even in his first publication on heredity. There nevertheless remains the fact that Galton 
did not coin and define the term until around the same time as his greatest discovery in 
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statistical method, the regression to the mean. Galton first publicly expressed eugenic 
ideas in his first statistical investigations into heredity. His thoughts on the two were 
developed in concord and were closely related: it was not until his discovery of the 
regression to the mean that he coined the term eugenics as a disciplinary term, while his 
discovery of regression was closely related to what he considered to be a eugenic 
problem, regarding why eminent men did not inevitably have eminent children. It could 
therefore be argued that while eugenics is an intuitive concept of ‘like begets like’ long 
prior to Galton’s coinage, eugenics as a disciplinary label was dependent on a particular 
statistical expression so that it could be formulated as a systematic mode of inquiry and 
application; at once a science and a practice. 
 Galton’s first published work on the idea that genius is hereditary was ‘Hereditary 
Talent and Character’.35 I will discuss this text in greater depth later, but first I will 
emphasise a particular passage from that article which relates a utopian vision that 
Galton retained for the remainder of his life. This passage is remarkable enough to quote 
almost in its entirety: ‘Let us, then, give reins to our fancy, and imagine a Utopia – or a 
Laputa, if you will – ’ it begins, to provide a sketch for a society in which there would be 
an annual competition to determine those girls and youths who were especially gifted in 
the important qualities of body and mind: ‘We may picture to ourselves an annual 
ceremony in that Utopia or Laputa, in which the Senior Trustee of the Endowment Fund 
would address ten deeply-blushing young men, all of twenty-five years old, in the 
following terms: – ’ 
Gentlemen, I have to announce the results of a public examination, conducted on 
established principles; which show that you occupy the foremost places in your 
year, in respect to those qualities of talent, character, and bodily vigour which are 
proved, on the whole, to do most honour and best service to our race. An 
examination has also been conducted on established principles among all the 
young ladies of this country who are now of the age of twenty-one, and I need 
hardly remind you, that this examination takes note of grace, beauty, health, good 
temper, accomplished housewifery, and disengaged affections, in addition to noble 
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qualities of heart and brain. By a careful investigation of the marks you have 
severally obtained, and a comparison of them, always on established principles, 
with theses obtained by the most distinguished among the young ladies, we have 
been enabled to select ten of their names with especial reference to your individual 
qualities. It appears that marriages between you and these ten ladies, according to 
the list I hold in my hand, would offer the probability of unusual happiness to 
yourselves, and, what is of paramount interest to the State, would probably result 
in an extraordinarily talented issue. Under these circumstances, if any or all of 
these marriages should be agreed upon, the Sovereign herself will give away the 
brides, at a high and solemn festival, six months hence, in Westminster Abbey. 
We, on our part, are prepared, in each case, to assign 5000 l. as a wedding-present, 
and to defray the cost of maintaining and educating your children, out of the 
ample funds entrusted to our disposal by the State.36 
Most all of Galton’s thinking of what a eugenics-based society should be like is already 
present here, even though it is a brief sketch: the social promotion of marriage through 
incentive among those deemed most fit. It was not a new idea. The most frequent 
rejoinder among those in the early twentieth century who promoted eugenics – 
sometimes as a legitimising strategy, sometimes to provide background – was to stress 
that Plato had advocated similar practices. In the first issue of the Eugenics Review, 
Montague Crackanthorpe, the first president of the Eugenics Education Society, likened 
eugenics to Leibniz and Newton’s simultaneous discovery of calculus. ‘This is precisely 
what Galton has done with regard to Eugenics,’ he wrote; it was simply an expression of 
something which was in the air, waiting to be formulated.37 Similarly, but more recently, 
David Galton, advocates for a modern version of eugenics, and claims that both 
Aristotle and Plato ‘held decidedly strong views on eugenics, their aim being to provide 
the city-state with the most able and effective children for the next generation.’38 
Galton never expressed the association to Plato outright, however; in a late lecture 
entitled ‘Probability, the Foundation of Eugenics’ he mentions a passage from the 
Republic, though wholly unrelated to the practices suggested by Socrates that he would 
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have recognised as very similar to his own.39 The only true link to be found to the 
Platonic ideal republic is found in a piece of doggerel he entered in a contest while still at 
Cambridge, years before his concerns with heredity:  
Well may we loathe this world of sin, and strain 
As an imprisoned dove to flee away; 
Well may we burn to be as citizens 
Of some state modelled after Plato’s scheme, 
And overruled by Christianity40 
Yet as his late, unpublished novel Kantsaywhere attests, Galton’s longing for the modelled 
utopian state did not end in his youth – Kantsaywhere lays out in quite precise fashion how 
the procreation of the inhabitants of an imagined college were to be closely determined, 
for the greater good of their racial stock. This concern for the racial stock and the 
community, rather than the individual, permeates nearly all of Galton’s writing, a 
sentiment that may strike us as strange compared to modern individualism. In the 
Republic we find this same sentiment; and though the connection may have been invented 
for the purpose of legitimisation, I will later look at some passages from Plato to provide 
a contextual frame.  
 
Spec ies  and populat ions 
Charles Darwin's publication of On the Origin of Species in 1859 would lead his half-cousin 
to develop, firstly, ideas of the heritability of mental faculties, and eventually the concept 
of eugenics. As Galton later wrote in his autobiography, ‘The publication in 1859 of the 
Origin of Species by Charles Darwin made a marked epoch in my own mental development, 
as it did in that of human thought generally.’41 Galton was particularly focused on the 
heritability of genius, and wrote several books on the matter where he declared that 
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‘natural ability’ showed a strong correlation to certain families, and showed by 
genealogical comparisons that there was a higher occurrence of people of ability in 
certain families than probability or chance would allow for. Dismissing socioeconomic 
background, Galton determined that ability and intelligence is wholly inherited, and, as a 
consequence that it can be promoted on the basis of the population. This readily lent 
itself to an analogy with breeding animals. Another consequence was the inherent 
superiority of those belonging to the upper middle and higher classes. But though Galton 
would call attention to natural selection and invoked evolutionary terms in his advocacy 
for eugenics, what he promoted was wholly unlike natural selection; his proposals for the 
arrangement of suitable marriages was more like what we would now call artificial 
selection. 
Even before the term ‘eugenics’ was coined in 1883, Galton was occupied with the 
possibility of ‘breeding’ better people, from his very first foray into studies of human 
heredity. Thus the article ‘Hereditary talent and character’ from 1865 begins:  
The power of man over animal life, in producing whatever varieties of form he 
pleases, is enormously great. It would seem as though the physical structure of 
future generations was almost as plastic as clay, under the control of the breeder’s 
will. It is my desire to show, more pointedly than – so far as I am aware – has been 
attempted before, that mental qualities are equally under control.42 
As the final sentence suggests, the idea that mental qualities were hereditary and could be 
controlled through breeding was widely held to be true, at the very least implicitly, 
George Combe’s popularisation of phrenology in the extremely popular Constitution of 
Man.43 Following on his cousin Charles Darwin’s work on the evolution of animals, 
Galton assumed what was true of animals was also true of humans, though in truth that 
conclusion was not uncommonly drawn following the publication of Darwin’s Origin. 
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In Darwin’s Origin, human heredity was not mentioned, but for the throwaway line 
towards the end: ‘Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history.’44 There are 
several reasons for Darwin’s omission of evolution concerning man, not least because of 
the opposition he would face with the church and mainstream society. Of course, he 
would soon find that his caution had been unnecessary; the implication of evolution on 
humans was obvious to all. Already a year after the publication of the Origin, at the 
famous Oxford debate on evolution Samuel Wilberforce supposedly asked whether T. H. 
Huxley was descended from a monkey on his grandfather’s or his grandmother’s side.45  
Darwin covered the evolutionary past of man in greater detail in his later book The 
Descent of Man. There, he affirmed what he thought of as one of the ills of civilised 
society, that natural selection no longer worked on mankind:  
We civilised men, on the other hand, do our utmost to check the process of 
elimination; we build asylums for the imbecile, the maimed, and the sick; we 
institute poor-laws; and our medical men exert their utmost skill to save the life of 
every one to the last moment. There is reason to believe that vaccination has 
preserved thousands, who from a weak constitution would formerly have 
succumbed to small-pox.46 
Galton shared this assumption that, with civilisation and culture, humans had effectively 
ended the process of natural selection. Consequently, Galton, having assumed Darwin's 
theory of evolution to be correct, was nevertheless not concerned with the possibility of 
natural selection in humans. The social organisation and available technologies of 
modern civilisation had effectively put a check on further evolution. Rather, Galton's 
argument for eugenics is based on one of Darwin’s most important premises for his 
argument that a natural force can shape and adapt species: In the Origin, Darwin first 
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argues that there is such a thing as artificial selection which can influence and shape the 
traits of animals.  
In the first chapter of the Origin, Darwin’s argument for artificial selection of traits 
in domesticated animals acted as a prelude for his theory of the natural selection of 
animals in the wild. His argument is that favourable traits in domesticated animals can be 
preserved (and amplified) by their breeders through artificial selection, and through 
successive generations, these traits will become permanent. There is some disagreement 
as to whether Darwin's theory of artificial selection came about at the same time as the 
theory of natural selection, or whether he thought of it later and used it in order to 
strengthen his argument. As Mark Largent notes,  
Several scholars have argued that, contrary to the actual structure of his argument 
in Origin as well as his later claims, Darwin had not fully developed his 
understanding of the power of breeders’ selective activities until after he had 
established in his mind his explanation of the process of natural selection.47 
Structurally, however, the theory of artificial selection is presented in the Origin as a 
necessary premise in the build-up to the argument for natural selection. 
Darwin's argument was that the domesticated animal displays a greater variability of 
traits than does the animal in the wild, due to the conditions of captivity; ‘we generally 
perceive in each domestic race […] less uniformity of character than in true species.’48 As 
we see from this statement, the condition of domestication, with its greater degree of 
variation, was not necessarily one Darwin viewed as a good one; the unstated assumption 
is a dichotomy between the ‘domesticated’ and ‘natural’ states, and there is little doubt 
about which Darwin perceived as the greater one. That he would later state that civilised 
man was, effectively, a domesticated animal was thus a pessimistic view of the society 
that had produced him.  
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Indeed, that man was domesticated was viewed as leading to the general 
degeneracy of the race, a view that was increasingly popular in Victorian times. Darwin 
had observed that domesticated animals showed more variation in traits than those in the 
wild, and it was widely held that modern society had, in a sense, domesticated man. 
Towards the end of the nineteenth century, the British zoologist Ray Lankester worked 
on the degeneracy of forms in evolutionary adaptation as a suppression of form: how 
organs could wither away though not disappear completely, leaving remnants of the 
previously functioning organs.49 Establishing the role of degeneration in biology thus 
became a bridge towards explaining the perceived ill effects of modern society, that the 
domestication of humans threatened to have a similar degenerative effect. According to 
Daniel Pick, it was ‘increasingly seen by medical and other writers not as the social 
condition of the poor, but as a self-reproducing force; not the effect but the cause of 
crime, destitution and disease. The putative biological force of degeneration produced 
degeneracy in society.’50 The view of degeneracy was one that dogged early evolutionary 
and eugenicist thought, not least because of the inherent teleology of Progress, the 
necessary partner of degeneracy that evolution seemed to suggest. Indeed, the ideas of 
progress and degeneracy are in themselves vital in order to understand the eugenicist 
project. 
Increased care from their keepers, an abundance of food and the removal of 
predatory threats lead to more individuals in a population living to reproduce. In 
Darwin’s view, domestication, rather than living in the wild, removed the selection 
mechanism in nature – a mechanism that could be supplanted by way of breeders’ 
artificial, or what he called ‘methodical and unconscious’ selection.51 A conclusion to be 
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drawn from this was that the ‘fitness’ of the domesticated animal thus stood unchecked; 
the greater variability also included traits that were not necessarily benign or helpful for 
the survival of the species, but were allowed to diversify. Darwin asserted that wild 
animals presented less variability than domesticated animals; this was because the wild 
animals were adapted to their wild condition and variations would therefore be culled by 
natural selection. A logical step to take from this was to see this as a demonstration of 
the average fitness of a population in the wild being higher than that of a population in 
captivity (disregarding that populations in the wild were adapted for their local 
environments).  
Galton, having read the Origin, assumed that what is true for animals must also be 
true of men – a conclusion, given Wilberforce’s comment, he was not alone to draw, 
even if Darwin initially avoided the subject. Thus, in the June and August issues in 1865 
of Macmillan’s Magazine Galton presented his first article on human heredity, where the 
first foray into the statistical analysis of men of note was made, in order to strengthen his 
theory that mental faculties in men were as heritable as the physical traits of animals. 
Indeed, it seems his conclusion was foregone, and in this article we already find the core 
of Galton’s beliefs about the control of heredity which he would spend the next 20-odd 
years proving. In the intervening years he would invent the concepts of statistical 
correlation and regression to the mean, still central concepts to statistics today.  
Taken together, ‘Hereditary Talent and Character,’ its two parts no longer than 
twenty pages in total, is devoted mostly to statistical observations rather than Galton’s 
ideas on heredity, even though the numbers are meant to illustrate Galton’s idea of talent 
and eminence as heritable. The ideas are nonetheless expressed in a manner that is 
surprisingly congruent with his later writings. Most succinctly, this is encapsulated in the 
following two extracts, which come, respectively, at the end of the first part:  
  
58 
The general intellectual capacity of our leaders requires to be raised, and also to be 
differentiated. We want abler commanders, statesmen, thinkers, inventors, and 
artists. The natural qualifications of our race are no greater than they used to be in 
semi-barbarous times, though the conditions amid which we are born are vastly 
more complex than of old. The foremost minds of the present day seem to stagger 
and halt under an intellectual load too heavy for their powers.52 
And from the beginning of the second: 
I hence conclude that the improvement of the breed of mankind is no insuperable 
difficulty. If everybody were to agree on the improvement of the race of man 
being a matter of the very utmost importance, and if the theory of the hereditary 
transmission of qualities in men was as thoroughly understood as it is in the case 
of our domestic animals, I see no absurdity in supposing that, in some way or 
other, the improvement would be carried into effect.53 
Already in these two extracts are the core tenets of eugenics: Firstly, that society has 
eliminated natural selection, leaving our capacity of dealing with the ever-increasing 
demands of a rapidly developing society behind. Second, that as a society we should 
therefore introduce a means of selection which is not haphazard. It must be conscious, 
methodical and scientific instead, to ensure the increased ability of the population. The 
next 47 years of Galton’s life would consist of convincing others that his idea was a good 
one. As he admitted in his autobiography, ‘The subject of Race Improvement, or 
Eugenics, with which I have much occupied myself during the last few years, is a pursuit 
of no recent interest.’54 
 Galton’s first book on the subject, Hereditary Genius, was a book-length expansion 
of his article in Macmillan’s, and his statistical analyses were much more thorough and 
substantial. In Hereditary Genius, Galton studies the lineages of ‘eminent’ men, which he 
defined as ‘one who has achieved a position that is attained by only 250 persons in each 
million of men, or by one person in each 4,000.’55 This number he arrived at by no 
rigorous means, and neither were his selection criteria particularly scientific – if anything, 
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such criteria did not yet exist. Galton arrives at the fraction by going through books of 
notable persons in English history, in addition to the obituaries of eminent men, and 
selecting those he deemed so notable as to be well known by most people. Daniel Kevles 
notes that ‘Galton’s hereditary analysis proceeded from the premise that reputation – 
especially the kind that earned a place in a dictionary of eminence – truly indicated ability, 
that the lack of it just as reliably bespoke the absence of ability, that neither outcome 
depended upon social circumstance.’ 56  Galton’s argument for this was that social 
standing alone would not guarantee the genius of the man (for they were all men); 
peerage alone would not necessarily lead to burial in Westminster Abbey. 
Galton’s method of statistical analysis was novel not only for the study of heritage, 
but also for the manner of analysis itself. He claimed to be ‘the first to treat the subject in 
a statistical manner, to arrive at numerical results, and to introduce the “law of deviation 
from an average” into discussions on heredity.’57 Galton’s ‘law of deviation’ was then a 
novel concept in statistics. He developed it by building on Adolphe Quetelet's 
application of the Gaussian, or normal, distribution curve to groups of people, and the 
‘law’ describes the deviation from the normal distribution. In the book, Galton uses the 
Gaussian formula to determine the distribution of his eminent figures, determining to 
what degree they deviated from the normal, and subsequently, to what degree the various 
professions he included as indicators of eminence (i.e., professors, judges, artists, 
scientists, writers, and so on) deviated from the average. In other words, Galton 
determined what professions had the highest ability. His calculations led him to fantasise: 
‘If we could raise the average standard of our race only one grade, what vast changes 
would be produced!’58 As we will see, Galton’s eugenic program was not as much a 
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concern for the individual’s betterment, but for the betterment of a statistical 
representation.  
 
Heredi tary mechanisms 
But even though Galton advanced statistics, biology was still an immature science. In the 
Origin, Darwin admitted that the ‘laws governing inheritance are quite unknown; no one 
can say why the same peculiarity in different individuals of the same species, and in 
individuals of different species, is sometimes inherited and sometimes not so’.59 An 
adequate answer to the problem of why some traits were inherited in successive 
generations, whereas some were not, would not be given until the publication of Gregor 
Mendel’s paper on inheritance was ‘rediscovered’ in 1900, and not widely disseminated in 
Britain until William Bateson translated it in 1909. Darwin put forward his own theory of 
‘pangenesis’ in Animals and Plants, a variation on a theory proposed by Herbert Spencer, 
in which he proposed that each cell of the body, before maturation, threw off what he 
called ‘gemmules;’ a kind of seed that would grow into new cells, which implied that 
the whole organisation, in the sense of every separate atom or unit, reproduces 
itself. Hence ovules and pollen grains, – the fertilised seed or egg, as well as buds, 
– include and consist of a multitude of germs thrown off from each separate atom 
of the organism.60 
Pangenesis offered an explanation for the mystery of why not all traits were transmitted 
to offspring. Like plant seeds, not all traits would grow to maturity. Galton supported 
pangenesis in Hereditary Genius, but would later reject it. By his reasoning, if only the 
matured gemmules were reproduced in the offspring, this meant that one could 
introduce cells into an animal from other specimens with other traits, and that they 
would be assimilated and passed on to successive generations. Galton conducted an 
experiment to see whether he could ‘mongrelize’ the offspring of Silver-grey rabbits by 
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transfusing blood from other, less ‘pure’ breeds to see, as he put it, whether by the 
injection of ‘alien blood into the circulation of pure varieties of animals […] their 
offspring did or did not show signs of mongrelism.’61 He carried out three different 
injection protocols – some of the rabbits had as much as half of their blood replaced – 
yet the offspring remained purebred; Galton also injected the ‘common rabbits’ with 
blood from the Silver-greys, but none of them had Silver-grey offspring. Galton took this 
as a disproval of Darwin’s gemmule hypothesis, and consequently rejected pangenesis 
completely. 
Pangenesis allowed for Lamarckism, the view that traits acquired during life could 
be passed on to offspring. Darwin, if somewhat ambiguously, ‘was a lifelong Lamarckian, 
though he still believed that natural selection was, on the whole, the most potent cause of 
evolution.’ 62  Darwin’s belief in natural selection was, however, even stronger with 
Galton, who was sceptical of Lamarckism from the beginning of his writings on heredity. 
Though Galton’s views seem to be somewhat inconsistent throughout his writings, this 
could possibly be due to his frequent writing for more popular audiences, in an attempt 
to mirror popular views on heredity in order to further his own eugenic agenda.  
In fact, some of Galton’s ideas are sometimes attributed as the precursor to 
Weismann’s theory of the germ plasm, which states that the cells of the body are divided 
into bodily, or somatic, and inheritance cells. ‘Everything we possess at our birth is a 
heritage from our ancestors,’ he wrote in 1865, asking ‘Can we hand anything down to 
our children, that we have fairly won by our own independent exertions? Will our 
children be born with more virtuous dispositions, if we ourselves have acquired virtuous 
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habits?’63 Galton’s answer was a very slightly qualified no: ‘If the habits of an individual 
are transmitted to his descendants, it is, as Darwin says, in a very small degree, and is 
hardly if at all, traceable.’64 And though he was among the first to advocate a fully non-
Lamarckian view, he would still publish articles where he carefully emphasised that he 
did not dispute Lamarckism, such as in an article on ‘Hereditary Improvement’ from 
1873:  
An improvement in the nurture of a race will eradicate inherited disease; 
consequently it is beyond dispute that if our future population were reared under 
more favourable conditions than at present, both their health and that of their 
descendants would be greatly improved. There is nothing in what I am about to 
say that shall underrate the sterling value of nurture, including all kinds of sanitary 
improvements; nay, I wish to claim them as powerful auxiliaries to my cause; 
nevertheless, I look upon race as far more important than nurture.65 
As Diane Paul and James Moore have pointed out, the Lamarckian view of heredity in 
fact allowed for the possibility of social improvement. While Lamarckists maintained a 
view that social standing and class were to a large degree inherited and biologically 
determined, the determination of class by biology was not absolute and could be 
overcome, since prodigal individuals could pass on successful traits. A mechanism of 
heredity like pangenesis meant that even if one’s social standing was low, a family could 
‘enhance their biological fortunes through education, exercise, good nourishment, and 
the pursuit of “higher” pleasures such as music and art. Good gemmules, like precious 
gems, could be amassed and bequeathed to posterity by parents who led prudent lives.’66 
This would also have social consequences, meaning that improved social conditions and 
a more nurturing environment would have heritable consequences for the offspring of 
society. As Pauline Mazumdar emphasises, part of the eugenics program arose from the 
‘efforts of the reforming middle class to improve the lives of their inferiors in the classes 
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below them.’67 Galton’s position would come to harden, however, and he eventually 
rejected acquired heritable traits altogether. Like the later president of the Eugenics 
Society, C. P. Blacker would comment in a retrospect on eugenics in 1945, ‘Eugenists 
often declare themselves to be primarily concerned with man’s inborn qualities; the 
improvement of the environment is other people’s concern.’68 
Eugenics remained a concern for a very small coterie of scientific men, however, 
with little or no recognition from the population in general. Galton, aware that the 
scientific methodology for determining inborn faculties in his original study was lacking 
in rigour, continued his efforts in providing a scientific basis for his theories of 
inheritance, pioneering, for example, twin studies in 1875.69 As noted, Inquiries into Human 
Faculty and its Development introduced the word eugenics, but also provided further 
statistical analysis of variables to prove his Malthusian concerns about the decline of 
society. 
After having rejected pangenesis because of the failure of the blood transfusion 
experiment, Galton lacked a mechanism to explain hereditary laws. In lieu of a 
mechanism, he endeavoured to further his scientific pursuits, by gathering data and 
advocated anthropometrics, or the measurement of man, which would later be renamed 
biometrics. He began by asking school masters for the measurements and test results of 
pupils at boarding schools, but found that he needed both greater rigour of measurement 
and more variety of people to study. In an article from 1882, Galton asked: ‘When shall 
we have anthropometric laboratories, where a man may from time to time get himself 
and his children weighed, measured, and rightly photographed, and have each of their 
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bodily faculties tested, by the best methods known to modern science?’70 The article 
outlines the purpose and aims of such a laboratory: what one would measure, and how, 
and with the international exhibition of 1885, Galton finally got his laboratory. He set up 
facilities where he measured ‘Keenness of Sight and of Hearing; Colour Sense, Judgment 
of Eye; Breathing Power; Reaction Time; Strength of Pull and of Squeeze; Force of 
Blow; Span of Arms; Height, both standing and sitting; and Weight.’ 71  When the 
exhibition closed in 1886, an anthropometric office was opened in the South Kensington 
Museum, where he was able to continue his efforts for another six years. Yet while the 
collection of data helped refine his statistical investigations, he still lacked a theory which 
could explain why acquired traits were not inherited. 
In 1892, August Weismann published his germ plasm theory in German, and an 
English translation was published in 1893. 72  The germ plasm theory provided a 
mechanism of inheritance that was both viable, and, if correct, provided a refutation of 
Lamarckism. The theory states that the cells of the organism are divided into so-called 
‘somatic cells’ and ‘germ cells,’ where the somatic cells of the body are subject to change 
throughout the organism’s life, the germ cells, or the reproductive cells located in the 
sperm or ova, are static, and subject to the ‘Weismann barrier,’ in which external 
influences do not affect their composition. Weismann had written to Galton in 1889, 
acknowledging his debts to Galton’s 1865 article. The germ plasm theory, combined with 
Mendel’s laws of heredity, would eventually give rise to the new science of genetics, and 
the scientific explanation for heredity would help foster the cause of eugenics. 
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In the meantime, however, Weismann’s theory brought greater certainty to 
Galton’s views, which he had by then harboured for at least thirty years. In his Memories, 
Galton wrote this chilling passage on what he had found in his study of twins: 
The general result of the inquiry was to support the views of those who hold that 
man is little more than a conscious machine, the slave of heredity and 
environment, the larger part, perhaps all, of whose actions are therefore 
predictable. As regards such residuum as may not be automatic but creative, and 
which a Being, however wise and well-informed, could not possibly foresee, I have 
nothing to say, but I found that the more carefully I inquired, whether it was into 
hereditary similarities of conduct, into the life-histories of twins, or introspectively 
into the actions of my own mind, the smaller seemed the room left for this 
possible residuum.73 
Galton’s conclusion was, in fact, that there was little or no room for free will. Contrary 
to the Cartesian view that the conscious mind controls the body, Galton appears to 
believe that our consciousness merely perceives the automatic actions we take with our 
bodies. In this he echoed his friend T. H. Huxley, whose article which argued that 
animals – and by extension, humans – were ‘conscious automata,’ and that consciousness 
had no influence on matter, had sparked much debate.74 The question of free will and 
determinism occupied Galton for a long time. In his plea for an anthropometric 
laboratory, he told of how he had come to the conclusion that in the exercise of 
character, a ‘surprisingly small margin seemed to be left to the effects of circumstances 
and education, and to the exercise of what we are accustomed to call “free-will.”’75 In 
1879, he had attempted to survey his own mental processes to see if he could exercise 
free will, writing an article about it. He came to the conclusion that there are surprisingly 
few mental operations that actively require an exercise of free will.76 
This did not seem to bother Galton. It was in perfect accord with the 
philosophical materialism that can be observed throughout his writings. One 
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consequence of a perfect philosophical materialism is ultimately its determinist nature – 
as a result there can be no free will to act as one wishes. In this regard, the class division 
of the British society and Galton’s nationalistic affirmation of the status quo was 
affirmed as an effect of powers outside our efforts to control them. It would be 
nationalistic fervour and worries over the status quo that would provide eugenics’ break 
into the concerns of mainstream society, with the crisis of the Second Boer war, which I 
will return to, at nearly the same time as the ‘rediscovery’ of Mendel’s laws of inheritance. 
Eugenics, which concerns itself with the biological fitness of population, naturally 
relates to the biological sciences and the theoretical advances that were reached 
concerning heredity following Darwin. Weissmann’s germ plasm theory provided a solid 
foundation for the mechanism of reproduction, which also worked in favour of eugenics, 
even though it remained unproven for some time. It gained support from Karl Pearson, 
who was sceptical of Mendel’s theory. In 1900, Gregor Mendel’s theory of heredity was 
rediscovered independently by three researchers, Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns and Erich 
von Tschermak-Seysenegg, and subsequently widely disseminated. In the UK, the most 
vocal supporter of Mendel was William Bateson. Bateson had called for experiments like 
Mendel’s before he had known about Mendel’s work and later translated Mendel’s 1865 
article into English. Mendelism, as it is usually called, is the probabilistic distribution of 
hereditary characteristics, and introduced the novel concept of ‘recessive’ and ‘dominant’ 
in biologically inherited traits. In this model, Mendel proposed an inheritance model that 
assumed that inheritable characteristics needed two components, and that these 
components came in two versions, where the ‘dominant’ type would always be inherited, 
whereas the ‘recessive’ type would need two copies, one from each parent, in order to be 
expressed in the following generation. According to the Mendelian theory of inheritance 
it was therefore possible to establish a clear pattern of probability in what characteristics 
were passed on to the offspring.  
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Famously, the mainstream acceptance of Mendelian genetics came long after the 
original papers were published – ‘genetics’ was coined by William Bateson in 1905, in a 
private letter to Adam Sedgewick, and it was rapidly adopted after Bateson used it 
publically at the Royal Horticultural Society’s annual conference in 1906.77 Today, the 
circumstances of Mendel’s discovery and subsequent obscurity has become nearly 
mythological, where the scientist-monk toiled in solitude while the establishment ignored 
his publications. This story, however, is also something of a romanticised account. 
According to Jan Sapp, one of the reasons why Mendel was not properly appreciated 
until the beginning of the twentieth century, and not when he originally published his 
paper, was due to a different focus on interests. Sapp writes: ‘Mendel was not trying to 
discover new laws of inheritance. He belonged to a tradition of hybridists who were 
examining the possibility that hybridisation might be a source of evolution.’78 Thus 
Mendel worked within an evolutionary paradigm, but not explicitly on hereditary 
mechanisms. The focus in his work was on the possibilities of new species being created 
out of the hybrids of the existing ones; the resultant statistical probability distribution of 
inherited characteristics he published were a result of this inquiry, and not that of a 
hereditary (genetic) one.  
Indeed, as Sapp shows, the reception of Mendel’s work throughout the twentieth 
century has ranged across a wide variety of endorsements and accusations, though the 
appraisal of Mendel’s theories consistently fail to contextualise his findings within his 
own time and concerns. Sapp discusses the interpretation of the historical circumstances, 
citing several scholars who have claimed that, rather than being a true rediscovery, 
Mendel’s theory was used as a pawn in a game of priorities in the scientific community, 
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where several scientists had independently arrived at some of the same conclusions as 
Mendel, but within a scientific context that had matured much since Mendel had 
conducted his experiments. At different times, Mendel’s theory has been interpreted as 
being both scientifically superior in method to his peers (the hybridists) while being 
inferior for his lack of full support for Darwinism; nevertheless, Mendelism (even if it 
would remain controversial within the eugenics community, not least because of the 
continuing influence of the biometricians) helped to provide the science of heredity with 
greater legitimacy.  
Mendel’s model of recession and dominance provided an explanation for the 
conundrum that had plagued both Darwin and Galton, the question of why inheritance 
did not appear to be continuous from generation to generation. The concept of the 
recessive trait provided a plausible explanation for why this happened – Galton, 
however, would not accept it in his old age, but after his death younger eugenicists 
would. It would still be a while before Mendelism was fully accepted by the scientific 
community, however, but in the interim, the nation was engaged with questions of 
degeneracy and national efficiency. First, however, it is necessary to examine the 
development of a scientific kind of ‘population thinking’ came into being with Galton’s 
work on statistics. 
 
Individuals  and populat ion thinking  
In Plato’s Republic, Socrates has a famous debate on morality, in which his sophist 
adversary Thrasymachus claims that morality is inevitably defined by those in power, and 
that morality is never to the benefit of the individual, but rather that the immoral 
individual is bound to come out on top over the moral one. Socrates defeats 
Thrasymachus in the debate, but his friends Glaucon and Adeimantes are not thoroughly 
convinced of his argument that the moral agent will always be the superior one. To 
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further develop his argument, Socrates suggests an elaborate thought-experiment: the 
organisation of an ideal city-state to demonstrate the superiority of morality. As Socrates 
explains:  
It’s not impossible, then, that morality might exist on a larger scale in the larger 
entity and be easier to discern. So, if you have no objection, why don’t we start by 
trying to see what morality is like in communities? And then we can examine 
individuals too, to see if the larger entity is reflected in the features of the smaller 
entity.79 
According to Socrates, the morality of a society is reflected in the morality of its 
individuals; thus, if you manage to construct a moral society, it will necessarily consist of 
moral individuals. 
Though Plato’s construction of the ideal society is one of the most important 
thought experiments in philosophy, the virtues of the state – or lack of such – is not 
what is most relevant to the current discussion. Rather, it is the concept of the state as a 
coherent unit, rather than a grouping of individuals that happen to be in the same place. 
This is essentially what statistics is about: the representation of a group as a coherent 
unity, which bears no particular regard to the individuals composing that unity, other 
than being able to make predictions about them in a probabilistic manner. We can 
understand statistics as a way to objectively describe the community as a unified entity, in 
a way that also reflects the individual’s relationship to the whole. Statistics is, partly, a 
model used for predictions: the individual’s relationship to the unity of the whole is 
revealed in the power of the statistical model, where any specific individual is not 
represented in terms of themselves but in the probability that a certain aspect of them 
relates to the statistical model of it. Statistics, because it represents a population, is 
therefore an impersonal but powerful modelling tool for predicting where an individual 
stands within a community. Moreover, it represents an alternative way of thinking of 
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people, much in the manner Socrates describes: People in general make more sense when 
placed into a context of other people, within the communities of their interactions.  
Ian Hacking argues that the rise of statistics first began with the rise of numeracy. 
More specifically, the vast increase of numbers describing matters of the state that 
became available both to the public and to the state itself from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century marked the beginning of thinking of statistics in an abstract manner:  
Statistical laws that look like brute, irreducible facts were first found in human 
affairs, but they could be noticed only after social phenomena had been 
enumerated, tabulated and made public. That role was well served by the avalanche 
of printed numbers at the start of the nineteenth century.80 
Statistics were first used by governments in the late seventeenth century, when it was 
championed by, among others, Leibniz, who saw that numbers were essential to the 
efficient running of a state. Hence it is little surprise that the word statistics itself first 
originated in Germany: Statistik – though its provenance is somewhat disputed and its 
usage originally differed in meaning across countries. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say 
that originally, statistics represented numbers of the state. That is to say, it was the state that 
produced the numbers, in order to run more efficiently.  
At first, this was to establish matters of taxation. If one knew the numbers of 
inhabitants, their profession, numbers of children, etc., then one could establish an 
estimate of how much they should pay in tax, and whether the collection of tax answered 
to the expected amount. In other words, the statistics were used to create a prediction of 
how much tax would be collected; if the numbers did not correspond, measures would 
have to be made in order to make them align better. This enumeration of state matters 
was a success, and was the foundation for modern governance. 
Statistics is thus essentially about numbers, tables that are related to and 
numerically representing some specific domain. Though its name reflects that it was 
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originally numbers in relation to state matters, statistics would in the course of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century be decoupled from its association with the state alone, 
though the emphasis would often remain on numbers concerning individuals. According 
to Donald MacKenzie, statistical theory ‘provides tools that can be used to analyse, for 
example, the information gathered by government statistical agencies. Normally, it 
employs concepts drawn from the mathematical theory of probability in constructing 
these tools.’81 Such an understanding took time to develop, however. In the 1797 edition 
of the Encyclopaedia Britannica, statistics was a word ‘“lately introduced to express a view 
or survey of any kingdom, county, or parish’ […] It was only very gradually that 
“statistics” came to refer exclusively to quantitative studies.’ 82  Outside of numbers 
concerning the inhabitants of the state, it became understood that statistics could be used 
to describe other types of aggregates, particularly soldiers. However, the predictive 
powers of statistics first came into focus with a cross-development from the physical 
sciences. 
 Astronomy requires great exactitude in its measurements, but the precision 
necessary to correctly determine the position of celestial objects was difficult to achieve 
with the technology available in the early nineteenth century. This led to the use of the 
Gaussian distribution, in order to establish what was most likely the precise value, 
calculated from the average calculated from a set of measurements. Plotted on a curve, it 
was shown that the most likely measurements were grouped together, creating the apex 
of the curve, with the less precise measurements tapering off at each side, creating the 
well-known bell shape. For this reason, the Gaussian distribution was also called the 
error curve, because of its use in minimising error. Theodore Porter explains:  
Although it had earlier been used in connection with the classical ‘doctrine of 
chances,’ it became closely associated with astronomy as a consequence of its 
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incorporation into the method of least squares for reducing astronomical 
observations. Since stellar objects have a real position at a given time, the existence 
of variation among observations was quite naturally interpreted as the product of 
error, and the error curve, accordingly, was conceived as descriptive of the 
imperfections of instruments and of the senses.83 
It is thus little surprise that it was an astronomer that first applied the error curve to 
statistical, population aggregates – numbers representing groups of people. The Belgian 
astronomer Adolphe Quetelet saw that the application of the error curve could be 
applied to describe groups of people and the distribution of variation in traits, such as 
height. But even as Quetelet used the curve to model the variance of traits in people, he 
perceived variance in terms of the error that the curve was named for, and thus that the 
curve demonstrated the existence of an ideal man, or what he called the homme type. 
Nonetheless, ‘the effect of his discovery was to begin the process by which the error law 
became a distribution formula, governing variation which was itself seen to have far 
greater interest than any mere mean value.’84 
According to Galton, he was indebted to Quetelet’s use of the error curve, and 
refers to it as Quetelet’s ‘law of “deviation from an average”’.85 In fact, it was Galton’s 
friend William Spottiswoode who had first made him aware of the technique in a paper 
given to the Royal Society.86 Though Galton was impressed by the error curve’s promise, 
he saw that Quetelet’s homme type did not conceptually account for differences between 
people. And while he would refer to the law of deviation, Galton’s insight was that the 
distribution curve accounted for a distribution of variance within a population, rather than 
that of an error. This statistical variance echoed the variance Darwin observed in species 
in the Origin, and Galton could therefore tie statistical distribution to the theory of 
evolution. The distribution was centred on the middle of the curve, whereas the tail-ends 
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were outliers, whether in the positive or negative direction, and as such the distribution 
showed in a visual mathematical form that extreme instances were more rare, but also 
that the distribution of variance followed a pattern that was reproduced in a host of 
domains when considering populations.  
Galton’s interest was never truly in the complete breadth of variance, however. As 
the titles of his publications at the time allude to, Hereditary Genius, and his earlier article-
series ‘Hereditary Talent and Character’, as well as in a host of minor articles on heredity, 
Galton’s main concern was with what he conceived as the positive outliers of the 
distribution, the illustrious men of genius and eminence. Though he professed in the 
preface of Hereditary Genius that his aim was originally a purely ethnographical study of 
‘the mental peculiarities of different races’, that aim is not adequately accounted for in his 
near-immediate non sequitur ambition to make ‘a cursory examination into the kindred of 
four hundred illustrious men of all periods of history’. 87  Though psychological 
speculation is not within the present scope, it is not unreasonable to claim that there 
appeared to be other motivations for Galton than a detached and purely objective study 
of hereditary influences. 
As was explored in the section on the establishment of the science of heredity, 
Galton’s ideas on eugenics were present as early as these two publications, and his 
formulation of the betterment of stock through breeding is expressed in his 1865 
publications. Galton saw, however, that there was an intrinsic problem with the idea of 
breeding for ability. In Hereditary Genius, he examined the biographies of ‘men of 
eminence’ in details, and while he argued that illustriousness and eminence had a 
tendency to run in families, he noted that there were phenomena in inheritance that 
remained puzzling: though there appeared to be evidence of eminence running in 
families, there was not any definite causal connection between eminent men and their 
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offspring. In fact, there was only an increased chance that offspring of eminent parents 
would also be of eminence when compared to the general population. For Galton, 
increased chance was not enough for his idea of inherited genius; it did not account for 
the fact that the majority of the offspring would ‘revert to mediocrity’. There was a 
mystery in inheritance, the tendency of the eminent to have less eminent offspring, that 
Galton sought to figure out, and which would ultimately lead him to discover the law of 
regression to the mean. 
 Galton’s first published exploration of the phenomenon of regression was in the 
article ‘Typical Laws of Heredity’, which was printed both in Nature and Proceedings of the 
Royal Institution. 88  In this article, Galton first establishes the phenomenon of the 
distribution of variance in a population along Quetelet’s error curve, but also observes 
the conundrum: ‘How is it, that although each individual does not as a rule leave his like 
behind him, yet successive generations resemble each other with great exactitude in all 
their general features?’89 This was the problem he had encountered in his studies of 
inheritance ever since his first published article on the subject in Macmillan’s Magazine: 
There is no steady improvement of heredity, and even if he determined there was a clear 
tendency, there did not appear to be any form of stability in inheriting mental qualities. 
Though the probability that ‘eminent’ men also had eminent progeny was higher, it was 
nevertheless more probable for them to have progeny closer to the mean of the 
population, or of lower eminence relative to themselves. This was, then, the conundrum, 
and Galton had set himself out to solve the problem of regression, or, as he called it in 
the article, ‘reversion to mediocrity’. This was a phenomenon that he had noticed across 
several of his studies, including those of sweet peas. Two years earlier, in an article 
discussing heredity, he made the observation that it was  
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the strong tendency of deterioration in the transmission of every exceptionally 
gifted race. That this is a universal tendency among races in a state of nature, is 
proved by the fact that existing races are only kept at their present level by the 
severe action of selection. If they were left unpruned even for a single generation, 
the weaker members would survive, and the average quality of the race would 
necessarily diminish.90 
Galton’s solution to the problem was in a contraption that he had had made, a 
transparent flat box which consisted of a narrow opening in the middle of the top end, a 
pattern of regularly spaced pins in the middle, and a row of funnels of equal length 
sticking up from the bottom. He called it the Quincunx, because the pins looked like a 
tree planting pattern from horticulture of that name, a pattern which resembles the 
number five on a die placed in succession. The purpose of the box was to put shot 
through the hole in the top; the result was that the shot, due to the randomness of their 
fall among the pins, would settle in the funnels at the bottom according to the variation 
of the error curve; the end result looked very much like the geometrical projection of the 
Gaussian distribution (see figure 1.1 for an illustration of the box).91 
 Furthermore, though, Galton proposed an alternative box (which he did not, 
however, manage to have built, but which was otherwise theoretically sound). Starting 
with the quincunx box, he would halve the length of the funnels at the bottom and 
interject another half in the middle, between two section of quincunx-patterned pins. 
Below the upper funnels was a stopper, which could then be removed, one section at a 
time, like opening a trapdoor. The result, Galton proposed, of placing the shot in this 
alternative box, would be that the upper funnel section would show the shot distributed 
along the deviation curve, though with less variance, or ‘error’; and when the shot was 
released from this section into the lower one, the end result would in practice be identical 
to the result from the first quincunx box. 
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Figure 1.1: Galton's illustration of the Quincunx in Natural  Inher i tance , p. 63 
However, and this was the crucial aspect of his experiment, was that when the shot 
was released individually from the upper funnels, the shot from each separate funnel 
would be dispersed in the manner of the error curve. What Galton discovered with this 
was that the error curve, which had been used in astronomical measurements of a single 
point, in fact did not express a variance of error due to, as he put it, ‘petty influences,’92 
meaning that they expressed deviance from a type (as multiple measurements of a single 
object would). Rather, Galton found that the normal distribution was a general 
expression which acted upon statistical populations. In Hacking’s words, ‘[i]n one stroke 
he was (a) explaining and (b) leaving out the “host of petty independent causes” story. 
He was regarding the Normal distribution of many traits as an autonomous statistical 
law. Statistical law had come into the world fully-fledged.’93 In this fashion, the true 
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abstract expression of population thinking came into being, because it demonstrated that 
populations could be thought of as units that followed their own set of laws 
independently of the individuals that composed them. It would not be long after Galton 
discovered the regression to the mean that he proposed eugenics as a science in its own 
right. 
 The discovery of the regression to the mean is, I argue, the most important 
development in statistics for the foundation of eugenics as a discipline. The regression 
provides the explanation for two phenomena: firstly why the offspring of outliers will 
most probably be closer to the average; and secondly, why the population average and 
distribution tends to stay the same from generation to generation. From his earliest 
inquiries into the hereditary transference of ability, Galton had assumed that ability was 
passed on in families; now he fully came to think of families as sub-sets within the 
population, in accord with his experiments with the Quincunx. While Galton had been 
extraordinarily preoccupied with the qualities of ‘race’ even from his earliest studies of 
inheritance, his book Natural Inheritance from 1889 showed that his understanding of the 
law of regression to the mean had affirmed his belief that nurture ultimately had little if 
no effect on the outcome of the individual: ‘The science of heredity is concerned with 
Fraternities and large Populations rather than individuals, and must treat them as units.’94 
To Galton, heredity ultimately acted upon the aggregate number of individuals: 
fraternities, populations, races and species. His determination that this must be true even 
led him to make the following bombastic statement:  
I know of scarcely anything so apt to impress the imagination as the wonderful 
form of cosmic order expressed by the ‘Law of Frequency of Error.’ The law 
would have been personified by the Greeks and deified, if they had known of it. It 
reigns with serenity and in complete self-effacement amidst the wildest confusion. 
The huger the mob, and the greater the apparent anarchy, the more perfect is its 
sway. It is the supreme law of Unreason. Whenever a large sample of chaotic 
elements are taken in hand and marshalled in the order of their magnitude, an 
unsuspected and most beautiful form of regularity proves to have been latent all 
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along. The tops of the marshalled row form a flowing curve of invariable 
proportions; and each element, as it is sorted into place, finds, as it were, a pre-
ordained niche, accurately adapted to fit it. If the measurement at any two 
specified Grades in the row are known, those that will be found at every other 
Grade, except towards the extreme ends, can be predicted in the way already 
explained, and with much precision.95 
With the discovery of the law of regression to the mean, Galton felt that the aspects of 
heredity as pertaining to entire populations could be described adequately; the corollary 
assumption, then, was that the law worked on subsets of the population. This again had 
implications for the entire population. It was this proof, that the manipulation of sub-
population would have direct consequences for the makeup of the whole population, 
that gave credence to Galton’s early assertion that there were agencies ‘of a social 
character’ that had influence upon the population, ‘working towards the degradation of 
human nature, and that others are working towards its improvement.’96 
Eugenics would still be a marginal pursuit for many years, though it began gaining 
some support in the years following Galton’s launch of the term. In the early 1890s, 
before he met Galton, Karl Pearson – then a professor of mathematics at UCL – began 
taking an interest in statistics, which would later become his main occupation. The 
determining event for the popularity of eugenics in Britain, however, came with a surge 
of worry about national degeneracy. What had been a fringe concern of Galton’s came to 
be a national worry that sparked a political debate surrounding national efficiency.  
 
Eugenics  comes to the fore 
In 1901, Queen Victoria died suddenly, ending a 63-year reign. This spurred a wave of 
national nostalgia in Britain with wistful reflections on the nineteenth century as a golden 
era. Where the prevailing progressivist enlightenment philosophy of the Victorians had 
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assumed that change would necessarily entail continued progress, a number a factors 
now contributed to show that change could be for the worse as well. 
The Second Boer War in 1899-1902 (more commonly known simply as the Boer 
War), was initially a humiliation to Britain, which failed to quash what was generally 
perceived to be a peasant rebellion. The war dragged on, proving an unprecedented 
money-sink; by the end of the war in 1902, ‘[t]he final balance sheet showed that the war 
had cost some £200 million. From start to finish, nearly half a million British and 
colonial soldiers had had to be employed against an enemy whose total population, women, 
children and old men included, amounted to scarcely one-fifth of that number.’97 There 
was a public outcry over the inability of British troops to wage war against an 
inexperienced foe. Additionally, it came out that a majority of the potential recruits to the 
war had been deemed unfit for service – a frequently cited example, the numbers from 
Manchester alone showed that ‘8000 out of 11,000 would-be volunteers had had to be 
turned away and of the remainder 2000 were declared fit only for the militia,’ leaving 
only one thousand battle-ready conscripts. 98  This turned into a crisis of national 
efficiency, which proved to be a catchall phrase for the politicians at the time.  
While Britain had risen to the pinnacles of industry, trade and population in the 
preceding century, there were, increasingly, worries about the quality of the population, 
but also of the declining differential birth rate. The population of Britain had continued 
increasing throughout the nineteenth century, but from the 1880s the birth rate had seen 
a considerably smaller rate of increase, leading to fears of ‘race suicide’ with ‘no end of 
comparisons with ancient and more recent civilizations and empires whose flagging 
reproductive energies explained their decline’, but also of the opposite: ‘comparisons 
with Germany and the United States, but sometimes China and Japan, whose higher 
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fertility and larger populations implicitly constituted an immediate or eventual threat to 
Britain’s extensive empire.’99 At the turn of the century, Britain faced a perceived crisis 
that included both worries about the fertility, quality, and efficiency of the population, 
and in this spirit of crisis eugenics was offered as a solution to the numerous perceived 
ailments of the nation, whether they were real or imaginary.  
One of the central factors influencing a broader support for eugenics was therefore 
nationalist sentiments. Eugenics was touted as a science of populations, and its promise 
was that its application could improve the national population. Eugenics was arguably an 
expression of Social Darwinism, the basic tenets of which, it could be argued, had 
support in Britain even before Darwin established the mechanism of natural selection in 
evolution. Social Darwinism gained foothold following the publication of the Origin, but 
especially with the evolutionary philosophy of Herbert Spencer, who was immensely 
popular in his day. Spencer was the first to refer to natural selection as the ‘survival of 
the fittest’ in his Principles of Biology from 1864, calling it ‘the preservation of favoured 
races in the struggle for life.’100 The slippage of meaning in his use of the word ‘race,’ 
which could refer both to animal species and human populations at once echoed 
Spencer’s progressive view of evolution as a universal phenomenon not limited to 
biology, but as a force in play in society, science, technology, even to matter itself. The 
use of statistics was a particularly effective tool for addressing the worries concerning 
national efficiency, given the relationship between statistics and matters of running the 
state efficiently. 
By then, statistics had been used for the study and worry over degeneracy for 
nearly a century. The French seemed to be particularly obsessed with worries over 
deterioration of the race, and the study of soldiers’ stature and rates of suicide had been 
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endlessly discussed to the degree that the statistical study of suicide came to be the object 
of one of the founding documents of the sociological discipline, Émile Durkheim’s 1897 
study Le Suicide, where Durkheim drew social conclusions on the behaviour of 
individuals based on the religious groups (Protestants and Catholics) they were associated 
with.101 
It was within this climate of worries over degeneracy, efficiency, and the longing 
for a golden age that Galton, with the help of Pearson, launched his public appeal for 
eugenics. While his previous suggestions mostly had been confined to his scientific 
writings, on 29 October, 1901, he was invited to give the public Huxley lecture, which 
according to Searle was the result of a ‘shrewdness’ in planning.102 His choice of topic 
reflects Galton’s wish to gather attention to the ‘science’ he had founded. Nonetheless, 
the Huxley lecture, with the title ‘The Possible Improvement of the Human Breed, under 
the Existing Conditions of Law and Sentiment’, marked a departure from his previous 
suggestions, for where Galton’s many treatises on the heritability of genius were 
concerned with the encouragement of those with ability to procreate, he now had the 
recently completed second edition of Charles Booth’s statistical survey of the working 
classes in London, Life and Labour of the People of London, which he used to argue for the 
suppression of the procreation of the lower classes. 
Galton took the data from Booth’s study of the East End of London, but 
generalised it to represent the whole of Britain. According to Donald MacKenzie, Galton 
misrepresented Booth’s data, and conflated them with what Galton had ambiguously 
presented as ‘natural categories’ in his own work, represented by his results with the 
Quincunx, but also in his demonstration of that ability was inherited through lineages. 
Galton’s natural categories were vague measures of ‘civic worth’, and so he proceeded to 
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‘map Booth’s social categories onto his natural ones. Booth’s lowest social strata 
corresponded, Galton assumed, to the groups with the smallest quantities of “civic 
worth”.’103 We can interpret this to be a kind of scientific affirmation of Galton’s 
growing conservatism, so that ‘the eugenic theory of society […] is a way of reading the 
structure of social classes onto nature.’104 
But Galton had not yet succumbed to the view that the suppression of the 
‘residuum,’ which eugenics has become so strongly associated with, was the way forward. 
The Huxley lecture was printed in Nature two days after the lecture, and we read the 
following under the subheading ‘Augmentation of Favoured Stock’:  
The possibility of improving the race of a nation depends on the power of 
increasing the productivity of the best stock. This is far more important than that 
of repressing the productivity of the worst. They both raise the average, the latter 
by reducing the undesirables, the former by increasing those who will become the 
lights of the nation. It is therefore all important to prove that favour to selected 
individuals might so increase their productivity p to warrant the expenditure in 
money and care that would be necessitated.105 
Nonetheless, even if Galton’s suggestions were in the main aimed at various schemes to 
incite earlier and more fruitful marriages, it was implied that an alternative to raising the 
population average lay in the suppression of those at the lower end of the distribution. 
As Paul and Moore remark, after this public call for eugenics to promote national 
efficiency, it ‘was no longer just about breeding from the right people, though this 
remained his chief concern; it was also about identifying those who ought not to 
breed.’106 The promotion of marriage and procreation, Galton’s earliest proposal for how 
to raise the population average, was only one side of the logic of the distribution of 
abilities and the possibility of altering it. The flip side to promoting procreation among 
those who were desirable was to suppress it among those were not. Galton’s early and 
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somewhat naïve ideas on how the patterns of procreation were to be shaped in society 
were broadened as the eugenic project became about finding ways to augment the 
statistical distribution of social and national worth. His experiments with the normal 
distribution curve and the discovery of the regression to the mean demonstrated that the 
distribution in society could be manipulated, at the very least in the abstract. Eugenics 
therefore became a search for the instruments of state could employ to alter an 
abstraction of its composition. 
 
Populat ion technology 
In the following passage, from the manuscript of The Eugenic College of Kantsaywhere, 
Galton arguably expresses what he truly believed about eugenics and populations. He 
was trying to put his scientific convictions into a more colloquial language, though he 
was clearly unable to express himself without some scientific idiosyncrasy:  
t[T]hey look on the Community as a whole, and know [the results of unfit 
marriages] with statistical certainty whenever large numbers are concerned,. [For 
instance, they say] that, say, 1000 unfit couples will assuredly produce a number of 
children that can be specified within narrow limits, of each grade of unfitness, 
though they cannot foretell whether these children will be the offspring of A, B, C, 
or X. This same statistical certainty forms everywhere [all the world over] a large 
part of the foundation of laws and penalties. [in every part of th world]107 
It is curious that in the final years of his life Galton wished to express his scientific ideas 
in literary prose and to write a novel.108 Galton’s eugenic beliefs disregarded individual 
fate outright, and Kantsaywhere is quite unlike the psychological narrative of the nascent 
Modernist novel. Written at the very end of his life, the draft shows to some degree what 
ultimate aspirations and beliefs the ageing Galton had for his eugenic creed. It is a 
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curious text which obsesses over measurements both bodily and mental while insisting 
on the worth of knowing one’s lineage and descent. Galton wrote the novel around 
1910, the year before he died, and he submitted it to a publisher to be evaluated, though 
it was ultimately (and understandably) rejected. The publisher’s rejection led to Galton 
disowning it, calling it ‘a diversion’ that should be henceforth be referred to as 
‘wontsaywhere’, and Galton told his niece to destroy it after his death. Karl Pearson 
asked her to see it, though it arrived to him in a heavily bowdlerised fashion, apparently a 
prudish attempt at excising all hints at sexual innuendo or, indeed, character 
development. The manuscript, in heavily mangled form, is still at the Galton archive at 
UCL. 
 The story, brimming with bad allegorical puns, tells of the ‘late professor I. 
Donoghue’ and his journey to the college of Kantsaywhere, which had been established 
upon the estate of a Mr Neverwas upon his death in 1820.109 Most of the surviving 
manuscript details the protagonist’s entry into the college, where he undergoes a battery 
of tests to determine his ‘genetic’ worth. Ultimately, though, the story is about Galton’s 
eugenic utopia – a utopia which echoes his very first foray into studies of inherited talent 
in 1865. Though he would frequently warn against applying utopian attitudes to his 
statistical findings, it seems like such thoughts ultimately ‘secretly motivated’ most of his 
own scientific inquiry. As such, his eugenic utopia formed an undercurrent of his 
thought through nearly 50 years of writing on heredity and statistics. But where the 
quivering youths of ‘Hereditary Talent and Character’ were praised for their individual 
ability, the most prized aspect of the inhabitants of Kantsaywhere is the quality of their 
aggregate value: 
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It is difficult to describe the indignation and even the horror felt at Kantsaywhere, 
at acts that may spoil the goodness of their stock, of which they have become 
extremely proud and jealous. They look confidently forward to a coming time 
when Kantsaywhere shall have evolved a superior race of men.110 
In the end, this reflects Galton’s own thinking about people, which determined their 
worth not from their own qualities, but for what the group expressed in total. In this 
view, the individual is only considered in negative terms: if they are deemed ‘unfit’ they 
are expelled or barred from reproducing. This superior race of men shows the ultimate 
ambition of eugenics: not to transcend the abilities of the individual, but to improve the 
statistical average; to take a page from Galton’s own writing, he wished to find a stable 
equilibrium at a degree higher than the current one. As the study of eugenics became 
popular, it also became imbued with a dual purpose. Not just to study the properties of 
good stock, but also of those ‘agencies under social control’ from the definition used at 
the Eugenics Laboratory:  
The resultant tendency is to emphasise interest in the future of man. If human 
descent from lower types of life is admitted, it follows that there is in human 
development a potency of ascent towards higher types. Thus there emerges from 
the doctrine of organic evolution, the conception of a potential race ideal. What 
are the conditions which would favour the organic evolution of a higher type of 
Social Being, and how far may we hope to create such conditions? These are the 
questions propounded for study by Eugenics.111 
From when he first defined eugenics in 1883, Galton had thought of it as the ‘science of 
improving stock’.112 Here, as it was being solidified as a discipline, eugenics was defined 
not just as the study of improvement, but also its application, aiming both to be a science 
and a technology of human enhancement. 
 In ‘The Question Concerning Technology,’ Martin Heidegger writes that the 
popular conception of technology, ‘according to which it is a means and a human 
activity, can therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of 
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technology.’113 Heidegger sees that this conception is undeniably true, because it is 
undeniable that technology, whether old or modern, acts as a means to end, to achieve 
something. He believes, though, that this view of technology is limiting, because it only 
views technology in the context of achieving something for human purposes, thus the 
‘anthropological’ definition. As such, the instrumental view of technology is not enough, 
because it does not engage with what the true essence of technology is. This essence lies 
in technology’s capacity for revealing, through the Gestell, or enframing, an aspect of 
reality. Heidegger’s position on technology is, in some respects, ambivalent, as he sees 
this revealing as a way of ‘dis-covering’ essence, an avenue to truth which is central to his 
existential analytic.114 In this respect, I propose ‘legibility’ – a concept I borrow from 
James C. Scott – as a corollary to Heidegger’s view of technology to address the 
technological intervention on populations. 
 Scott refers to the subordination of a unified whole to a governing principle of a 
statistical measure as a process of making something legible, which he conceptually 
defines as a state’s project ‘to arrange the population in ways that simplified the classic 
state functions of taxation, conscription, and prevention of rebellion.’115 Legibility, then, 
is revealing an aspect of the population that enables the state to maintain its purposes. As 
a technical operation, it instrumentalises what it is revealing, and in its extension, to 
eugenics. In relationship to technology, I mean the way in which technology 
instrumentalises its object according to a desired outcome is its function: like the 
hydroelectric power plant subordinates the river only to be a matter of the energy it can 
extract from it, or how the lamp subordinates the darkened room in terms of how it can 
illuminate it. This view of legibility does not accord with Heidegger’s idea of the essence of 
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technology, but I believe it can fruitfully be applied to the anthropological conception of 
it. According to that view, technology has a function, for me, and as such that function is 
what defines it, but at the same time this is a naïve idea of technology, because 
technologies always necessarily have other consequences: the destroyed ecology in the 
area around the hydroelectric power plant is as much a function of it as the storage of 
energy, but it does not represent the desired outcome. In these terms, though, legibility 
as a function of technology is a helpful way of understanding eugenics, because it 
addresses ‘applied eugenics’ as a way of technologising a reductionist, scientific 
description – ‘scientific eugenics,’ as it were. Eugenics would, by the help of statistical 
modelling, make populations and heredity more legible, at the cost of overlooking other 
aspects. 
I therefore argue that Scott’s concept of ‘legibility’ can be used in a wider sense 
than only applying it to the practice of the running of a state. The use of statistics, while 
in the sense of ‘pertaining to the state’ is completely within Scott’s definition, but it also 
pertains to the very nature of statistics itself: it acts as a mediation that represents a unity 
which is otherwise difficult to comprehend for any individual. As such, as a 
representation of population thinking in eugenic terms, statistics is also a translation 
between two objects that are mutually incomprehensible: the human individual and the 
human population. Statistical representation, though, is a simplification because it 
requires legibility; the consequence is that other aspects of the representation of the 
population are overlooked, even though those aspects nevertheless are present. 
I stated earlier that human enhancement, in the eugenicist perspective, is not about 
the human individual. As an articulation of the improvement of populations, it can never 
refer with precision to the improvement of individuals, but can only measure the relative 
value of an individual in relation to the population. Eugenics is about the improvement 
of the human, but only in a collective sense: in a biological perspective as a species; in a 
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statistical view as a population, whether in terms of a nation, a race, or the inhabitants of 
a city or region. While this can be understood, with reference to Foucault, as biopolitical; 
as Foucault explains it, biopolitics came about as one of  
two poles of development linked together by a whole intermediary cluster of 
relations. […] The second, formed somewhat later, focused on the species body, 
the body imbued with the mechanics of life and serving as the basis of the 
biological processes: propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life 
expectancy and longevity, with all the conditions that can cause these to vary. 
Their supervision was effected through an entire series of interventions and 
regulatory controls: a bio-politics of the population.116 
Extrapolating these practices to other forms of population control, it is easy to view 
statistics as helping to enact these kinds of (speculative) control at any population-scale. 
Even so, the use of statistics is not just the domain of the state, even though it takes its 
name therefrom. Before the twentieth century, statistics was an imprecise instrument in 
reference to any nation’s entire population – statistics were, at best, weakly 
representative, providing only a certain measure of probability in the accuracy of its 
predictions.  
 This was, as John Brewer shows in The Sinews of Power,117 exploited by interest 
groups, establishing the modern political lobby. Following the Glorious Revolution of 
1688, Parliament would gather on an annual basis, rather than at the whim of the 
monarch. These circumstances initiated a political climate that gave rise to the lobby: 
private interested parties, such as merchants or guilds, would approach government 
officials – literally, in the lobby of Parliament – to gather support for their causes. These 
causes would be in conflict with the official line, and ‘required statistical backing, because 
government departments were usually in a position to produce figures to challenge or 
corroborate a special interest’s interpretation of their position.’ The result was that the 
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lobbies, to apply pressure on the legislative process, ‘concocted their own statistics.’118 
Thus, while statistics arose in the context of governance, it was utilised and further 
developed in parallel, providing an alternative channel to influence governmental power 
through quantitative techniques. While statistics could be used as a technique of 
expressing power and control over populations, it is not limited to be an expression, as it 
were, of the nation-state. 
 The relationship between the science and technology of eugenics is defined by its 
purpose, as it was stated by Galton in his final definition of it: the ‘study of agencies 
under social control’, and, by implication, how to use them. As noted, eugenics was 
somewhat paradoxically its own application, and could therefore be considered in itself 
as the technology that related to the science. But the technological formulation of 
eugenics was essentially that which would eventually be called ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
eugenics. 
 The origin of the terms ‘positive’ and ‘negative eugenics’ is somewhat unclear. 
Daniel Kevles refers to C. P. Blacker,119 who in turn refers to Caleb Saleeby’s Parenthood 
and Race Culture, simply stating that ‘It was Dr. Saleeby who, with the approval of Sir 
Francis Galton, devised the terms “positive” and “negative” eugenics.’120 Saleeby was a 
prolific author of popular works supporting eugenics in the early twentieth century, and a 
prominent member of the Eugenics Education Society, and he congratulated himself on 
coming up with the term: ‘Now if we are to achieve any immediate success we must 
clearly divide our proposals, as the present writer did some years ago, with Mr. Galton’s 
approval, into two classes: positive eugenics and negative eugenics.’121 Saleeby was something of 
a liability to the Society, not least for his tendency to inflate his standing: ‘Saleeby was in 
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the habit of claiming to be Galton’s favourite son and disciple, a tactic doubly infuriating 
to Galton and Pearson, because innocent outsiders sometimes accepted this claim at face 
value.’122 I mention this because Saleeby’s use of the terms is somewhat superficial, 
obscuring its grounding in Galton’s statistical research and the regression of the mean. 
 The earliest definite reference to positive and negative eugenics (though in a 
somewhat circumlocutory manner) was not made by Saleeby, but by the sociologist W. 
McDougall, in the paper ‘A Practicable Eugenic Solution’ which was presented to a 
meeting of the Sociological Society: 
Influences of each of these our groups we may call positive or negative according as 
they favour or tend to diminish the rate of reproduction of individuals of these 
classes. All eugenic influences are thus negative influences of the first or second 
class, or positive influences of the third or fourth class.123 
The classes McDougall was referring to are the statistical ‘quartiles’ of the population, 
terms that had originally been proposed by Galton to designate the division of the whole 
into quarters.124 The first and second class would be those below the mean; the third and 
fourth above it. What McDougall proposed was clearly in terms of Galton’s previous 
thoughts on eugenics, since Galton had proposed that one should influence marriage, 
and thus procreation, of the abler classes. And so, McDougall made this idea more 
explicit in terms of statistical thinking, but also expressed it in terms of the part of the 
population that was considered to be below the average. 
 At this time, in Edwardian Britain, there is little doubt that McDougall’s use of 
the term ‘classes’ carried with it its double, social meaning. Like Galton had appropriated 
Booth’s social classes as natural ones, one can easily interpret McDougall’s proposal as a 
way of handling social classes based on their statistical legibility. Indeed, it was one of the 
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worries of the age, that the ‘abler’ classes were being outbred by those less able, and that 
the population as a whole was threatened by degeneracy. The Boer War, and the 
rejection of the recruits that had become such a national outrage, only served to prove 
what Galton had lamented for many years. Already in 1869 he had voiced his worries 
that modern society was developing too quickly for modern man:  
We are in crying want for a greater fund of ability in all stations of life; for neither 
the classes of statesmen, philosophers, artisans nor labourers are up to the modern 
complexity of their several professions. An extended civilization like ours 
comprises more interests than the ordinary statesmen or philosophers of our 
present race are capable of dealing with, and it exacts more intelligent work than 
our ordinary artisans and labourers are capable of performing. Our race is over-
weighted, and appears likely to be drudged into degeneracy by demands that 
exceed its powers.125 
By the time of McDougall’s paper, then, the idea of the degeneracy of the population 
was a reaction to the observed fact that those parts of society that were observed to be 
more able happened to be less prolific. As McDougall writes: ‘in this country at the 
present time, the fertility of the superior classes, or, better, of the individuals of higher 
civic worth, is low relatively to that of the mediocre mass of the population, and still 
lower relatively to their maximal natural fertility.’126 But this degeneracy, he argued, was 
not one that was intrinsic to biology itself; it was due to artificial causes, and ‘this relative 
infertility is mainly due to artificial and removable causes.’127 
McDougall’s view that degeneracy of the population came about as a result of 
social organisation was an echo of Darwin’s Descent of Man, written thirty-five years 
earlier. In the above section on ‘Species and populations’ I quote Darwin’s observation 
on how vaccinations preserved weaklings who would otherwise have succumbed of 
small-pox. Immediately following it we read: ‘It is surprising how soon a want of care, or 
care wrongly directed, leads to the degeneration of a domestic race; but excepting in the 
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case of man himself, hardly any one is so ignorant as to allow his worst animals to 
breed.’128 Degeneracy was thus a matter of social organisation; it had come about as the 
result of a bad practice of artificial selection, rather than the good practice of natural 
selection, and this is what the twin concepts of negative and positive eugenics sought to 
ameliorate. McDougall’s suggestion tread little new ground in his theoretical discussion 
besides the novelty of a phrase that would come to stick; neither, one might argue, was 
his ‘practicable suggestion’ particularly ground breaking: he suggests a scaled pay-grade 
for civil servants according to the number of children they have, rather than the fixed 
one, on the presumption that civil servants are of the highest civil worth, but that their 
pay is lamentably poor, and more so if they have children. In other words, McDougall 
proposes a welfare solution to those who were the most gifted and with most ‘civic 
worth,’ but who otherwise earned (what he perceived to be) too little to support a large 
family – ignoring, of course, that those classes he laments as being far too prolific most 
definitely had a much lower annual income than the figure he saw as too low, £700.  
In McDougall’s four classes, the first and lowest class would probably encompass 
what was seen as the ‘residuum,’ which was seen as a sort of superfluous part of society, 
not contributing to the economy, but rather depleting it of resources. It was the 
suppression of this class that was the main focus of negative eugenics, and which 
commonly received the most attention. ‘“Negative eugenics” in Britain,’ MacKenzie 
writes, ‘was thus in large part a strategy for dealing with a crisis in the reproduction of 
labour power. The residuum was a section of the working class surplus to capital’s 
requirements.’129 Yet McDougall’s suggestion also shows that there was some divisions 
on the degree of intervention any eugenic policy could be allowed to have. Listing the 
various atrocious proposals of negative eugenics, he observes that ‘these and other 
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drastic measures have had their ardent advocates, while positive eugenic suggestions have 
been generally received with indifference’, and furthermore, that strategies of negative 
eugenics might contribute less to the aims of eugenics as a whole, and would therefore 
be ‘of insignificant importance, relatively to the influence of the third and fourth groups; 
those which affect the reproduction of the better elements, and especially those of the 
fourth group.’130 The proposals of positive and negative eugenics were attempts at how 
to affect the population average; the average they hoped for, however, was arbitrary and, 
more specifically, was decided upon in terms of those qualities that the eugenicists 
arguably favoured in themselves. Much like the problems of the prefix ‘eu-’ the category 
of ‘civic worth’ was nebulous and hard to define – and therefore it was similarly difficult 
to determine how to enact positive eugenics policies. McDougall gives it as ‘the 
combination of intellectual, moral and physical qualities with which any individual is 
innately endowed.’131 It is easy to see how difficult it would be to determine objectively 
what people it was that inhabited these ideals, but it reflects the subjective nature of the 
eugenic endeavour, and thus that the categories and measurements of worth that were 
produced reflected on those who created them. It becomes a way of reading the rest of 
society in terms of how one understands oneself. In other words, the idea of eugenics, 
and its variants negative and positive eugenics, was a way of making the population 
legible in terms of those who defined what worth was, while at the same time being a 
proposal for how to rewrite it in the terms it was being made legible, and as such a 
technological, technocratic proposal. 
Galton’s population thinking makes the population legible in favour of what he 
deemed to be civic worth and ability. But as the Eugenic College of Kantsaywhere shows, this 
necessitated a particular form of elitism, and a disdain for the very variability that was 
                                                
130 McDougall, III, pp. 56–57. 
131 McDougall, III, p. 56. 
  
94 
essential for Galton to make his innovations in statistics to begin with – redefining the 
distribution of error as a distribution of variance. The price for legibility is the 
suppression of seeing value in other things; the inhabitants of the college think of their 
‘race’ at the cost of not being able to value the individual, they anxiously await their race 
of supermen in the future while overlooking the present. 
  
Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have presented the origins of eugenic thought, in particular as it was 
expressed by its originator, Francis Galton. Returning to the questions I asked at the 
beginning then, eugenics provides some subjective answers: As a scientific expression, it 
came about with advances in both heredity and statistics as necessary components, and 
as Galton believed, to think eugenically was to think in terms of the generation of 
populations, and not of individuals. In eugenic terms, then, ‘human’ has greater meaning 
as an aggregate than as an individual: as a population, a race, a species; ‘enhancement’ is 
the improvement of that aggregate, to bring about, through the mechanism of evolution 
and supersede the current average a stable higher point for the species – the superman 
even. ‘Technology’ would be the way to bring this about, through knowledge of 
populations and evolution, the manipulation and control over heredity and statistics. The 
early eugenicists struggled with the conflict between the ideal society and the threat of 
authoritarian control necessary to achieve it. Ultimately, eugenics proposes to alter an 
abstraction, the statistical representation of traits in a population, an abstraction that 
makes a large number of individuals legible as a unified whole. Hence, if eugenics is a 
technology of human enhancement, it is a technology quite unlike how we otherwise 
think of technologies, as it was intended to manipulate that abstraction. The associated 
means for achieving that, whether they be marriage certificates, sterilisation or modern 
forms of genetic alteration, can therefore only be considered eugenic insofar as they are 
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subservient to that aim. To truly achieve such a goal would require some measure of 
authoritarian intervention, a point which should be kept in mind when I discuss 
transhumanism in chapters four and five. 
As eugenics aimed to enhance evolved traits, I now turn to a more direct 
intervention into altering adaptive function. The view that evolved traits have a 
functional adaptation relative to the environment readily invites an analogy between the 
body’s parts and organs, and technology. In the following two chapters I therefore turn 
to the mechanistic conception of the body, and how enhancement technologies are 
expressed through it, most prominently with the cyborg. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Mechanical Bodies 
The solipsism of the Cartesian Machine 
 
 
The art i f i c ia l  man and the evolut ion o f  the human/insec t  
Nestled among the pages of the November 1924 issue of Science and Invention is a full-page 
spread which heralds the coming of an ‘Artificial Man’ (see figure 2.1). The magazine was 
one of Hugo Gernsback’s many magazines – most famously, in Amazing Stories 
Gernsback named the type of fiction he published ‘scientifiction,’ which would 
eventually crystallise as ‘science fiction.’ Science and Invention, however, was not purely 
dedicated to fiction, as each issue had only a few stories. Mostly, it contained popular 
reports on the latest science and technology news. Scientific fact was intermingled with 
science fiction. 
 The Artificial Man is a collage that mixes photographs with drawings and text to 
tout the new possibilities of prosthetic innovations. ‘Removing the Fangs of Death by 
Substituting Organs of the Body,’ the subtitle states, and in the accompanying illustration 
a man, otherwise normally dressed in a suit and hat, has a control panel strapped to his 
chest. Various arrows point to artificial organs attached to the control panel: an oxygen 
tank, a pump for circulating blood, a mechanical replacement of the small intestine. To 
the right of the man we get a closer look at the apparatus itself, with labels for an 
artificial heart, artificial kidneys and artificial lungs. ‘These methods are not as impractical 
as one might at first glance suppose them to be,’ it says, followed by a non sequitur: ‘The 
heart pump is a simple double-valved mechanism; it pumps the blood through the 
artificial lungs, and consequently replaces both.’ Above this proclamation is a picture of a 
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Figure 2.1: The Artificial Man, in Science  and Invent ion , 12 (1924), p. 665. 
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woman who has undergone rhinoplasty, apparently to her benefit; below, a drawing of a 
man ‘playing cards with two artificial arms.’1 
 The Artificial Man is, of course, a fiction; a fantastic vehicle to introduce some 
imagined possibilities that could lead from the creation of a haemodialysis machine. In 
1913, John J. Abel, L. G. Rowntree and B. B. Turner presented such a machine to the 
Association of American Physicians.2 They proposed to use it first on animals, but by 
1924 Abel had proclaimed it to be very nearly ready for use on people. The German 
medical doctor Georg Haas performed the first experimental haemodialysis on a person 
that year, lasting only fifteen minutes, but it wasn’t until 1943 that Willem Kolff created a 
dialyser which could be used clinically.3  
 Outwardly, the ‘artificial kidney’ bears little in common with a normal kidney. 
Metal, glass and rubber, it is long and cylindrical – and much larger than any animal 
kidney. What it shares with organic kidneys is function, not form, and it is therefore no 
surprise that the Artificial Man is portrayed as carrying his internal organs in a harness 
outside of his body, as none of them would actually fit inside of what must be the 
hollowed-out cavity of his torso. However, the most incongruous aspect is those 
peripherals that come in addition to the artificial organs themselves: the control board 
and the battery, and two temperature regulators, both apparently manually operated. 
Must he continuously adjust the dials so his organs work appropriately? What happens if 
the battery runs out of electricity? As a proto-cyborg The Artificial Man is only 
superficially convincing, showcasing the limitations of technology in the 1920s, before a 
proper theory of control had been developed. Similarly, yet subtly, it showcases the 
                                                
1 Joseph H. Kraus and H. Winfield Secor, ‘Homo Artificialis’, Science and Invention, 12 (1924), 665. 
2 John J. Abel, L. G. Rowntree and B. B. Turner, ‘On the Removal of Diffusible Substances from the 
Circulating Blood by Means of Dialysis’, Transactions of the Association of American Physicians, 28 (1913), 51–54; 
W. J. Kolff and others, ‘The Artificial Kidney: A Dialyser with a Great Area’, Acta Medica Scandinavica, 117 
(1944), 121–34. 
3 Dobrin N. Paskalev, ‘Georg Haas (1886-1971): The Forgotten Hemodialysis Pioneer’, Dialysis and 
Transplantation, 30 (2001), 828–32. 
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limitations of a mechanical understanding of the human body. Unlike the artificial 
kidney, the kidneys in the body control themselves. If the body is a machine, it was at 
this time a machine still inadequately described as such. 
 Though visually striking, the Artificial Man was only a casual sketch hinting at 
future developments. Five years later, the physicist and pioneering crystallographer John 
Desmond Bernal fleshed out the artificial men of the future in greater depth, in The 
World, The Flesh, and The Devil. A short polemic on the future of humans in a 
technological perspective, Bernal’s book, part of the series of future predictions ‘To-day 
and To-morrow,’ was advertised by the publisher as being ‘one of the most amazing 
prophecies in the series,’ ostensibly as startling in its predictions as J. B. S. Haldane’s 
Daedalus.4 The series covered topics ranging from science to politics, religion and art; 
Daedalus had been the inaugural book. A controversial tract on the future of science and 
technology, Haldane’s scientific optimism and eugenic idealism was soon after muted by 
Bertrand Russell’s ironically titled riposte Icarus, a more pessimistic take on the topic.5 
Today, Haldane’s book is well known for introducing ‘ectogenesis’, a reproductive 
technology for growing foetuses outside of the body, which was explicitly intended to be 
a eugenic technology to secure the health and well-being of the foetus.6 According to 
Patrick Parrinder, the ‘To-day and To-morrow’ series inaugurates futurology as a 
discipline, as the series launched a number of volumes that projected the impact of 
coming technologies on society by leading scientists of the day.7  
                                                
4 John Desmond Bernal, The World, The Flesh and The Devil: An Enquiry into the Future of the Three Enemies of 
the Rational Soul, To-Day and To-Morrow (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner; New York: Dutton, 
1929), unpaginated. 
5 Bertrand Russell, Icarus; Or, the Future of Science, To-day and To-morrow (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner; New York: Dutton, 1924). 
6 John Burdon Sanderson Haldane, Daedalus: Or, Science and the Future, To-Day and To-Morrow (London: 
Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1923), p. 65. 
7 Patrick Parrinder, ‘Robots, Clones and Clockwork Men: The Post-Human Perplex in Early Twentieth-
Century Literature and Science’, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, 34 (2009), 56–67 (p. 58). 
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 Haldane’s volume was the first of the series; Bernal’s, while not the last (the 
series carried over one hundred titles), arrived auspiciously at the end of the Roaring 
Twenties, and at the eve of the depression of the 1930s. While the First World War had 
sparked a shock to the prevalent idea of Progress which had so characterised the years 
prior to it, with popular writers like Oswald Spengler adopting a Nietzschean, cyclical 
view of history, the decade following the war enjoyed economic prosperity and 
technological optimism. Thus Haldane and Bernal bookend the futurological 
speculations of the 1920s in thematically similar ways. Compared to Haldane, however, 
Bernal is more radical in his predictions for the future of the human body. 
 Bernal envisions a future evolution of the human where the technologies we have 
created become a part of us. He considers the future of the ‘rational man’ and the 
challenges we face in terms of the developments of our constructed modern 
environment and divides his short book into the three sections which give the book its 
title. The World: the future of our bodies faced with the environment and how we might 
change them in light of the emerging scientific technological system. The Flesh: the 
challenges that are posed against our inherent tendencies towards irrationality. Finally, 
The Devil: the enemy within. Bernal introduces what he calls the mechanical or 
compound man, and the book is therefore one of the earliest texts which describes the 
merging of technological and biological evolution, describing a future in which the tools 
that we create end up literally becoming part of us. 
 In the third chapter, ‘The Flesh’, Bernal suggests that in ‘the alteration of himself 
man has a great deal further to go.’8 His is not only a possible future, but something of a 
necessity: ‘In a civilized worker the limbs are mere parasites,’ since ‘modern mechanical 
and modern chemical discoveries have rendered both the skeletal and metabolic 
functions of the body to a large extent useless’ (p. 41). But while the modern knowledge 
                                                
8 Bernal, p. 37. Further references to this edition are given after quotations. 
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worker needs to adapt to an industrialised society which has no need for his prehistoric 
physiology, nature’s method of altering the functions of man by natural selection is too 
slow. To Bernal the eugenic method of artificial selection, which Haldane favoured, is 
limited by not achieving any alteration of function, only the ‘perfection’ of what is 
already there, with no ‘alteration of the species.’ To achieve that, ‘we must alter either the 
germ plasm or the living structure of the body, or both together’ (p. 38). In a stroke, 
Bernal suggests at once genetic engineering and prosthetic cyborgisation, but it is the 
alteration of the body’s living structure which interests him most – maybe because it has 
the greater technological possibility for him. 
 Bernal proceeds in the manner of Haldane’s technological speculations in 
Daedalus to describe an alternative to the eugenic model which pushes it further: the 
physiological alteration of the body, both possible and commonplace with the highly 
advanced technology of a future society.9 With the caveat that his account ‘must be taken 
rather as a fable’ (p. 42), he proposes to append an additional stage to human life as it 
currently is: first the natural life span, which in the future one might expect to be up to 
120 years of good health. This stage would be a time for folly, art, socialising and sex, 
and Bernal reckons that even if it is limited to 60 or 70 years there should be no real 
complaints against what is to succeed it. As one approaches the end of the natural 
lifespan, ‘a complicated and rather unpleasant process of transforming the already 
existing organs and grafting on all the new sensory and motor mechanisms’ (p. 45). The 
body is broken down and its constituent parts are disassembled. Only the brain is 
preserved in an encasement; attached to it are new limbs and sensory organs with novel 
                                                
9 Bernal was a communist, and progress for was therefore not limited to science and technology alone. 
Like other enhancement utopias I discuss, such as Francis Galton’s Kantsaywhere in chapter one, or the 
liberal state necessary to realise the ideas of Nicholas Agar and James Hughes discussed in chapter four, 
Bernal’s machine man first requires perfect social organization: Progress in the World entails Progress for 
the Flesh. 
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and improved functions. The metamorphosis is neither final nor permanent, however, as 
man will be 
physically plastic in a way quite transcending the capacities of untransformed 
humanity. Should he need a new sense organ, or have a new mechanism to 
operate, he will have undifferentiated nerve connections to attach to them, and will 
be able to extend indefinitely his possible sensations and actions by using 
successively different end-organs. (p. 46) 
The plasticity of the body enables a ‘great number of typical forms’ (p. 46), each 
specialised to carry out their given roles. In the place of the matter of our current organic 
bodies we will have ‘some very rigid material, probably not metal but one of the new 
fibrous substances,’ possibly in the shape of ‘a short cylinder’ to contain the brain (p. 47). 
This is trussed up with the life-support systems which keeps the brain alive, an ‘artificial 
heart-lung digestive system – an elaborate, automatic contrivance’ (p. 48). The primary 
sense organs, the eyes and ears, will be preserved as they are, but the eyes ‘will look into a 
kind of optical box which will enable them alternatively to look into periscopes 
projecting from the case, telescopes, microscopes and a whole range of televisual 
apparatus. The ear would have the corresponding microphone attachments and would 
still be the chief organ for wireless reception’ (p.48). But these are the last vestiges of the 
human body. Smell and taste, on account of their lesser importance for emotion, ‘would 
be prolonged into connections outside the case and would be changed into chemical 
testing organs’ (pp. 48-49). Motor organs would be attached to the brain, ‘but much 
more complex than our mouth, tongue and hands,’ which ‘would probably be built up 
like that of a crustacean’ (p. 49). The body in this future becomes modular, more loosely 
connected to the brain, with interchangeable parts: ‘There would be locomotor apparatus 
of different kinds, which could be used alternatively for slow movement, equivalent to 
walking, for rapid transit and for flight’ (p. 49). Options for extending the body include 
the projection of thoughts, vision, sound and even movement, to the degree that Bernal 
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foresees that the brain can remain stationary as its ‘indefinitely extendible’ body goes 
about its tasks. 
 Bernal recognises that his vision for the future might strike us as monstrous, a 
monstrosity which is reflected in his language of transformation. For example, he 
suggests that we take on crustacean aspects in the attachment of artificial limbs; not least 
is his description of the unpleasant metamorphosis itself, which ‘might be compared to 
that of a chrysalis’ (p. 45) that transforms us from our current larval state into the 
technologically augmented final form: the human’s imago. But, he contends, ‘it is only the 
logical outcome of the type of humanity that exists at present’ (p. 51).  
 Bernal’s grotesquerie is reminiscent of H. G. Wells’s scientific romances. The 
brain in its cylinder recalls the discovery of the Martians in The War of the Worlds, who are 
physically feeble but extend their capabilities through technology;10 similarly, Bernal’s 
separation of human life into two stages of life, one completely dissimilar form the other, 
also echoes the future of human evolution as portrayed in The Time Machine, where 
mankind has separated into two strands, the weakly and effete Eloi and the malevolent, 
troglodytic Morlocks.11 Like Darwin and Galton before him, Bernal believes evolution to 
have come to a standstill with human civilisation. Through our technological prowess, 
the human species has become a dead end for evolutionary progress, by virtue of our 
tools and technologies which extend our grasp and shape our environment. But while 
organic man’s evolutionary progress has ended, ‘mechanical man, apparently a break in 
organic evolution, is actually more in the true tradition of a further evolution’ (p. 52). 
Humanity is equally preserved as it is superseded, and our current form is only an 
intermediate stage. Paradoxically, too, humanity is conserved in the push towards an 
entomological technologisation of our body. With the metamorphosis to the final stage, 
                                                
10 H. G. Wells, The War of the Worlds (London: Heinemann, 1898). 
11 H. G. Wells, The Time Machine (London: Heinemann, 1895). 
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the only aspect of the human body that is preserved is the human brain and its 
immediate sensory apparatus. For Bernal, as for the Enlightenment thinkers, it is our 
brain and capacity for reason that truly makes us human. 
 In this scenario the body beyond our brain is peripheral, accidental, and, to 
Bernal, something which it becomes necessary to alter. The physical capacities we have – 
or the lack thereof – are also the sources for our evolutionary weaknesses as a species. 
Again we might draw a parallel to Platonic philosophy. In Protagoras, in which the Titan 
Epimetheus, having been given the task of passing out attributes to the animals, in his 
forgetfulness exhausts them before coming to the humans, leaving humans without any 
attributes of our own. This spurs his brother, Prometheus, to steal fire from Zeus and 
grant it to humans; and so, in the lack of specialist attributes, humans gained the capacity 
for making tools and technology. This lack may have given us tools, but Bernal believes 
that the bodily structure which allows for them has now become superfluous. Among 
insects, highly specialised adaptations to endlessly varying micro-climates proliferate, 
with morphological variations evolved to handle the most minute differences in the 
environment. Humans, however, are generalists, capable of surviving in any number of 
environments, and the technologies we use extend this capability even further. But if the 
tools extend our hands, to Bernal our hands merely extend our minds, and the generality 
of human morphology can be pared down further and technological developments will 
again bestow upon us those specialist attributes we lost through evolution. Humanity will 
gain the capacity for endless, physiological adaptation for a technological society which 
has left the needs of the natural environment behind. 
 Bernal’s book was polemical, not scientific, his proposal was speculative and he 
conceded that his vision for the future of the flesh must be seen as a fable. And while he 
pushed his vision towards the grotesque, the basic idea of evolutionary progress and 
adaptation wedded to technologies would come to be a persistent one. His was an idea 
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which preceded any scientific conceptualisation of how it might be carried out – how to 
replace the body with the machine – but he articulated a basic topic of enhancement. If 
the body is a machine, and if the creation of novel machines are progressing to become 
ever more complex and capable – is then the progress of science and technology a form 
of evolution? Is it evolving us? 
 
Cyborg language 
Paul Edwards, building on George Lakoff and Mark Johnson’s work on how metaphors 
constitute the way we perceive and speak of the world, 12  claims that the guiding 
metaphor or ‘master trope’ of modern Western Medicine is 
‘THE BODY IS A MACHINE’. 13  There is merit to this view: As the successes of 
Western medicine has shown, if we have a physical theory of how the body works, we 
can also have a method for how to heal it if it fails us, based on our knowledge of 
physiology, and of cause and effect. The scientific method provides us with a way to 
determine which practices of healing are successful, and which are not. 
 Yet the metaphor strains at the seams. A machine is built while a body is grown; 
it is designed from the bottom up and its parts are known and interchangeable, where the 
body is the result of natural selection. Recognition of this lies at the core of the classic 
dispute in biology between mechanicism and vitalism, where the problem of generation 
was one of the persistent factors in the vitalists’ critique of mechanicism. Yet while 
medicine and biology recognises the differences between machine and body – the 
machine is static, the body plastic – the language of machines is persistent, and the 
metaphor’s logic gives rise to medical ideas in terms of the body as machine.  
                                                
12 George Lakoff, Metaphors We Live By (Chicago; London: University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
13 Paul N. Edwards, The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America, Inside 
Technology (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 1996), p. 158. 
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 An illustrative example can be found in the 1967 article ‘Spare-part surgery’. In 
this article, Norman Browse thinks of the body in terms of – as the title indicates – ‘spare 
parts,’ not only claiming this view is nothing new (‘there is nothing new in medicine’), 
but almost constitutive of humanity itself: ‘Spare-part surgery began when the first 
prehistoric man to survive a traumatic amputation of a limb attached a piece of wood to 
the remaining stump to help himself to walk or grasp.’14 This starting point, speculative 
as it is, arguably reflects the industrial society in which the BODY IS A MACHINE-
metaphor has developed within, where manufactured goods are infinitely reproducible 
on the assembly line instead of being individually unique artefacts crafted by a skilled 
artisan. Browse’s stance is also a consequence of the many successes of mid-century 
medicine, both in terms of organ transplantation and the introduction of assistive 
machines – the heart-lung machine, kidney dialysis and the pacemaker were all in use by 
the time the article was published. The first heart transplant was conducted that same 
year, and Browse mentions the recent success in transplanting pancreas. By these 
successes, Browse sees no obvious limit to what can be repaired, hoping that ‘years 
hence we may see an artificial eye relaying its message to the brain’,15 a prediction that 
modern prosthetics have proven correct, even if the quality of vision at present is still 
low. Artificial limbs, internal organs and sensory organs are becoming increasingly 
sophisticated, to the point where it is imaginable that they can function as well as healthy 
body parts. 
 Browse’s language, however, also indicates the limits of how far he is willing to 
push his speculations. The ‘spare’ parts are replacements for existing, failed organs, 
reflecting the medical stance of restoring function, not exceeding it. But technology is 
not limited by the constraints in the capabilities of bodily functions. If the body is a 
                                                
14 Norman Browse, ‘Spare-Part Surgery’, The British Medical Journal, 4 (1967), 156–61 (p. 157). 
15 Browse, p. 157. 
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machine, our contemporary technological reality in which technologies are continuously 
improved on, replaced or upgraded tells us that it is just as reasonable to believe that 
replacement parts can exceed existing functions, and that the body can be augmented 
instead of repaired, enhanced rather than healed. This is the territory of the cyborg.  
 Though ‘cyborg’ is commonly explained to be a contraction of ‘cybernetic 
organism,’ Nathan Kline and Manfred Clynes, the pair who first coined the word, 
themselves never refer to it as such in the paper where they first launched the cyborg. 
Nevertheless, the constellation of the two words signal a new approach to the machinic 
man. Cybernetics, the word coined by Norbert Wiener in 1947 and canonised the 
following year in his book Cybernetics, or, Control and Communication in the Animal and 
Machine, was both an epistemology and a scientific approach that introduced the 
principles of control engineering to a number of disciplines with its analysis of the 
feedback loop and its emphasis on the universal importance of information theory. As is 
clear from the title of Wiener’s book, cybernetics was an attempt to bridge the perceived 
gap between the organic and the inorganic, dissolving the philosophical antagonism 
between mechanicism and vitalism, a dichotomy which Wiener perceived as having been 
superseded, ‘relegated to the limbo of badly posed questions.’16 Cybernetics is also seen 
as a theory that mechanises the body, which treats it like it is actually a (specific type of) 
machine, rather than merely dissolving the ontological boundaries between the living and 
the inert. In his characteristically lucid style, W. Ross Ashby put it most succinctly in his 
Introduction to Cybernetics: ‘Cybernetics, too, is a “theory of machines”, but it treats, not 
things but ways of behaving.’17 By mechanising purposeful behaviour, cybernetics opened 
for the construction of machines with apparent intent – such as in the philosophically 
vexing concept of life.  
                                                
16 Norbert Wiener, Cybernetics: Or, Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (New York: Wiley, 
1948), p. 56. 
17 W. Ross Ashby, Introduction to Cybernetics (London: Chapman & Hall, 1956), p. 3. 
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 When Kline and Clynes first articulated the cyborg, they proposed to use 
cybernetics as a technique to replace the body’s ‘robot-like’ functions with equivalent but 
superior mechanisms; today, descriptions of modern, functional prosthetics will 
frequently refer to them as ‘cybernetic’ in order to describe the merging and extension of 
organic tissue with metal. In one sense, then, cybernetics treats the body as a machine. I 
have already explored a few expressions of this idea, but it goes back much further than 
the early decades of the twentieth century. Already in the seventeenth century René 
Descartes held that the animal was a machine, and his influence occasions a closer 
examination of what he meant. Moreover, his dualism, the separation of mind from 
body, is often invoked in critiques of enhancement ideas, most notably in N. Katherine 
Hayles’s influential How We Became Posthuman.18 Bernal’s brain in a box is a variation on 
this theme, as the rest of the body is treated merely as surplus, adjunct parts which do 
not constitute the true self, which is situated in the brain alone. But to what degree is 
Kline and Clynes’s most explicit example a true example of cyborg technology? 
 
The cyborg rat  
Kline and Clynes proposes that man, rather than carry his entire environment with him 
into space, should ‘attempt a partial adaptation to the conditions of space’, to be 
achieved through ‘cybernetic aids’. The aim is to alter the self-regulating mechanisms of 
the autonomic nervous system and the endocrine glands which, they say, ‘maintain the 
multiple balances required for [man’s] continued existence’ so that the augmented body 
becomes a ‘man-machine system.’ More importantly, the bodily systems maintain the 
balances ‘without conscious control,’ although they concede, as an aside, that the two 
                                                
18 N. Katherine Hayles, How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, Literature, and Informatics 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999). 
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systems are amenable to conscious involvement.19 The autonomy of the autonomic 
nervous system, that the maintenance of our basic bodily functions operate entirely 
without the involvement of conscious action, is key to what they are proposing: ‘If it 
were necessary for us to continuously check to maintain our heart rate at the appropriate 
rate […] there would be little time left for other activities’ (p. 348). On Earth, of course, 
these functions are already adapted to the environment we live in, and our experience of 
the workings of bodily functions lies outside of conscious perception, unless we explicitly 
pay attention to them. Yet in a radically different, hostile, and possibly changing 
environment such as space, the maintenance of the right bodily functions becomes 
altogether more crucial, and if we are to alter those functions, they are subject to 
monitoring. However: 
If we also had to adjust these rates upward or downward depending on whether 
we were doing more or less activity, we would be a slave to keeping the human 
body functioning. Similarly, if a man in space, in addition to flying his ship must be 
taking continual checks and making continual adjustments in order to keep himself 
alive, he becomes a slave to the machine. (p. 348) 
The adjustments, then, need to be done by a mechanism that can operate 
independently, but whether these adjustments would be in reaction to the environment 
remains unclear. The centre-piece for the mechanical homeostatic control that they are 
proposing for a number of autonomous bodily functions is the Rose-Nelson osmotic 
pump – a device which can be incorporated into the organism, allowing for the 
‘administration of a selected drug at a particular organ and at a continuous variable rate 
… without any attention on the part of the organism’ (p. 348). The implantation of this 
pump was celebrated as ‘One of the first Cyborgs’ by Clynes and Kline. Andy Clark calls 
it the ‘first duly-accredited-and-labelled cyborg’, while Donna Haraway suggests that the 
                                                
19 Nathan S. Kline and Manfred E. Clynes, ‘Drugs, Space and Cybernetics: Evolution to Cyborgs’, in 
Psychophysiological Aspects of Space Flight, ed. by Bernard E. Flaherty (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1961), pp. 345–71 (p. 347). Following references are made after quotations in the text. 
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photo ‘belongs in Man’s family album.’ 20  That the rate is ‘variable,’ however, is 
something of an embellishment, and the celebration of the rat as a cyborg is hyperbolic.  
 S. Rose and J. F. Nelson’s pump was originally developed for animal research 
purposes, not for use in humans, clinical or otherwise. The article where they describe 
the device is accompanied by a picture of a mouse which has been implanted with the 
pump, a picture which is reproduced in the Psychophysiological Aspects of Space Flight 
proceedings. The popular article on the cyborg in Astronautics which was published in 
1960, however, has a different picture of unknown origin, possibly from one of Clynes’s 
own experiments (see figure 2.2).21  
 ‘Certain experiments,’ Rose and Nelson write, ‘require that the drug be given as a 
continuous injection over a long period extending into many weeks.’22 They mention two 
situations where such continuous injections are necessary: when a gland has been excised 
and a hormone needs to be administered to replace natural production, and in the long-
term administration of drugs for other purposes. But, they note, while continuous 
administration is necessary, this is most often too arduous, with the result that the 
attending researchers will typically only administer injections twice a day. An additional 
problem noted is that injections are often given systemically, whereas for greatest efficacy 
it sometimes needs to be administered to a specific site. In response to this problem, they 
developed a simple device to implant in the animal, which delivers the hormone or drug 
‘continuously and at a relatively constant rate.’23 The Rose-Nelson 
  
                                                
20 Manfred E. Clynes and Nathan S. Kline, ‘Cyborgs and Space’, Astronautics, 5 (1960), 26–27, 74–76 (p. 
27); Andy Clark, Natural-Born Cyborgs: Minds, Technologies, and the Future of Human Intelligence (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), p. 15; Donna Haraway, ‘Cyborgs and Symbionts: Living Together in the New 
World Order’, in The Cyborg Handbook, ed. by Chris Hables Gray, Heidi Figueroa-Sarriera, and Steven 
Mentor (New York; London: Routledge, 1995), pp. xi – xx (p. xv). 
21 S. Rose and J. F. Nelson, ‘A Continuous Long-Term Injector’, Australian Journal of Experimental Biology and 
Medical Science, 33 (1955), 415–20 (p. 416); reproduced in Kline and Clynes, p. 361; Clynes and Kline, p. 27. 
22 Rose and Nelson, p. 415. 
23 Rose and Nelson, p. 415. 
  
111 
 
Figure 2.2: A rat implanted with a Rose-Nelson pump. 
pump works by the osmotic pressure between water and a solution of Congo red which 
drives an injection mechanism for a drug (in a separate compartment), where the 
injection rate can be adjusted via the solution of Congo red. In practice, this means that 
the device does not, in fact, react to its surroundings; its operational sequence is entirely 
self-contained once it is set into motion; it is a Cartesian and not a cybernetic machine. 
This is why the emphasis by Rose and Nelson on the device’s continuous and constant 
injection rate is relevant when considering its role in the cyborg, since what they describe 
is not a homeostatic machine or a feedback mechanism. Its function is predetermined, 
and it does not work in communication with the environment it is implanted into, and 
the implantation of it into the body does not couple it with the existing bodily systems. It 
can augment them, but they cannot, in turn, reciprocally affect its function. 
 Reading Kline and Clynes, it seems like the Rose-Nelson pump is a homeostatic 
machine, capable of varying its rate of delivery according to environmental needs. Even 
if it is not, it is surely something like what they describe that they envision will go into 
the creation of a true cyborg. Yet their emphasis on the autonomy of the systems they wish 
to alter also suggests, as Ian Hacking has pointed out, a certain Cartesianism in the 
attitude towards the mind’s relationship with the body – an attitude which is not entirely 
consistent, however, perhaps due to their joint authorship.24 In many ways, the emphasis 
                                                
24 Ian Hacking, ‘Canguilhem Amid the Cyborgs’, Economy and Society, 27 (1998), 202–16 (pp. 9–10). 
  
112 
on the separation of the body from the mind resonates deeply under the piece, right up 
to the discussion at the end – surely written by Clynes, who was also a concert pianist – 
of the possible role of music in battling the anomie of space. Cartesian dualism is only 
the first hint at the importance of Descartes to understanding technological 
enhancements of the body. While Clynes emphasises the sovereignty of the mind in 
relation to the plasticity of the living body, the construction of any theoretical cyborg 
must be dependent on the body-is-a-machine metaphor. It is therefore worth looking at 
the autonomous machine, the automaton, and its role in philosophy and biology. 
 In the remainder of this chapter I therefore interrogate the philosophy of René 
Descartes and how he articulated the machinic body, in order to highlight that while the 
metaphor that the body is a machine is an old one, its meaning has necessarily shifted. 
Nevertheless, to treat the body as a machine is crucial to believing that one can improve 
it, especially if one begins to see a proliferation of mechanisms that mimic the functions 
of bodily organs. Machines can be tinkered with, improved; the body, then, might as well 
be amenable to alterations. Neither the Artificial Man, Bernal’s brain in a box or the 
cyborg is possible without first believing that the body is a machine. 
 But if the semantic content of the concept ‘machine’ has changed, to refer to 
Cartesian dualism while retaining a contemporary meaning of ‘machine’ elides a 
surprising aspect of how cybernetic machines were conceptualised. Where Descartes 
banished teleology and formal substance, claiming it introduced ‘little minds’ into natural 
explanation, cybernetics arguably reintroduced form and teleology into mechanical 
explanation, though in a limited sense, effectively changing the conception of a machine. 
I discuss this shift in greater depth in the third chapter. Most of the remainder of this 
chapter therefore examines Descartes’s mechanical philosophy and his banishment of 
teleology. 
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Descartes ,  mechanic( i s t )  
Descartes is considered to be the first wholly systematic mechanistic philosopher, and 
was enormously influential in the move in metaphysics away from Aristotelian 
Scholasticism.25 Though many of his physiological mechanistic explanations were soon 
discredited, if one were discussing mechanisms in one of its many variations – atomism, 
corpuscularism or materialism, and variations thereupon – it was impossible to avoid 
Descartes’s metaphysics in the early modern period.26 In addition to metaphysics and 
natural philosophy (i.e., science), Descartes’s philosophy influenced medicine and 
physiology, and was especially important for the medical school of the iatromechanists; 
descriptions and images of the human body as an assemblage of mechanical tools began 
to proliferate among the adherents of this medical school in the late seventeenth century.  
 Central to Descartes’s metaphysics, which for him was the firm ground from 
which all systematic knowledge of the world must spring from, was his substance 
dualism. Descartes put that there were two substances, and distinguished between 
material extension and the rational soul, respectively res extensa and res cogitans, where the 
soul was entirely immaterial. By doing this, Descartes eliminated – mechanised – those 
other souls in Aristotelian Scholasticism, the vegetative and sensitive souls, and reserved 
the res cogitans for man and God alone.27 Beyond Man, all of creation was mechanical, like 
clockwork. This substance dualism is frequently invoked in discussions and critiques of 
the cyborg, whether it is taken to be the strict man/machine construction, or sociological 
interpretations of hybridity, and humans’ interaction with and dependency upon 
everyday technology. However, as Allison Muri notes, ‘much of postmodern cyborg 
                                                
25 I refer to mechanistic philosophies as ‘mechanicism’, following E. J. Dijksterhuis, The Mechanization of the 
World Picture (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961). 
26 For a longer discussion of Descartes’s position as a ‘mechanical philosopher’, see Daniel Garber, 
‘Remarks on the Pre-History of the Mechanical Philosophy’, in Mechanization of Natural Philosophy., ed. by 
Daniel Garber and Sophie Roux, 2013, pp. 3–26. 
27 Dennis Des Chene, Spirits and Clocks: Machine and Organism in Descartes (Ithaca; London: Cornell 
University Press, 2001), p. 14. 
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theory seems to require a caricature of early modernity’ which posits dualist theories of 
the enlightenment in simplified terms, straw men to be knocked down.28  
 But what is mechanicism? Does mechanicism have a single precise definition? As 
will be argued, mechanical understanding is always and necessarily historically situated in 
the mechanical culture it is proposed within. In general terms, mechanicism claims that 
the material world, and living bodies in particular, work on the same principles as 
machines. In effect, this means that organisms are governed by physical forces in the 
same manner as inorganic, inert matter, and that it is possible to elaborate the 
mechanisms involved in the motion of both animals and machines exhaustively with 
physics. The term ‘mechanicism’ is here used as a unifying term to describe an attitude 
that spans from the Early Modern philosophers to the early twentieth century,29 whereas 
in contemporary philosophy a more contemporary term to describe a similar position 
Naturalism, or the stance that reality can be exhaustively described without making 
recourse to supernatural claims.30 At the time of Descartes, however, there was no 
unified term for this approach, only a shared program to counter the Scholastic 
Aristotelianism that was then prevalent. It was not until Robert Boyle gave the name 
‘mechanical philosophy’ to a number of competing philosophical attitudes that a shared 
program began to emerge. 31  When examining Descartes as the first systematic 
philosopher of mechanicism, it is therefore necessary to consider his metaphysical 
outlook and, by extension, his understanding of physics. 
 Descartes’s metaphysical project was a reaction to the dominance of Scholastic 
philosophy of the time, which broadly speaking followed Thomas Aquinas in his 
                                                
28 Allison Muri, The Enlightenment Cyborg: A History of Communications and Control in the Human Machine, 1660-
1830 (Toronto; London: University of Toronto Press, 2007), p. 15. 
29 See Dijksterhuis. 
30 David Papineau, ‘Naturalism’, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. by Edward N. Zalta, 2009 
<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/> [accessed 22 August 2015]. 
31 Garber. 
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synthesis of Christianity and Aristotelian metaphysics. An aspect of the Scholastics’ 
metaphysical system is the doctrine of the four causes: the formal, material, efficient and 
final causes, first referred to by Aristotle. Before Descartes, Francis Bacon engaged with 
the four causes and their place in his germinal articulation of a scientific method, 
particularly in Novum Organum. Though Bacon retains the four causes, he states that ‘of 
these the Final [cause] is a long way from being useful; in fact it actually distorts the 
sciences except in the case of human actions.’32 The three remaining causes he divides 
between metaphysics and physics: 
The inquiry after forms, which are (at least by reason and their law) eternal and 
unmoving, would constitute metaphysics; the inquiry after the efficient and material 
causes, the latent process and latent structure (all of which are concerned with the 
common and ordinary course of nature, not the fundamental, eternal laws) would 
constitute physics. (p. 109) 
Bacon’s attitude towards the causes and their role in scientific explanation is 
characteristic of philosophers’ attempts in the early seventeenth century to move away 
from Scholasticism. But while Bacon is often held as one of the fathers of the scientific 
method due to his emphasis on experimentation, he is nonetheless rather dismissive of 
all of the causes; besides disparaging the final cause, he laments that ‘Discovery of Form 
is regarded as hopeless. And the Efficient and Material causes (as they are commonly 
sought and accepted, i.e. in themselves and apart from the latent process which leads to the 
Form) are perfunctory, superficial things, of almost no value for true, active knowledge’ 
(p. 102). His experimental method has, in fact, as its goal to ascertain the nature of form. 
As he says, ‘The task and purpose of human Science is to find for a given nature its 
Form’ (p. 102). Form, as noted, is the subject of metaphysics – and reveals the different 
attitude Bacon had to the concept of science. In fact, he recognises the validity of all the 
                                                
32 Francis Bacon, The New Organon, ed. by Lisa Jardine and Michael Silverthorne (Cambridge; New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 102 Subsequent references will be given after quotations in the text. 
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causes, and is dismissive of the final cause only in its explanatory power for how to reach 
scientific knowledge of forms.  
 Descartes was not alone in his criticisms of Scholasticism, though he is regarded 
among the premier proponents of the mechanical philosophy that came to prominence, 
especially following the revisions of physics and mechanics that followed in the wake of 
the Copernican overthrow of the Ptolemaic system. Other than Descartes the coterie of 
philosophers developing a mechanicist philosophy in the early to mid-seventeenth 
century included figures such as Pierre Gassendi, Sébastian Basson, Isaac Beeckman and 
Marin Mersenne, whereas astronomical observation, in the wake of Copernicus, led to a 
mathematical, geometric and mechanical development of physics through figures such as 
Galileo Galilei, Johannes Kepler, Christiaan Huygens and, later, Isaac Newton. So while 
Descartes was not alone in the revolt against Scholasticism and the drive towards 
establishing a mechanistic physics, his influence and the degree to which he has been 
studied allows for a thorough understanding of the metaphysical and physical principles 
which were at stake. In Principles of Philosophy, he writes, ‘we must not examine the final 
causes of created things, but rather their efficient causes.’33 By ‘created things’, he is 
referring to God’s creation; as for Aquinas, for Descartes God was the prime mover. 
Subsequent to creation, which was God’s initial act of intention and purpose which set 
the perfection of the Universe in motion, only the efficient cause could be investigated. 
Consequently, the study of the physical world and machines is the study of efficient 
causes, because there are no others. Where Bacon saw the role of investigating causes as 
limited to the task of acquiring scientific knowledge of forms, Descartes goes further and 
opposes the doctrine of the causes altogether, rejecting them in favour of a system in 
which only the efficient cause remains. Part of the reason for this is Descartes’s rejection 
                                                
33 René Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, trans. by Valentine Rodger Miller and Reese P. Miller (Dordrecht ; 
London: Reidel, 1983), p. 14. 
  
117 
of hylomorphism, which refers to the substances that compose matter: to Aristotle, the 
matter is composed of two substances, primary matter (hyle), which has no properties, 
and substantial form (morphe), which gives matter its properties. Descartes came to reject 
hylomorphism following his study of mechanical explanations, and posited that matter 
only consists of one substance, extension, and is therefore called the res extensa. This 
aspect of his philosophical system is evident throughout his philosophical writings, and 
in the ‘Fourth Meditation’ he writes that only God and the res cogitans are subject to the 
final cause, but since he considers it rash to suppose to know the purposes of God, the 
final cause cannot be studied.34 As such, the study of physics, which includes the study of 
animals and humans, is the study of extended matter and therefore follows mechanical 
principles of action.  
 While the systematic application of ends or purposes as an explanatory model 
would be banished in physics – later to be named teleology, after the Greek word for the 
final cause, telos – it remained a point of debate in both metaphysics and, later, in biology. 
Banished from physics, teleology remained a topic of debate in the study of the human, 
especially when biology matured as a science, and was later thoroughly debated in the 
context of evolution and the problem of explanatory models for an organism’s 
adaptation to its environment. Given that bodily organs appear to be intrinsically 
purposeful, teleology’s language of ends, intentions and purposes seemed to have the 
greatest explanatory power. We say that an organ is for something, in order to achieve an 
as-yet unrealised end – and even Descartes wrote of the ‘office’ of organs, despite his 
banishment of ends and purposes. 35  Charles Darwin’s discussion of evolutionary 
adaptation, for example, is replete with appeals to the purpose of adaptation, despite his 
stated intention to remove teleological explanation from evolution. The debate on 
                                                
34 René Descartes, Discourse on Method and Meditations, trans. by Elizabeth Sanderson Haldane and G. R. T. 
Ross, Dover Philosophical Classics (Mineola, NY: Dover, 2003), p. 95. 
35 Des Chene, p. 5. 
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teleology in evolution was eventually settled with the emergence of the Neo-Darwinist 
model of the Modern Synthesis, arising in the 1940s, as summarised by Julian Huxley.36 I 
return to the role of teleology in biology and evolution in chapter three. 
 
Mechanics  and technical  discourse in the seventeenth century  
‘Mechanical’ must be understood as that which works on the principle of the interactions 
of physical force, rather than simply referring to machines themselves, though the 
interplay between the machine and the study of mechanical principles is very much at 
play in developing a mechanical philosophy. In 1517, the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise on 
mechanics, the Mechanical Problems, was translated by the humanist Vittore Fausto. While 
the Mechanical Problems is usually included in the Aristotelian corpus and was thought to 
be Aristotle’s up until the nineteenth century, it is now thought to have been authored by 
someone else in the peripatetic school.37 Presented as thirty-five questions on mechanical 
operations, the treatise came to be highly influential for Renaissance physics, especially in 
its treatments of so-called simple machines – especially the lever – machines that transfer 
the force of action to give a mechanical advantage, so that seemingly small applications 
of force can have large effects (traditionally, the classical simple machines also include 
the pulley, the inclined plane, the wedge, the wheel and the screw). For example, with the 
example of a ship’s rudder, leverage gives the relatively small action of turning the rudder 
great effect, moving a large ship. While not being at odds with the Aristotelian causes, 
the treatise offered an alternative to the causes through mechanical explanations, and was 
therefore, in addition to the other Greek mechanical treatises which had recently been 
translated, influential in the explication of mechanical causation as an alternative.  
                                                
36 Julian Huxley, Evolution. The Modern Synthesis (London: Allen & Unwin, 1942). 
37 Helen Hattab, Descartes on Forms and Mechanisms (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 86; 
see also Michael A. Coxhead, ‘A Close Examination of the Pseudo-Aristotelian Mechanical Problems: The 
Homology between Mechanics and Poetry as technē’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 43 
(2012), 300–306. 
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 By Descartes’s time, the Mechanical Problems and the small machines were widely 
studied, and Descartes himself wrote on some of the questions in his private 
correspondence.38 Galileo, for instance, wrote a small but influential book on the subject, 
On Mechanics (written ca. 1600), but apparently did not think it a particularly original 
contribution, as he considered it merely a systematic introduction to the mechanical 
principles of the Greeks. Stillman Drake, however, states that Galileo’s book on 
mechanics became extremely influential due to how it synthesised Aristotelian mechanics 
with mechanical principles from a host of important sources.39 Indeed, Marin Mersenne, 
whose philosophical circle Descartes was a part of from the 1620s, translated On 
Mechanics to French in 1634 – before it was formally published in Italy, and at about the 
same time Descartes wrote the Treatise of Man, his most elaborate exposition of the 
animal machine, which would not be published until after his death. Furthermore, as 
Helen Hattab has shown, Descartes most likely was influenced by the many 
commentaries on the Mechanical Problems, as Scholastic philosophers such as Henri de 
Monantheuil, Giovanni di Guevara and Josephus Blancanus had elaborated the questions 
therein. Even though they were working within an Aristotelian framework, these figures 
were moving away from hylomorphism towards mechanical explanations, particularly in 
the appeal to the relationship between mathematical certainty and physics. 40  The 
Mechanical Problems refers, of course, to mechanical problems: to practical questions 
regarding the working of ever-proliferating machines. The Mechanical Problems, the 
commentaries, and the proliferation of mechanical texts by people such as Ramelli and 
Galileo therefore represent a burgeoning discourse on the creation of technological 
artefacts. 
                                                
38 Hattab, p. 87 n9. 
39 Stillman Drake, ‘Introduction’, in On Motion and Mechanics, by Galileo Galilei (Madison: Wisconsin 
University Press, 1960), pp. 135–45. 
40 Hattab, pp. 98–119. 
  
120 
‘Technology’ and ‘machine’ are words commonly used interchangeably to refer to 
objects that are created, not grown, and which regularly and predictably perform a type 
of transformational work. The transformational aspect of machine lies in the origin of 
the word itself: mechane in Greek means ‘work,’ and as the machine and mechanical 
explanation grew in stature in the early modern period, it would come to designate the 
capacity of an object to perform work, independently of human technical interaction. 
Thus, mechanism as a philosophical stance is intimately coupled with the increased 
knowledge of mechanics and interest in machines, such as automata, that arose following 
the Renaissance. 
 The colloquial meaning of technology today (allowing for a broad definition that 
applies to any technical object) is relatively recent in terms of the word’s roots in classical 
Greek. Carl Mitcham has traced out the roots of the philosophical meaning of technē, 
which builds on the literal meaning in Sanskrit, relating to carpentry; which in classical 
Greek was abstracted to mean any craft or art. With Plato and Aristotle, however, it 
comes to signify a particular type of knowledge of the world: ‘As a type of awareness of 
the world, [techne] lies between unconscious experience and knowledge of first principles; 
techne is part of that continuum which moves from sense impressions and memories 
through experience to systematic knowledge, episteme’.41 Mitcham concludes that coupling 
techne with logos as technologia, a construction which only appears a few times in Aristotle’s 
Rhetorics, does not carry any similar meaning as ‘technology’ does for us, but for Aristotle 
means ‘“words about techne” or “speech concerning art”.’ Though as he claims, there is 
an intimation that ‘logos of techne means something stronger, that Aristotle is trying to 
refer to a logos of the process of the techne of persuasion.’42  
                                                
41 Carl Mitcham, ‘Philosophy and the History of Technology’, in The History and Philosophy of Technology, ed. 
by George Bugliarello and Dean B. Doner (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979), pp. 163–201 (p. 
175). 
42 Mitcham, p. 183. 
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This is why ‘technology’ was, from at least the second century AD, used as a term 
for books of grammar and rhetoric, a method of instruction in the craft of persuasion. In 
English, ‘technology’ does not get a definition related to its current usage until John 
Kersey’s revision of Edward Philips’s dictionary, The New World of English Words, where it 
is defined as ‘a Description of Arts, especially the Mechanical.’43 Furthermore, Mitcham 
claims that the difference in attitude between the classical concept of techne versus the 
modern technology belies different ontologies of matter: 
The ancient or classical ontology involves looking upon matter as a living reality ordered 
toward the taking on of form – in accord with whatever form it already possesses and the 
potentialities contained therein. There is a hierarchy of form to be articulated in thought 
and to be responsible to in action. 
Herein is the teleological idea of formal substance, in which matter was ordered towards 
something, and was therefore considered to be, in some way, itself living. With the 
mechanical philosophy, however, the classical ontology of matter fundamentally 
changed, especially with ‘the Cartesian theory of matter as pure, lifeless extension, in 
itself ordered toward nothing else, something to be done with as one pleases.’ The 
implication, in Mitcham’s terms, is that a modern concept of technology becomes 
possible only once matter has become mechanistic.44 
 The drive to establish mechanics as grounded in certain, mathematical 
geometrical terms by the commentators on the Mechanical Problems arguably also has 
another consequence: establishing technology as something separate from technē, as a 
discourse on technics grounded in a systematic knowledge. I say this advisedly: there is 
no reference to technology as such in Descartes or the other mechanicist philosophers of 
the seventeenth centuries. Aristotelian mechanics was, even in the Mechanical Problems, 
regarded as something of an art, and not of phusis, of nature. It was not metaphysical, yet 
as the commentators on the Mechanical Problems demonstrated, mechanical explanation in 
                                                
43 Mitcham, p. 184. 
44 Mitcham, pp. 186–187. 
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terms of mathematics was both a viable alternative to the causal explanations afforded by 
hylomorphism. Moreover, mathematics was seen as something pertaining to truth itself, 
and of scientific explanation, scientia. If mechanics went from being a technical subject to 
a scientific one, it arguably marks an important conceptual distinction, as technics, being 
something related to a practical endeavour of an artistic or crafting nature, became a 
subject that could be explained in terms of true, certain and exact scientific description. 
In this way, technics arguably passed over to be technology. In other words, we can say 
that technology, considered as a discourse on machines, is born in the time of the 
Renaissance discovery of the Mechanical Problems and its subsequent commentators, 
culminating with Descartes giving mechanical – and hence technological – explanation 
primacy. 
 
Philosophy and technical  sys tems 
In the present context, it is Descartes’s philosophy which is most important in terms of 
his mechanistic conception of bodies. Despite his many misconceptions concerning 
anatomy, these are of lesser importance in terms of his philosophical system. Cartesian 
mechanicism had a lasting influence that began in his own time, and given the attention 
his philosophy is still given, continues to the present day. Elaborating it sufficiently to 
create a consistent and complete system, his work led to mechanistic philosophy being 
taken as a serious challenge to the dominant Aristotelian Scholasticism. In many ways, 
we might simply say that Descartes won: As I suggested previously, the structuring 
metaphor for medicine today is ‘the body is a machine’ – a metaphor which we owe to 
Descartes. 
 It is, however, important to emphasise the role of technology in the development 
of mechanistic explanations. Following Bertrand Gille, we can say that Cartesian 
mechanicism is contingent upon the technical system it was realised within. By technical 
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system, Gille refers to the entirety of available techniques at a given time, but also the 
material, social and scientific constraints that limits the possibility of invention.45 While 
Gille intends this definition to describe technical invention, he also emphasises the 
mutual dependency of science and technology. As Sylvia Berryman has pointed out, 
mechanicist philosophies comes in many variants, and consequently any particular 
mechanistic philosophy must be considered in its relationship with the mechanical 
innovations current to its articulation.46 One must be careful when assuming what 
aspects of mechanical thinking were available at their respective times, and thus we find 
that Descartes’s mechanicist philosophy must, by simple technological necessity, differ in 
its details from, for example, Denis Diderot and the French encyclopédistes of only a 
hundred years later. As an avowed mechanicist, Diderot was fully materialist and rejected 
the substantial soul; but Diderot was writing after Newton, Huygens and La Mettrie. By 
his time, the state of automata had advanced much further than during Descartes’s 
lifetime, and Diderot fawned over, for instance, Vaucanson’s creations and wrote of 
them in detail in the Encyclopédie. Strikingly, Diderot’s life (1713-1784) was bookended by 
the development of the steam engine, from the Newcomen Engine in 1712 to the final 
Watt engine in 1775. Though Jacquard did not present his programmable loom until 
1801, Vaucanson had developed an earlier model for punch-card programming.47 The 
complexity of the technologies that were invented during his lifetime may have made an 
even more profound impact on Diderot’s materialism if compared to his philosophical 
forebears. 
 Mechanicist philosophy, then, as a philosophical term referring to a specific 
period in time, is contingent on the technological system that it arises and exists within. 
                                                
45 Bertrand Gille, History of Techniques, trans. by P. Southgate and T. Williamson (New York: Gordon and 
Breach Science Publishers, 1986), p. 60. 
46 Sylvia Berryman, ‘Ancient Automata and Mechanical Explanation’, Phronesis, 48 (2003), 344–69 (p. 349). 
47 For an in-depth study of Early Modern automata, see Alfred Chapuis and Edmond Droz, Automata; a 
Historical and Technological Study (Neuchâtel: Éditions du Griffon, 1958). 
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Berryman, for example, levels a critique at those who describe quasi-mechanical artefacts 
in Greek mythology (such as wooden doves coming to life, or the god Hephaistos’s 
moving tripods and golden assistant handmaidens) as being fully technological, and 
hence evidence of a latent mechanicism in early antiquity.48 Not only can we not know 
the intentions of the original authors of these stories, and whether their knowledge of 
mechanics were sufficient to posit a plausible mechanical wonder – or if they took 
mechanical creatures to be at least in part magical. This tendency to project current 
technical and scientific knowledge into the past can obscure the historical context ideas 
were posited in. Though contemporary concepts may help to elucidate past ideas, to say 
that the cyborg first appeared in the Enlightenment or in 1920s Berlin is an impossibility; 
the necessary scientific concepts of feedback and information were not yet articulated.49 
 At Descartes’s time, clockwork was a major reference for the governing technical 
system and is the locus for his mechanical explanation, with the development of more 
refined gears, and the mathematical description of ratios and periods. The role of 
clockwork and automata in philosophy came to be prominent following the 
Renaissance’s renewed interest in the mechanical writings of Greeks, especially those of 
Ctesebius, Philon, and especially Heron of Alexandria.50 During the sixteenth century, 
texts and fragments, especially those of Heron, were translated and disseminated. New 
works, such as the Agostino Ramelli’s influential Various and Ingenious Machines (1588), led 
to a general expansion of the field of clockwork and automata, whether they were the 
grand automata-structures in cathedral clock towers, more conventionally sized clocks 
(which were becoming increasingly miniaturised), or fantastic hydraulic displays such as 
fountains. 
                                                
48 Berryman, pp. 350–356. 
49 In particular, I am referring to Muri, The Enlightenment Cyborg; and Matthew Biro, The Dada Cyborg: Visions 
of the New Human in Weimar Berlin (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2009). While Muri and Biro 
may have intended to be provocative with their titles, the Cyborg is discussed at length in both works. 
50 Silvio A. Bedini, ‘The Role of Automata in the History of Technology’, Technology and Culture, 5 (1964), 
24–42 (pp. 24–25). 
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 The influence of the rise in mechanical proficiency and elaborate automata is 
evident in the work of Descartes, and there is little doubt that the bête-machine sprang out 
of his own experiences and observations of technology and medicine. He was 
profoundly interested in automata and continuously engaged with the study of medicine, 
studying the new anatomical works that were being produced and even performed 
autopsies to investigate human anatomy for himself. Descartes was a professed admirer 
of William Harvey, whose writing on the circulatory system in De motu cordis is filled with 
technological metaphors – the famous comparison of the heart to a water pump is only 
one among many.51 Additionally, he made major contributions to mathematics and 
physics, both disciplines which are intrinsic to the mechanical arts. In other words, 
Descartes’s metaphysical project did not arise from a purely abstract elaboration of, 
refinement of, or argument with his philosophical precursors, but was also a response to 
them in light of the technological and scientific advances of his day. The mechanical 
clock, with its early origins in the twelfth century’s church clock towers, had by 
Descartes’s time become increasingly precise, miniaturised and prevalent to the degree 
that it was a highly popular metaphor for the inner workings of nature. 
 Thomas S. Hall notes that ‘two figurative uses of machine are of special interest 
to science, namely the role of this term as a metaphor for the world and, equally 
important, its role as a metaphor for man.’52 In this respect, Otto Mayr has taken the 
clockwork metaphor as a natural extension for the idea of the machina mundi, the World 
Machine (first used by the Roman poet Lucretius) and later used prominently by a 
number of philosophers both in agreement with it and to contest it.53 In terms of 
machines, the clock and clockwork were the most visible, and perhaps, most approved of 
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machine in the early modern period. Mayr writes that there ‘was a widespread habit of 
referring to clocks in writings on almost any subject in the form of comparisons and 
metaphors,’ and that in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries ‘the clock metaphor 
became strikingly frequent, more frequent, probably, than any other. Such frequency 
signifies more than broad public approval of the clock. It tells us something about that 
society itself.’ 54  That the metaphor of the world machine was in widespread use, 
however, did not necessarily mean that there was collective agreement upon its meaning 
or that everyone was conversant with other uses of it; more emphatically, Mayr states 
that such metaphors must be understood as ‘auxiliary devices adduced for emphasis and 
illustration, upon which neither author nor audience will concentrate much attention.’55 
Nevertheless, that the clockwork metaphor became so popular in the early modern 
period is closely related to a new-found understanding of the how the world works, and 
an increased interest in scientific explanation in all fields. 
Descartes’s universal mechanicism was reflected in the universality of his own 
interests, which were not restricted to metaphysics, but extended into scientific inquiry 
(or natural philosophy), mathematics, physics, engineering, anatomy and medicine, and 
so on. Most pertinent to his mechanicism was his abiding interest in the technology of 
his time, such as mills, pumps, and of course, clockwork and automata. Hall points out 
that these technologies had become commonplace in Europe at the time: ‘such practical 
realities as waterwheels, looms, pumps, and presses and the windmills in view everywhere 
from the British Midlands to the Peloponnesus.’ 56  Descartes’s interest in automata 
appears to have been a life-long preoccupation, and it is possible that he owned a clock 
himself. Clocks were being produced in greater quantities due to the standardisation of 
parts which allowed for cheaper and faster construction, something that led to much 
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more affordable models than those that had been available previously. Descartes’s 
writing is peppered with references to clockwork throughout, to the effect that the 
natural world is equivalent to the artificially produced one. So when referring to a 
Cartesian mechanicism that likens the body to a machine, it is necessary to understand 
what, exactly, was meant by ‘machine’ at that point in time. Descartes’s clockworks were 
ultimately understood in terms of the known simple machines which had gained some 
metaphysical importance, in that they were an explication of the efficient causes in 
machines. The understanding of machines was becoming more sophisticated, but it was 
still early; in Descartes’s time there were six simple machines, whereas 250 years later 
with Franz Reuleaux’s kinematics, a systematic study of mechanics, the number of simple 
machines had expanded to several hundred.57 
 
Bête-machine 
Before he could claim that the human body was a machine, Descartes first posited that 
animals were machines. Gordon Baker and Katherine J. Morris sees it as a natural 
extension of the relatively unscandalous claim that an animal’s ‘behaviour was regular 
and that it lacked the sort of plasticity and spontaneity that characterizes the behaviour of 
human beings.’58 In the Discourse on Method, Descartes arrived at this conclusion when 
examining the functions of the body which were directed by his soul. When introspecting 
on the functions that existed in the body, 
I found precisely all those which might exist in us without our having the power of 
thought, and consequently without our soul […] contributing to it, functions 
which are identically the same as those in which animals lacking reason may be 
said to resemble us. For all that, I could not find in these functions any which, 
being dependent on thought, pertain to us alone, inasmuch as we are men; while I 
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found all of them afterwards, when I assumed that God had created a rational soul 
and that He had united it to this body in a particular manner which I described.59  
For Descartes, then, the causal relationships in living bodies are of the same type as 
those found in the inorganic, particularly as demonstrated in clockwork automata. As he 
argues, ‘the body is regarded as a machine which, having been made by the hands of 
God, is incomparably better arranged, and possesses in itself movements which are much 
more admirable, than any of those which can be invented by man.’60 Organisms are 
differentiated from automata by the fact that the mechanisms involved are minute, 
smaller, more intricate and with greater sophistication than in the mechanisms of 
manufactured machines. It is merely a question of a difference in the degree of 
complexity between living beings and machines, rather than that life as such had a 
fundamentally different metaphysical quality than mechanical ‘life’. In the Treatise on Man, 
Descartes elaborates how one would create an automaton from the ground up, which 
would be identical in all respects to a human except for its lack of a rational soul.  
 The metaphysical (and, later, biological) problem with this is the lack of 
distinction between the organic and the inorganic, the living and the inert. As Des Chene 
remarks, Descartes’s innovation in the Treatise was something of a revolution for the 
science of life, proposing to ‘eliminate the living as a natural kind.’61 Where philosophers 
and physiologists had previously taken the natural world to be divided into the living and 
non-living, where all living beings had a form of soul, Descartes erased the distinction 
and dismissed the vegetative and sensible souls that were supposed to be present in 
plants and animals; thus, the study of life came not to be the study of things that had 
souls, but became an extension of physics. The consequence of this lack of distinction is, 
of course, Descartes’s famous bête machine found in the Treatise of Man, in which the 
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bodies of living things necessarily follow the same physical, material laws as inorganic 
matter. 
 A consequence of this, however, was that the causal, physical world was seen as 
deterministic. In Aristotle’s refutation of the atomists – to whom the early modernist 
mechanicists are often likened, though there are reservations concerning this, particularly 
regarding the necessity for knowledge of mechanical devices – he maintained that nature 
was undetermined, that it was filled with potentialities and final causes.62 A determinist 
worldview disallows any notion of free will since all physical actions are determined prior 
to their occasion; anything that happens in physical space happens by no account of its 
own, but is due to its intersecting causal lines, all down to the ‘first mover’. Descartes’s 
solution to the problem of free will in a mechanistic physical universe is that the soul, the 
seat of free will, is an immaterial substance unique to humans: the Cartesian doctrine of 
dualism. 
 The Cartesian dualist concept both narrows and expands upon already existing 
scholastic notions regarding the body, res extensa, and the (rational) soul, res cogitans, in that 
Descartes firstly denies the existence of the additional souls. In the prior scheme, 
everything alive was afforded a soul which allowed for it to be alive. Descartes denied 
this, and, by pointing to the apparent vividness of automata, claimed that animals were 
nothing but living, animal machines. Aspects of living that could be explained as acting 
by a principle of automatism or reflex – including digestion and sensation – were 
relegated to being mechanical functions. On the other hand, the rational soul was seen as 
the only principle that could give rise to intentional action, something that was seen only 
to be possible for human beings. The extreme complexity and perfection of the bêtes-
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machines, however, was not seen to be a denigration of animals, but as praise for their 
creator: God as clockmaker. 
 Thus, in Cartesian dualism, the soul is non-material, of a different substance than 
the material world, which allows for the free will to counteract the deterministic material 
world. For Descartes, the soul interacted with the body through the pineal gland at the 
centre of the skull, at the base of the brain – though how, or why, exactly, it did this was 
never fully accounted for – and it was also quickly ridiculed. Though Cartesian dualism 
was highly influential, in terms not only of adherents but also detractors, it nonetheless 
has taken on a lasting legacy that lasts to this day, not least in the way it is rhetorically 
invoked to dismiss various technological or philosophical approaches. Furthermore, we 
can add that the Cartesian view of substance dualism creates a unique space for humans 
in the universe, given that humans alone are allowed agency. All other objects, whether 
living or inorganic, are subject to the deterministic laws of the physical world. Others 
would later, heretically, do away with the soul altogether, most famously in Julien Offray 
de La Mettrie’s Man a Machine, in which he claimed the mind was underlain the same 
physical principles as the rest of the world.63 The ultimate expression of this deterministic 
universe would be expressed by Pierre Simon Laplace, who claimed that, given an 
‘intelligence’ with knowledge of the position and direction of all objects in the world and 
a sufficient capacity for calculation, ‘nothing would be uncertain and the future, as the 
past, would be present to its eyes.’64 A lasting belief in this determinacy would reign until 
the rise of quantum indeterminacy.  
 To further understand the mechanistic philosophy and the role of machines in it, 
we must primarily emphasise how, when its critics complain that it seeks to understand 
the body as a machine, this is often a misrepresentation, at the very least when it comes 
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to Descartes. This is not to say that mechanical imagery cannot convey the impression. 
An instructive example from the iatromechanical school, founded by Giovanni Borelli 
and strongly influenced by Cartesian mechanicism, is found in the Croatio-Italian 
physician Giorgio Baglivi. In the following passage Baglivi reduces the various bodily 
organs into a catalogue of technological, mechanical principles: 
For whoever takes an attentive View of its Fabrick, he’ll really meet with Shears in 
the Jaw-bones and Teeth, a Phiol in the Ventricle, Hydraulick Tubes in the Veins, 
Arteries and other Vessels, a Wedge in the Heart, a Sieve or Straining-holes in the 
Viscera, a Pair of Bellows in the Lungs, the Power of a Leaver in the Muscles, 
Pulleys in the Corners of the Eyes, and so on. And tho’ the Chymists explain the 
Phenomena of natural Things, by the Terms of Fusion, Sublimation, Precipitation, &c. 
and so make a separate sort of Philosophy; yet all these ought to be imputed to the 
Force of a Wedge, Balance, Leaver, Spring, and such like Mechanical Principles.65 
Similarly, Descartes’s philosophy is generally informed by mechanical description, 
and particularly in the Treatise on Man (published posthumously in 1664, but used in part 
in other works published during his lifetime). In the Treatise, Descartes proposes an 
abstract machine, describing it in minute detail, which he likens to the complete function 
of the human body. In this work, we get, for example, the famous passage where he 
compares a fountain to the function of the circulatory system – a comparison 
reminiscent of Harvey’s description of the heart as a water pump.66 
 Yet ultimately the view that Descartes makes the body into a machine must be 
qualified. As Hall remarks, firstly Descartes only superficially equates the workings of the 
human body to those machines that interested Descartes to a great degree; the 
comparisons are those of analogy rather than direct equations. Descartes’s description of 
bodily function was one of a difference in degree, where he reasoned that the body’s 
functions took place at a much more minute scale, and thus that the relationship between 
the body and machines were of the same kind only in an abstract sense. Indeed, the 
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technological metaphor for describing bodily functions has been with us since at least 
Aristotle, who in De motum animalum describes bodily functions in terms of  
automatic puppets, which are set going on the occasion of a tiny movement; the 
levers are released, and strike the twisted strings against one another; or with the 
toy wagon. For the child mounts on it and moves it straight forward, and then 
again it is moved in a circle owing to its wheels being of unequal diameter (the 
smaller acts like a centre on the same principle as the cylinders). Animals have 
parts of a similar kind, their organs, the sinewy tendons to wit and the bones; the 
bones are like the wooden levers in the automaton, and the iron; the tendons are 
like the strings, for when these are tightened or leased movement begins. 
However, in the automata and the toy wagon there is no change of quality, though 
if the inner wheels became smaller and greater by turns there would be the same 
circular movement set up.67 
More importantly, the metaphorical application of bodily function in terms of technology 
acts as metaphysical examples in terms of physical causation that is more readily 
observed (magnification being relatively new at the time of Descartes). Fountains and 
automata are in this sense examples of machines where the physical causal relationships 
are clearly explicated; moreover, much like the human body, which had also only recently 
been studied in terms of its precise internal functioning, the sources of movement in 
automata are hidden to the outside observer, much like in the human body. The 
automata were clearly artefacts: intricate, ingenious, but still designed by humans. The 
use of such comparisons, then, was used in part to make a deeper point, that the 
constitution and movement of the body is mechanical in the physical sense, and not 
moved by any form of vitalistic force such as vegetative or sensible souls, the 
philosophical norm for explanation prior to Descartes ever since the days of Galen. 
 Descartes’s bodily machine is therefore created according to his own pluralist 
ontology, and he lays out the mechanical construction of the human body. Yet it can 
only be fully human if God were to grant this fully realised automaton a soul. To 
propose the body as an automaton with a supplementary soul, such as he does in the 
Treatise, is a rhetorical manner of explaining the complete workings of the body in 
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mechanical terms. It posited a mechanical body which remained inhuman, which could 
only act with a mechanical determinism, and not with free will, which was necessary for 
moral action. As Descartes was influenced by the automata of his own time, their 
sophistication only grew after his death as their creators attempted to build ever more 
lifelike creations.  
 
The so l ips is t  duck 
The springs, levers, and mechanical principles which animates mechanical bodies act 
solely in reaction to other forces. Each motion, each intersection of a causal line with 
another, is a trigger, a reaction, a physical interaction. If constructed in an elaborate 
enough manner, and given that there is enough power to provide the motive force, one 
can create an automaton which can seem surprisingly lively. While Descartes is the 
philosopher of automata, the height of that art would soar to greater heights in the 
hundred and fifty years following his death. Perhaps the most famous automaton ever, 
now lost, is Jacques de Vaucanson’s Digesting Duck from 1739. The automata of that 
time, as Jessica Riskin explains, were not only diversions for entertainment, but ever 
more elaborate illustrations of the philosophical questions that were first raised by 
Descartes. The Duck, she contends, marks a turning point in the construction of 
automata for mechanical explanation since ‘Vaucanson made the imitation of internal 
process explicitly central to his project.’68 Whereas automata up to that point would often 
have a completely separate mechanism that drove the action of the figures, Vaucanson 
made a point out of simulating the internal workings of a duck, hence the ‘digesting’ of 
its name. Feeding the automaton food pellets, the duck would chew, swallow and 
eventually excrete them, as if they had gone through the digesting process of the 
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stomach. The digestion was a ruse, however. The excrement came from a separate 
compartment in the automaton which had been prepared in advance, and the food was 
never actually digested; to all appearances the Digesting Duck acted as if it could eat and 
defecate just like a living duck, but it was a simulacrum, all surface and no depth. Though 
its mechanism was magnificently elaborate, once triggered it ran through its set 
operational sequence, unreactive whether food was offered or the prepared faeces had 
been secreted in its hidden second stomach, or not. Elaborate as it was, it was a machine 
of surfaces, seemingly alive but in appearance alone. 
 As we have seen, the body-as-machine metaphor originates in the first half of the 
seventeenth century, and was fully articulated with the Cartesian bête-machine. The animal 
machine was a logical consequence of Descartes’s metaphysical distinction between the 
substance of the body which extends in space, the res extensa, and the mind which has no 
spatial extension and no physical interaction with the world, the res cogitans. Descartes’s 
machines are not the machines we know presently, and neither is his physical model to 
explain how they work. Writing before Newton, who laid the foundations for classical 
mechanics, Descartes’s machines are firmly entrenched as the clockwork automata of the 
seventeenth century, a deterministic technology: If we know how an automaton 
functions and given that it will not malfunction, we know in advance what it will do, and 
that it will perform its designated action in the same manner every time. Jussi Parikka, in 
a discussion of the Estonian biologist Jakob von Uexküll, calls this a ‘centripetal’ 
technology, by which he means that ‘mechanical machines as watches are always turning 
only toward their inner principles, which are predetermined and rely on those 
components,’ whereas ‘the “building” of an animal works as a project that always orients 
away from a center to the world.’69 The technical tendency to reach outwards Parikka 
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therefore terms ‘centrifugal’; the technical composition of the animal is situated in and 
interacts with what Uexküll calls its Umwelt, or environment – a concept that would also 
become important to Heidegger’s philosophy, but also is relevant to a technological 
theory in which the machine interacts with and reacts to its environment.70 
 Another way of thinking about the distinction between centripetal and centrifugal 
technology is what I call the difference between solipsistic and gregarious technologies. A 
solipsistic technology has a self-contained and self-sufficient mechanism; being 
centripetal, it is turned inward and is separated from its environment. Though its effects 
are not necessarily limited to its own workings (though this is the case with the clock, for 
example), its inner workings or, following André Leroi-Gourhan, its operational 
sequence, and its power are all contained within itself.71 The only interaction it has with 
its environment is the winding of the mechanism, or other ways of providing power, 
after which the power is either stored within the mechanism or immediately used to 
power its technical gestures, and the triggering of the mechanism itself. Following the 
trigger, it runs according its predetermined operational sequence. This is the machine in 
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: the automaton, a completely self-contained 
machine, existing solely by itself, outside of its environment. The Digesting Duck, then, 
is the quintessential solipsistic machine as it goes through its predetermined actions, 
unreactive to whether those elements – the food, the faeces – that appear to make it alive 
are present or not. 
 The reason I call centrifugal technology gregarious is because it is not only directed 
outwards towards its environment, it actively engages with and communicates with it to 
alter and correct its own behaviour. Communication, and by extension, information, was 
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one of the key theoretical innovations in cybernetics, whereby communication became 
the principle of control, which is reflected in Norbert Wiener’s subtitle for his main work 
on cybernetics, ‘control and communication in the animal and the machine’. Cybernetics 
posits a theory of technology (based in biology) which is oriented outwards to take into 
account the object’s environment in its technical action. Such a technology is non-
deterministic, since it can achieve a goal through changing its behaviour accordingly. It is 
a realist technology, because it acknowledges the outside world; it is an environmentally 
oriented technology, because it mediates between the environment and its internal 
mechanism of action. I return to the gregarious technology of cybernetics in the next 
chapter, along with a treatment of the machine’s interaction with the environment or 
milieu.72  
 Descartes remarks in the Principles that his reasoning about the nature of 
imperceptible matter must hold true because, according to his principle of extended 
matter, what is true for the large must also be true of the small.73 By this reasoning, he 
proves the validity of the mechanical nature of matter based on his observations of 
crafted objects, automatons, in which the causes are much more readily discerned. Based 
on this we might draw two conclusions: firstly, that Descartes does not equate the body 
with the existing automata of the day; but secondly, that the body works on the same 
principles which are demonstrated visibly in the automata. Even if the automata are not 
the same as living bodies, an artificer of infinite subtlety, i.e., God, would be able to craft 
a living body based only on the mechanical principles or simple machines, such as they 
are found in automata. A corollary to this is that an idea similar to the cyborg could not 
have arisen in the seventeenth century, for even though the principles of automata and 
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of bodies might be the same, there was no sense that one could actually construct 
mechanisms of such minute detail and subtlety that would have been required to 
construct artificial body parts. While early microscopes were being constructed at the end 
of the sixteenth and beginning of the seventeenth centuries, mechanical production 
worked at the humanly perceptible scale. To Descartes, the construction of machines 
was still quite literally manufactured – made by hand – and the difference between 
human scale and microscopic was a barrier that the productive arts could not cross at his 
time. 
 Of course, even if Descartes was certain of the correctness of his general system, 
even despite his difficulties with, for example, the problem of generation, his grasp of 
physics and mechanics was necessarily incomplete. This was readily accepted soon after 
his death even by some of his closest followers, such as Christiaan Huygens. 
Nevertheless, as Dijksterhuis points out, his metaphysical and physical system (as they 
might as well be considered one and the same), and especially his conception of matter 
acted upon by force, would remain influential on the study of physics for a long time, 
possibly at least until electromagnetism and thermodynamics.74 Even these branches of 
physics owed a great deal to Newton, whose energetic physics is impossible without the 
earlier mechanical philosophers. It is also worth noting the role of thermodynamics in a 
more contemporary understanding of machines, for two reasons: Firstly, 
thermodynamics was instrumental in finally accounting for a mechanical understanding 
of the body in terms of energy and its conservation, with the demonstration that the 
energy expended by a living body is equivalent to the energy expended by a machine. 
This also entailed an energetic analysis of physical systems in which several bodies, 
whether living or machines, were analysed as a single system. Second, the development 
of thermodynamics is one of the key innovations in physics prior to relativity and 
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quantum mechanics, and was fundamental in the development of cybernetics and 
information theory. 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, let’s return to the Artificial Man. That the various artificial replacements of 
internal organs require a control panel to be properly operated makes the image almost 
comedic. But it also sets in relief the distinction between the body and its voluntary 
control: this vision of technological replacements represents an increase in autonomy, as 
the body’s parts are no longer subject to the reflexive actions of their internal 
mechanisms. Even when machines are self-driven automata, their actions are mindless 
and without agency, determined by a pre-defined mechanism. While Descartes said the 
body was a machine, he held that as humans, we are uniquely capable of controlling our 
actions due to our minds and their separation from our bodies. If, however, like La 
Mettrie, we reject the existence of the soul, it stands to reason that all of our actions are 
determined, that we have no agency. 
 As I discussed in Chapter One, Galton’s disavowal of free will reflected a more 
general debate of the time, particularly as put forward by T. H. Huxley and also discussed 
by William James.75 Huxley’s argument was that our sense of agency is an illusion, that 
we are merely bystanders to the automatic operation of our bodies; as unknowing slaves 
to the solipsistic machine, our sense of agency is an illusion. By contrast, the Artificial 
Man’s control panel grants him direct technological control over his organs, something 
that he would otherwise be without. The presence of a control panel demonstrates our 
free will by externalising agency into a technological artefact. Greater agency is granted 
over the body by making it subject to manual control. In some sense, then, the image 
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depicts what was inaccessible and automatic to have become subject to direct 
manipulation, an agency which presumably also would render the organs subject to skill. 
 In practical terms, the scenario is intractable, of course, but it resonates not only 
with the view of the ‘mechanised man’ as a cog in the machine; a line can be drawn to 
recent developments in artificial organs. Technological marvels like pacemakers, 
implantable insulin pumps and even artificial hearts are today not only computer 
controlled, but can be accessed wirelessly. Like the Artificial Man, this grants a degree of 
agency over the function of our own organs that we don’t naturally have. But on the 
flipside, such control can be denied and makes us subject to the whims of whoever has 
access to the control apparatus of the organs in question, be it the implanting doctor or 
the corporation that manufactures it. In recent years there has occasionally been 
warnings of a further threat, that these organs can be hacked. If it can connect to the 
internet, it can in theory be hacked, and the control of a vital organ could be relinquished 
to the hands of a tormentor. 
 These fears, whether substantiated or not, reflect the uneasy and ambiguous 
relationship we have to the idea that our bodies are machines. That the body is a 
machine threatens us with the danger that we are automata but also promises the 
possibility for agency, itself a double-edged sword. This view of the technologisation of 
the body thus runs counter to a more common narrative, that in the process becoming 
machines we relinquish our autonomy, by the claim that technological enhancements can 
give us greater liberty in determining ourselves. But the impracticality of the Artificial 
Man’s control panel at the same time highlights the problem of such an attitude: absolute 
control renders us subservient to what we control, since we would need to be endlessly 
attentive to our own function lest we succumb to malfunction.  
 The problems of liberty and autonomy attendant to the body as automaton, 
however, are different from those encountered in the cyborg, the cybernetic organism, 
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which I turn to next. With the cyborg, relinquishing agency to the mechanised body 
would liberate us from the oppression of our lived environment, freeing our spirit and 
human potential though not without its own dangers. 
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CHAPTER THREE: Cybernetic organisms 
Freedom in isolation 
 
 
 
Introduct ion:  Fic t ional ,  cr i t i ca l  and mil i tary cyborgs  
In recent years, technological augmentations of the body have shifted from being 
relegated to the imaginary, whether in science fiction or speculative futurisms, to be 
something actually present in the world. From modest beginnings of pacemakers and 
cochlear implants to the development of increasingly sophisticated prosthetic limbs, 
artificial internal organs and even neural implants that stimulate the brain’s memory 
centres, the incipient success and promise of these new alluring technologies stoke the 
fires of the imagination. The prosthetic enhancements previously only known in fiction 
are coming. Though there had been cyborgs on television previously, notably the 
Cybermen on Doctor Who in 1966, the cyborg as a prosthetically enhanced person came 
into a wider public consciousness with the success of the film and subsequent television 
series The Six Million Dollar Man. Based on Martin Caidin’s series of novels, it portrays 
how the astronaut Steve Austin is rescued from the brink of death after a plane crash and 
is given cybernetic replacement limbs that exceed the function of his unaugmented body, 
making him the titular ‘cyborg’ of Caidin’s novels.1 As the opening voice-over in the film 
famously tells us: ‘Gentlemen, we can rebuild him. We have the technology. We have the 
capability to make the world’s first bionic man. Steve Austin will be that man. Better than 
he was before. Better, stronger, faster.’2 Austin’s superhuman abilities now seem within 
                                                
1 Martin Caidin, Cyborg (New York: Arbor House, 1972). 
2 Richard Irving, The Six Million Dollar Man (American Broadcast Company, 1973). The word ‘cyborg’ 
featured more prominently in the original release of the film. ‘Bionic’ refers to a cybernetic discipline that 
explored the development of technological prototypes inspired by organisms, which Caidin conflated with 
cyborgs. 
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our own grasp, and in this respect the cyborg has become a figurehead for transhumanist 
ideas, where the desirable aim of technological enhancement is visualised as a marriage of 
flesh with machine. 
 N. Katherine Hayles has persuasively argued that at the core of transhumanist 
enhancement ideas lies a conception of the relationship between body and mind which 
represents a misguided return to Cartesian dualism, albeit in a new guise. By this view, 
the mind is reduced to an informational pattern, freely transferrable from body to body, 
in which the body has become completely separated from the mind. To Hayles, the 
cyborg is thus a figure that not only hybridises humans and machines, but a figure that 
represents a new perception of the human in the post-cybernetic, computerised age. 
With it, there is a separation of the messy, biological body from the pristine, 
informational intellect, yet the two nonetheless exist together as a whole in a tenuous 
union. The cyborg, then, has come to represent a figure of joined dichotomies, where 
oppositions have been uneasily brought together, at any moment threatening to separate 
like oil from water: flesh with machine, body with mind, animal with human, nature with 
culture.  
 The word conjures these uneasy unions by its composition: cybernetic, the science 
which inaugurated the informational age, and organism, that evolutionary construction 
which is almost as old as nature itself. But is the cyborg guilty of its accusation? Does it 
rely on an informational dualism that recapitulates the Cartesian separation of the res 
existensa from the res cogitans in an updated, scientific language? In this chapter I examine 
the cyborg’s origin and intellectual context to investigate the discrepancy that has arisen 
between the cyborg as a cultural and theoretical figure and how its inventors originally 
presented it. In this respect, the original cyborg was an avenue for technological 
enhancement of the body, a way of altering the body’s metabolic systems in order to free 
it from environmental constraints. As I question the grounds for calling the cyborg 
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emblematic of the informational discourse that arose in the United States military, I read 
it in terms of its stated liberating ambition: an evolutionary progression that allows 
humankind to expand into space. 
 
First  days o f  the Cyborg :  Psychophysio logy o f  space f l i ght 
The cyborg today is most prominently a figure of popular culture, and it is frequently 
assumed that it first appeared in science fiction. Aesthetically speaking, the colloquial, 
cultural idea of the cyborg emphasises the monstrous joining of incongruent elements, 
machine with flesh, to create a prosthetic corporeality. But as I established in the 
previous chapter, it was first used in a scientific context, by the psychiatrist Nathan Kline 
and the engineer and physiologist Manfred Clynes. In May 1960 they presented a joint 
paper at a symposium for ‘Psychophysiological Aspects of Space Flight’ held at the 
Brooks Air Force Base in San Antonio, Texas, organised during the earliest years of the 
space race between the United States and the Soviet Union. The NASA-led Project 
Mercury, which aimed to put the first man in space, had been initiated only the previous 
year, and it was still another year before anyone would be sent into orbit – though it was 
the cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin, and not an American astronaut, who made it into orbit first 
(not counting the dog Laika).  
 The symposium was replete with medical reports on the effects of radiation, 
studies on the human circadian rhythm, possible problems with experiencing 
weightlessness and vacuum, and the physiological and psychological stresses of space 
conditions. As Bernard E. Flaherty emphasises in the introduction to the proceedings, in 
human space flight the space craft and its occupant is considered to be a single man-
machine system, where ‘man’s limitations are the baseline which determine the degree of 
  
144 
efficiency of the total system.’3 In the man-machine system, humans were the ‘weakest 
link,’ and the entire system had to be designed on the basis of human needs. 
 The space race had begun in earnest following the Soviet Union’s launch into 
orbit of the first Sputnik satellite in 1957. That milestone proved that space could be 
reached by rocket power, and the ultimate aim became to send a man into space. Several 
satellites and probes had been launched after Sputnik, but placing humans in space 
would be the ultimate demonstration of technical superiority and national dominance. 
Moreover, as Flaherty notes, ‘man is an integral part of the total machine; the 
contributions of the machine to the final system output cannot be differentiated from 
the contributions of man.’4 Yet despite being an integral part of the entire system, man 
was the most fragile component of it, precisely because he was not a machine: ‘Man is a 
sea-level, low-speed, one-g, 12-hour animal.’5 In this context, then, human life is limited 
by the environmental constraints imposed by being adapted for a specific environment, 
an environment wholly different to that of space. Flaherty was paraphrasing the United 
States’ Air Force’s chief of staff, General Thomas D. White, whose description of man 
reflects the role the so-called ‘human factor’ played in the Air Force’s ambition to 
conquer space: ‘As each new goal in our march of progress has been won, we have been 
faced with the problem of adapting man to his new environment, and man by the very 
nature of his basic design is not readily amenable to engineering change.’6 To stay alive in 
such hostile conditions necessitated a close study of the limitations and possible 
                                                
3 Bernard E. Flaherty, ‘Introduction’, in Psychophysiological Aspects of Space Flight, ed. by Bernard E. Flaherty 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), pp. 1–5 (p. 1). 
4 Flaherty, p. 1. 
5 Flaherty, p. 4. 
6 Thomas D. White, ‘The Inevitable Climb to Space’, Air University Quarterly Review, 10 (1959), p. 4; for 
more on the ‘human factor’ and the role of space medicine during the space race, see John A. Pitts, The 
Human Factor: Biomedicine in the Manned Space Program to 1980, NASA History Series (Washington, DC: 
Scientific and Technical Information Branch, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 1985). 
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solutions to sending men into space; the symposium was therefore organized ‘to 
strengthen this “weakest link”.’7 
 In practice, ‘strengthening the weakest link’ entailed the development of 
supportive systems for the human body. Though the Air Force often used the term 
‘human engineering,’ that term described the practice of developing an artificial 
environment for humans, and not a technological augmentation of the body. A major 
part of the symposium therefore entailed mapping the ‘psychophysiological’ needs 
necessary to keep a human alive in space. The research papers at the symposium 
explored the stressors the space environment would exert on the human body, what 
environmental needs humans would have in space, and how to create and sustain an 
environment to accommodate for those needs. Beyond establishing which aspects of 
human biology were the most susceptible to hostile environments, the papers considered 
how to create a spacefaring vessel that could accommodate humans. Ultimately, it is clear 
that the aim was to bring a human enclosed in an earth-like environment into space, a 
goal which complicated matters greatly; for while a machine alone had previously been 
launched into space, that was a comparatively much simpler task. The development of 
the space vessel therefore entailed logistical problems: how much air, water and food to 
bring according to human needs; what to do with refuse; how to shield the craft from 
stressors such as radiation and the heat of re-entry; and logistical needs meant 
establishing engineering specifications. Despite Flaherty’s insistence that man and 
machine were an integrated system, already an established idea in the Air Force, it was 
clear that engineering a machine both capable of going into orbit and preserving an 
earth-like environment was a formidable problem. The man-machine might have been a 
system, but it was not one of equivalent entities. To the Air Force, man was not a 
machine, only working in unison with it towards a shared goal. Machines could be 
                                                
7 Flaherty, p. 4. 
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tinkered with and improved based on knowledge; men could be trained, but their 
parameters for basic functions of survival were static and fragile, and could not be 
changed.  
 Kline and Clynes’s solution to this problem was a reversal of what to engineer, to 
whom, making the phrase ‘human engineering’ much more literal. In the paper ‘Drugs, 
Space, and Cybernetics: Evolution to Cyborgs’ they claim that the ‘solution of artificial 
atmospheres encapsulated in smaller or larger enclosures’ otherwise explored at the 
symposium, ‘is only temporizing’;8 transient and short term solutions which made failure 
more likely. What they propose is a more permanent solution through technological 
means. Under the heading ‘Participant Evolution’ they observe that in the past, ‘the 
altering of bodily functions to suit different environments was accomplished through 
evolution. From now on, at least in some degree, this can be achieved without alteration 
of heredity by suitable biochemical, physiological, and electronic modifications of man’s 
existing modus vivendi’ (p. 346). With this in mind, they launch their concept of a 
Cyborg, an ‘artificially extended homeostatic control system functioning unconsciously’ 
(p. 347) which ‘deliberately incorporates exogeneous components extending the self-
regulatory control function of the organism in order to adapt it to new environments’, 
the purpose of which is to ‘provide an organizational system in which … robot-like 
problems are taken care of automatically and unconsciously, thus freeing man to explore, to 
create, to think, and to feel’ (p. 348, my emphasis).  
 Despite the similarity of their ideas of mechanising parts of the body, the cyborg 
Kline and Clynes envision is a far cry from Bernal’s mechanised man, which is more like 
the human-machine hybrids that populate fiction and cinema. They suggest that we 
should change only the ‘robot-like’ automatic functions of the autonomous nervous 
system that regulate our metabolism. Presumably, such a technological intervention 
                                                
8 Kline and Clynes, p. 346. Further references are given in the main text. 
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would be as invisible as it is unnoticed, situated within the body and outside of conscious 
experience. Their proposal echoes the metaphor of the body as machine, but they 
emphasise an application that goes beyond the purely instrumental need of placing 
people in space. The cyborg, as they envision it, is a possibility for radical liberty; space 
travel, as they see it, is not only a technical challenge, but ‘a spiritual challenge to take an 
active part in [man’s] own evolution’ (p. 345). Augmentation of the body through 
cybernetic techniques is an avenue for freedom and a renewed spirituality. 
 This runs counter to much of the historical literature on cyborgs which 
emphasises its roots in military thinking following World War II. While the list of 
contributors at the symposium shows that most of the participants present were affiliated 
with the Air Force, the final section of the proceedings – which also has the most 
speculative contributions – contains only papers presented by civilian researchers. In this 
context, Kline and Clynes were outsiders who had been invited to participate by the 
conference organiser Otis O. Benson, Jr.; 9  besides the cyborg paper are one on 
hypothermic hibernation and one on hypnosis. The Air Force had been working on 
space medicine since the late 1940s, but Kline and Clynes, who normally practiced at the 
Rockland State Hospital in Orangeburg, New York, were not constrained by the 
orthodoxy of the military approach to space medicine. 
 In this respect, while overtly contributing to the task of conquering space as an 
exercise in military hegemony, Kline and Clynes were taking part in a parallel narrative of 
technological progress and the liberating potential of space travel. This narrative 
originates with the Russian mystic Nikolai Fedorov, whose Philosophy of the Common Task 
dictated that expansion into space was the ultimate goal of human spirituality. 
Eventually, Fedorov’s philosophy became known as ‘cosmism’, and one of his greatest 
                                                
9 Chris Hables Gray, ‘An Interview with Manfred Clynes’, in The Cyborg Handbook, ed. by Chris Hables 
Gray, Heidi J. Figueroa-Sarriera, and Steven Mentor (New York; London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 43–54. 
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admirers was Vladimiar Tsiolkovsky, a pioneer in rocket science. Furthermore, however, 
the liberating potential of space flight was central to the work of Wernher von Braun. 
Von Braun, who famously constructed the V-2 rocket for Nazi Germany, was put in 
charge of the construction of rockets for the American space programme. Yet according 
to William Sims Bainbridge, von Braun’s military work was cynically instrumental to his 
cosmist-inspired preoccupations. The leading figure of a marginal group concerned with 
space travel, Bainbridge claims that von Braun in practice co-opted both German and 
American military research in order to further his own space-travelling agenda, likening 
the imposition of the obsessions of a marginal group on the global political arena as a 
coup d’etat. Ultimately, a fringe pursuit ‘became institutionalized as the space programs of 
the Soviet Union, United States, and other countries.’10 Though the military approached 
space flight in terms of political dominion, public support was gained through an abstract 
emphasis on human progress, and it was in this spirit Kline and Clynes articulated the 
cyborg to be the physical and spiritual evolution of humankind; as von Braun declared, 
the first moon landing was ‘equal in importance to that moment in evolution when 
aquatic life came crawling up on the land.’11 
 Air Force research in space medicine had been based at Brooks Air Force Base 
since 1949, in the Space Medicine department. On 29 July 1958, the National Space Act 
established that there was to be two separate space programmes in the United States, 
where civilian applications fell to a new space agency, the National Aeronautics and 
Space Administration, NASA, while the Air Force maintained military applications.12 
                                                
10 William Sims Bainbridge, ‘The Spaceflight Revolution Revisited’, in Looking Backward, Looking Forward: 
Forty Years of U.S. Human Spaceflight Symposium, ed. by Stephen J. Garber, NASA History Series 
(Washington, DC: NASA History Office, 2002), pp. 39–64 (p. 42). 
11 William Sims Bainbridge, The Spaceflight Revolution: A Sociological Study (New York; London: Wiley, 1976), 
p. 1. 
12 David N. Spires, ‘The Air Force and Military Space Missions: The Critical Years, 1957-1961’, in The U.S. 
Air Force in Space: 1945 to the Twenty-First Century: Proceedings, Air Force Historical Foundation Symposium, Andrews 
AFB, Maryland, September 21-22, 1995, ed. by R. Cargill Hall and Jacob Neufeld (Washington, DC: Air 
Force History and Museums Program, 1998), pp. 33–45 (p. 38). 
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Despite this, by 1960 there was still a political struggle over whether space, and especially 
manned space flight, was the dominion of civilian or military authorities. The Air Force 
defined space as a natural extension of airspace, which meant that they saw it as their 
rightful domain, and at the time they still commanded much of the funding for research 
into space medicine. In fact, the Air Force is still technically a space agency, but only for 
unmanned space flight. It is therefore worthwhile to emphasise the circumstances of the 
cyborg. For instance, science and technology historians such as Peter Galison, Andrew 
Pickering, and Paul Edwards employ the cyborg as a figure to signify the origins of 
cybernetics in the American military’s World War II efforts, representing those novel 
entities that were formed by the connection of men with machines as a complete system 
through informational feedback loops. 13  The Psychophysiological Space Flight 
symposium was organised by a military entity, and therefore the cyborg was conceptually 
launched in a quasi-military context. However, the symposium brought together 
researchers from several institutions, in general drawn from the Air Force and NASA, 
but also researchers unaffiliated with the military, such as Kline and Clynes. Whereas 
Kline and Clynes define the cyborg as a cybernetic entity, it does not fall comfortably 
within the American military’s systems thinking of the time. The military man-machine 
describes humans working in concert with machines as a collective entity, but, as noted, 
the human in that system remained human. Where the military man-machine systems 
erase the physical boundaries between entities through an emphasis on informational 
flows, for Kline and Clynes somatic boundaries are not only preserved but essential, to 
the degree that the man-machine’s environmental support machinery becomes 
internalised into the body. Exogenous components, by which they mean not just external 
technological artefacts but technologies that interface with the body to alter and reduce 
                                                
13 Peter Galison, ‘The Ontology of the Enemy: Norbert Wiener and the Cybernetic Vision’, Critical Inquiry, 
21 (1994), 228–66; Andy Pickering, ‘Cyborg History and the World War II Regime’, Perspectives on Science, 3 
(1995), 1–48; Edwards. 
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its environmental needs, were to be deliberately incorporated, and as such the somatic 
boundaries are preserved, even as its internal configuration is altered. 
 Kline and Clynes, then, were not working within the systems schools of thought 
that arose out of the military theorising during World War II (cybernetics was only one 
of the several systems theories that sprang out of the United States military following the 
war), and their articulation of the cyborg drew on multiple scientific disciplines. In 
addition to cybernetics, their cyborg concept is shaped by physiological research, 
evolutionary biology and the then nascent psychiatric pharmacology – and a hint of 
spiritualism. This bringing together of disciplines is illustrative of cybernetics’ aim to 
become a ‘universal’ science, aiming to unify scientific disciplines under its revisionist 
epistemology.14 However, their cybernetic approach had little in common with the space 
medicine researched by the Air Force. The index of the proceedings shows that ‘Drugs, 
Space, and Cybernetics’ is the only paper at the symposium which explored cybernetic 
avenues, and despite that NASA later commissioned an in-depth study of the cyborg, it 
was eventually dropped as a line of inquiry for space travel by both the military and 
civilian space agencies.15 Arguably, it was the reporting media that showed the biggest 
interest in the cyborg, and in 1960 alone it was reported on in the New York Times,16 in 
Life, which ran an illustrated article on the Cyborg,17  and in the specialist press.18 
Arguably, then, the cyborg as a cultural phenomenon owes more to its early 
dissemination in the reporting media than to its importance in any of the military 
branches. 
 
                                                
14 Geof Bowker, ‘How to Be Universal: Some Cybernetic Strategies, 1943-70’, Social Studies of Science, 23 
(1993), 107–27. 
15 R. W. Driscoll, ‘Engineering Man for Space. The Cyborg Study Final Report’, 1963 
<http://ntrs.nasa.gov/search.jsp?R=19650005586> [accessed 19 November 2012]. 
16 ‘Spaceman Is Seen as Man-Machine’, New York Times (New York, 22 May 1960), p. 31. 
17 ‘Man Remade to Live in Space’, Life, 11 July 1960, pp. 77–78. 
18 William Beller, ‘Ways Sought to Ease Ordeal of Space’, Missiles and Rockets, 6 (1960), 38–40. 
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The prol i f erat ion o f  cyborgs 
Since it was coined in 1960, the word ‘cyborg’ has definitively entered the English 
language: in 1989 it received an entry in the second edition of the OED.19 The science-
fictional vision of humans with machine parts embedded in their flesh has become 
common in popular culture. In the 11 July, 1960 issue of Life, a two-page spread revealed 
that two scientists were working to remake man for space. ‘Striding buoyantly across the 
low-gravity surface of the moon, there may someday be strange new men – part human, 
part machine’ it proclaimed.20 The article was accompanied by a large illustration made by 
Fred Freeman, who besides illustrating naval histories and works on space exploration, 
also designed book covers for science fiction magazines and novels. The illustration 
depicts two cyborgs, astronauts on the moon clad in skin-tight suits with transparent 
segments that show electronic components as part of their bodies (see figure 3.1). The 
general subject of the story fell under Life’s continuing report on the space race, having 
run a longer series on the astronauts involved in Project Mercury the same year. But it 
was perhaps more difficult to find these potential cyborgs as wholesome as the all-
Americans who were to be sent into orbit. Three weeks later, the readers had responded. 
One, a ‘technologist’, found the cyborg to be ‘artificially dehumanized, mechanized 
monsters.’ Another ridiculed it, asking where they would get volunteers: ‘who wants to 
jump around on the moon in his underwear?’21 
 The Cyborg had become public knowledge before Clynes and Kline published a 
shortened version of their paper in the popular magazine Astronautics, in September that 
year.22 Even prior to them reading the paper to their peers at the ‘Psychophysiological 
aspects’ symposium, the cyborg was in the news. On 22 May the New York Times ran the 
                                                
19 ‘Cyborg, N.’, OED Online (Oxford University Press) <http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/46487>. 
20 ‘Man Remade to Live in Space’, p. 77. 
21 Joseph Shelley and Tom Fornwalt, ‘Letters to the Editor’, Life, 1 August 1960, section Letters to the 
Editor: Man and Cyborgs, p. 9 (p. 9). 
22 Clynes and Kline. 
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notice ‘Spaceman is seen as man-machine,’ reporting that a ‘possible picture of the space 
man of the future has emerged from a radically new approach to the problems of space 
medicine’; 
According to the new view, a space man would be a human-and-then-some. He 
would not have to eat or breathe. Those functions and many others would be 
taken care of automatically by drugs and battery-powered devices, some of which 
would be built directly into his body. So equipped, the space man would belong to 
a breed of literally super-human beings that the scientists who conceived them call 
‘cyborgs.’23 
It is likely that it Nathan Kline had contacted the press before the symposium. Kline was 
a savvy self-promoter, and had previously taken the glory for the discovery of a 
tuberculosis treatment, Iproniazid, as a new class of psychiatric medicine, the 
monoamine oxidase inhibitor, calling it a ‘psychic energizer.’24 Kline advocated iproniazid 
not only as a psychiatric drug, but one that had the potential of improving the lives of 
healthy individuals, noting that psychic energizers were ‘compounds which tend to “fill 
the pump” rather than “speed it up”.’25 Before it was eventually banned due to problems 
of liver toxicity (Kline claimed that the problems were in fact due to people over-
medicating themselves due to its positive impact on mood), iproniazid received attention 
from the medical community,26 and eventually Kline would receive the Lasker award in 
1964 for the second time for his discovery. Kline also introduced the psychic energizer 
class of drugs as a drug to promote wakefulness in the Cyborg in ‘Drugs, Space, and 
Cybernetics’.  
 The press release in the New York Times was only the beginning of the media’s 
interest in the Cyborg, which combined the then cutting-edge scientific epistemology of 
cybernetics with the space race aspirations of the early 60s and the science fictional, 
                                                
23 ‘Spaceman Is Seen as Man-Machine’, p. 31. 
24 See for example ‘Psychic Energizer’, Time, 15 April 1957, p. 31; the background for the discovery of 
iproniazid as a psychiatric drug is detailed in Shorter. 
25 Nathan S. Kline, ‘Psychopharmaceuticals: Effects and Side Effects’, Bulletin of the World Health 
Organization, 21 (1959), 397–410 (p. 398). 
26 Arthur M. Sackler, ‘Toward a Unifying Concept in Psychiatry’, Journal of Clinical and Experimental 
Psychopathology, 19. 
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medical grotesquerie of bodies mixed with machines. Kline and Clynes’s Cyborg was 
quickly picked up by both the trade and popular presses, and was heavily featured in the 
first review of the symposium for the public in the trade journal Missiles and Rockets, 
where we read about a ‘minority report’ advising the astronauts not to bring their 
environment with them, but that it would ‘be wiser to change man, making him more 
adaptable to space conditions as they are.’27 Ultimately, NASA commissioned a study, 
Engineering Man for Space: The Cyborg Study.  
 The journalist Heather David at Missiles and Rockets took a special interest in the 
Cyborg, and followed it up over the next years as the idea was investigated at NASA.28 
The contract procurement reports in Missiles and Rockets show that NASA commissioned 
a study on the cyborg to be done by the United Aircraft Corporation in 1962,29 and after 
the publication of Driscoll’s preliminary report, the study went into a second stage,30 with 
experiments on ‘animals breathing directly in a saline solution with the aid of electrodes 
implanted to convert the water to usable oxygen and hydrogen’ as well as ‘means of 
reducing metabolic needs during the prolonged travel periods to distant planets are being 
considered.’31 It seems, however, that the study was subsequently dropped, following a 
change in leadership at the Bioastronautics division at NASA.  
 Some years later, the grand old man of aerospace medicine, Hubertus Strughold, 
dismissed the Cyborg altogether as ‘a matter of wild imagination.’32 Even so, an internal   
                                                
27 Beller, p. 38. 
28 Heather David, ‘Drugs May Halve Radiation Damage’, Missiles and Rockets, 7 (1960), 39–40; Heather 
David, ‘NASA Has a New Bioastronautics Unit’, Missiles and Rockets, 11 (1962), 26–27; Heather David, 
‘UAC Cyborg Study in Second Phase’, Missiles and Rockets, 12 (1963), 41–43. 
29 ‘Contracts and Procurements’, Missiles and Rockets, 24 September 1962, 51–52. 
30 David, ‘UAC Cyborg Study in Second Phase’. 
31 ‘Biotechnology Research Pushed by Big Companies’, Missiles and Rockets, 13 (1963), 83–89 (p. 89). 
32 Hubertus Strughold, ‘Unorthodoxies and Controversies in Planetary and Space Science’, in Proceedings of 
the Sixth Annual Meeting of the Working Group on Extraterrestrial Resources (Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, 
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Figure 3.1: Cyborgs in Space. From LIFE, 11 July, 1960, p. 77. 
 
report on NASA’s societal impact of that year noted that the Cyborg Study was influential 
for the development of artificial organs. The report’s author acknowledged that the 
cyborg study was ‘the most exotic of the life science studies that NASA has supported to 
date’,33 but also claimed that Willem Kolff, the creator of the first fully functional kidney 
dialysis machine and known as the father of artificial organs said that the ‘cyborg study 
                                                
33 Robert W. Prehoda, Public Health, Medicine, and Biological Research, Some Major Impacts of the National 
Space Program (Menlo Park: Stanford Research Institute, 1968), p. 42. 
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provided useful research transfer data for his efforts,’ with ‘great impact on his 
program.’34 
 While there was much interest in the Cyborg in the popular presses, the reception 
was more muted in scientific circles. A reviewer of the proceedings of the symposium 
dismissed the presentation, stating that while the thinking was ‘at times imaginative and 
original,’ it took the appearance of a ‘collection of miscellanea and anecdotes’ making it, 
in certain passages, ‘disconnected and discordant.’35 It is not hard to see what he means. 
The paper does in places come across as a collection of miscellany, and there are really 
only two concrete suggestions for the implementation of their ideas present, including 
the Rose-Nelson osmotic pump, which has gained an unusual amount of attention as a 
‘cyborg’ technology, given how it is, by itself, a purely mechanical injection pump which 
happens to be implanted, as noted in chapter two. The other concrete suggestion is the 
use of psychic energizers, which they suggest should be used to promote wakefulness, to 
be used in conjunction with the osmotic pump.  
 The cyborg Kline and Clynes presented is thus quite unlike how we currently 
think of it both in terms of cultural representations and as a central figure in cybernetic 
and military history. The presentation of cyborgs as technologically augmented bodies, a 
visually striking assemblage of functionally interchangeable parts, more closely resembles 
Bernal’s machine man than the space-travelling cyborg of 1960. Their idea was to 
change, replace or augment bodily functions that are otherwise unseen and unnoticed, 
almost the diametrical opposite of the aesthetic image of the cyborg in popular culture. It 
strictly preserves bodily boundaries, and elsewhere Clynes insists upon the essentiality of 
identity. While Kline and Clynes’s cyborg was proposed as an evolutionary, spiritual 
liberation, the manner in which it was proposed runs counter to Donnay Haraway’s 
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35 Henry G. Wagner, ‘Review of Psychophysiological Aspects of Space Flight. by Bernard E. Flaherty’, The 
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cyborg feminism, who has sought to wrest the cyborg from its military associations to 
use it as a figure that represents shifting and fluid identities.36  
 In many ways, then, the cyborg’s endurance, both as a theoretical approach and 
an aesthetic figure, is based on an interpretation at odds with how it was first formulated. 
Despite this discrepancy, its original formulation brings together a number of strands of 
thought which are constitutive of the development of thinking around enhancement 
technology. Its introduction of machines into the body is more limited than its later 
aesthetic representation, and its proposed application is narrower than being simply any 
configuration of bodies and machines. Nevertheless, the formulation of the cyborg 
represents a watershed moment for theorising a union between body and machine by 
creating a hybrid entity both compelling and alien, an entity which has endured in both 
culture and theory. Clynes later expressed downright revulsion at what he saw as the 
cultural misrepresentation of his idea, like the killer android in The Terminator (1984) 
referring to itself as a cyborg.37  Nevertheless, ‘Drugs, Space, and Cybernetics’ was 
arguably the first fully fleshed-out expression of technologically augmenting the body in 
a scientific context, and helped to make the idea of technological enhancement via 
surgical intervention, coupling the body with the machine, gain cultural currency as both 
a possibility, but also, to some, as an appealing aesthetic end.  
 
What is  a cyborg? 
Ronald Kline has noted that despite its looming presence in histories concerned with 
cybernetics, there is a conspicuous lack of mention of cyborgs in the actual writings of 
the people involved with the original cybernetics group. In other words, there is an 
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1980s’, Socialist Review, 15 (1985), 65–108. 
37 Gray, ‘An Interview with Manfred Clynes’. 
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overemphasis on the cyborg in the critical histories of cybernetics.38 While the Cyborg of 
Nathan Kline and Manfred Clynes (‘Cyborg’ is hereafter capitalised to refer to the cyborg 
described in 1960) relies on a quintessentially cybernetic idea, that the body’s 
maintenance of homeostasis can be described in terms of the negative feedback 
mechanisms found in communication engineering, their Cyborg is, strictly speaking, not 
the same as the cyborg found in critical theory. Following Donna Haraway’s famous 
‘Cyborg Manifesto’, the cyborg has come to represent a hybrid figure that informs 
identity politics, and has served as the inspiration of a ‘cyborgology’ that investigates the 
role of technology in constituting personal identity.39  
 But an unfortunate side effect of Haraway’s emphasis on the cyborg as an 
ahistorical metaphor which disrupts dichotomies and dualities has been the obscuring of 
its origins which has led to an overemphasis on the role of information theory for its 
constitution. One reason may be ignorance of its origins, and that it has merely been 
taken as a science fictional figure that grew out of the popular image of cybernetics; 
Haraway has herself admitted that she was unaware of Kline and Clynes’s Cyborg when 
she first wrote the ‘Manifesto.’ 40  Galison and Pickering’s historical accounts of 
cybernetics in World War II anachronistically place the cyborg as representative for the 
military systems discourse that was developed in the mid-1940s. Galison borrows the 
cyborg from Haraway, making it an exemplary of the early cyberneticians’ blurring of 
boundaries between bodies and machines, but without any reference to Kline and 
Clynes.41 Pickering states that his ‘cyborg history’ is equivalent to Bruno Latour and 
                                                
38 Ronald Kline, ‘Where Are the Cyborgs in Cybernetics?’, Social Studies of Science, 39 (2009), 331–62. Ronald 
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39 Most notable in The Cyborg Handbook, ed. by Chris Hables Gray, Heidi Figueroa-Sarriera, and Steven 
Mentor (New York; London: Routledge, 1995). 
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Michel Callon’s actor-network theory, and he refers to cyborg objects and sciences that 
‘in different ways destabilized the boundary between the human and the non-human.’42 
Edwards calls the post-war military emphasis on information and the research on 
intelligent machines a ‘cyborg discourse,’43 which, while a conceptually valuable approach 
in describing the emphasis on information as a mediating factor to join and create new 
entities, implies that the cyborg was much more accepted in the scientific and military 
culture than was actually the case. In other words, the cyborg has been decontextualized 
from its historical moment to be used as a symbol for a more general discourse it did not 
take part in. 
 What the original paper on the cyborg describes is not just a method for 
mechanical extension of the body to create machine-body assemblages. In ‘Drugs, Space, 
and Cybernetics,’ Kline and Clynes describe an alteration of the body’s internal 
environmental responses in relation to a radically different external environment; they 
propose a change or replacement of the homeostatic mechanisms of the body 
themselves to cope with a radically hostile environment. While cybernetics is partly an 
epistemological approach to analysing systems which emphasises relationships and 
organisation over material and causal chains, the Cyborg was intended as a practical 
technological solution to what amounted to a logistical problem. An astronaut’s extended 
stay in space would require bringing an artificial Earth environment. While Clynes has 
later made developed his views on the cyborg, remarking that, for example, someone 
who is wearing glasses or riding a bicycle can be understood as a cyborg,44 that view does 
not adequately reflect the Cyborg that he launched in 1960.  
                                                
42 Pickering, p. 5. Pickering acknowledges the Cyborg’s origin, but admits that he was made aware of it 
only after his essay was finished (p. 3 n3). 
43 Edwards, p. 2. 
44 Gray, ‘An Interview with Manfred Clynes’, p. 49. 
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 Such a view, that we become cyborgs as soon as we use a technical artefact, is 
similar to what we find in critical theory, most prominently in the work of Chris Hables 
Gray, a student of Haraway.45 The depiction of the cyborg as an amalgamation of 
material and informational entities has enabled, for example, Andy Clark’s ‘extended 
mind theory,’ especially in the book Natural-born Cyborgs, where ‘Cyborgs and Space’ is 
also discussed at length.46 For these writers, the cyborg relies on a cybernetic systems 
analysis of the interaction between the subject and object which collapses the distinction 
between them. By this view, it becomes valid to say that using a tool means that one 
temporarily extends the self to create a body-tool assemblage, body and tool acting as a 
unity. In the cybernetic system analysis, picking up a tool and using it skilfully means that 
the more useful level of analysis is not to consider the body and the tool as separate, but 
that both are working together in a larger system that also consists of the surrounding 
environment and the body-with-tool. Consequently, that the modern human is, in part, 
defined by the usage of tools and technology, leads to the assertion that any tool usage 
renders us into cyborgs. The evolution of Homo sapiens’ modern anatomy most likely took 
place in tandem with the development of manual tools with selection pressure for tool 
manipulation.47 By this view, then, a shift in perspective for the understanding of Homo 
sapiens renders us, in some sense, to always have been cyborgs. Yet this perspective 
obscures the Cyborg’s specific historical situation. 
 The sense of cyborg as assemblage is heightened by the various information-
processing technologies – computers – that arose in the wake of cybernetics, and which 
are commonplace today. This leads Hayles, for example, to claim that when we are using 
                                                
45 Chris Hables Gray, Cyborg Citizen: Politics in the Posthuman Age (New York: Routledge, 2000). 
46 Clark. 
47 See for instance S. L. Washburn, ‘Speculations on the Interrelations of the History of Tools and 
Biological Evolution’, Human Biology, 31 (1959); Leroi-Gourhan. 
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a computer we are (metaphorically) temporarily cyborgs. 48  The interaction with 
information processing technologies is skill-mediated, but this is a matter of interfacing; 
skill is also embodied in the technologies themselves. As Hayles impresses on us, 
‘cybernetics radically changed how boundaries were conceived,’ and emphasises that 
‘cybernetic systems are constituted by flows of information.’49 For Hayles, the cyborg is a 
hybrid entity formed by humans’ interaction with information-processing objects, 
integrated as a whole through reciprocal feedback flows. Thus the cyborg describes an 
assemblage in which two subjects merge to become a single subject, where each have 
embodied skilled systems that interact with the other’s according to their separate 
feedback mechanisms. Each subject constitutes the environment of the other, which 
collapses their distinction, and together they form a single, mutually interacting whole. 
 This form of analysis makes sense from the cybernetic point of view. But it can 
also lead to absurd conclusions, because it means that a cyborg arises spontaneously 
whenever there are two entities that enter into such a mutually feedback-mediated 
relationship. A person adjusting a thermostat and the thermostat is a cyborg; a plumber 
adjusting a toilet’s ball-cock and the toilet is a cyborg. But moreover, a dancing couple is 
a cyborg; a dog and the hare trying to escape it together form a cyborg. Walking a dog 
makes you – and the dog – temporarily enter into a cyborg union. When you’re speaking 
to a friend the two of you form a cyborg. This absurdity undermines the alterity of the 
cyborg itself by universalising it, draining it of conceptual significance by making any 
feedback-regulated behaviour which interacts with a feedback-regulated behaviour – and 
where each are mutually conditioned by the other – into a cyborg. To make sense, such a 
conception of the cyborg relies upon upholding the distinction between the artificial and 
                                                
48 N. Katherine Hayles, ‘The Life Cycle of Cyborgs. Writing the Posthuman’, in The Cyborg Handbook, ed. by 
Chris Hables Gray, Heidi Figueroa-Sarriera, and Steven Mentor (New York; London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 
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the natural, a dichotomy which is otherwise not supported by cybernetic theory, which 
dissolved the distinction between the two categories. 
 Even more loosely, there is the tendency to consider any technological 
interventions in the body to be creating cyborgs. The introduction to The Cyborg 
Handbook demonstrates this idea of what the cyborg has come to mean in this extended 
sense.50 There, the book’s editors describe the cyborg as ‘Anyone with an artificial organ, 
limb or supplement (like a pacemaker), anyone reprogrammed to resist disease 
(immunized) or drugged to think/behave/feel better (psychopharmacology) is technically 
a cyborg.’51 Chris Hables Gray further emphasises in Cyborg Citizen that what he calls the 
‘technical cyborg’ can be ‘any organism/system that mixes the evolved and the made, the 
living and the inanimate’.52 By this account, modern cyborgs are not limited to people 
who have pacemakers or have some type of artificial organs (however rare these may be), 
but you are also a cyborg if you wear glasses, if you have gotten a vaccine, if you have 
fillings in your teeth or replace them with dentures, in addition to any type of passive 
prosthesis. Again, this undermines the specific situation of the cyborg as a cybernetically 
constructed being. Kline and Clynes’s Cyborg is not just about technological alteration of 
the body, but an alteration which includes its own regulation through feedback 
mechanisms while – counter to the boundary-diffusing analysis enabled by cybernetics – 
preserving traditional somatic boundaries.  
 Some, like David Mindell, have observed that cybernetics did not pioneer the 
feedback-mediated technologies themselves.53 But where cybernetics pioneered a novel 
theory of technology, a theory which relied on existing mechanisms in biology and 
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extended their remit by demystifying them. The Cyborg followed in the wake of this, 
making explicit how one might alter the body by using cybernetic technology. As Ronald 
Kline notes, the concatenation ‘cybernetic organism’ seems to be a redundant misnomer 
because according to cybernetics, all living creatures are already cybernetic. However, the 
Cyborg should be understood as cybernetic since it is ‘an organism extended by means of 
cybernetic technology’.54 The cybernetic model of biological function is essential to 
understand where the cyborg comes from; while at the same time, it is also valuable to 
note the role of the word ‘organism’ in biology.  
 To fully appreciate the Cyborg, a discussion of cybernetics is therefore necessary. 
But whereas cybernetic histories often emphasise the role of information theory – rightly 
so, given its prominence at the Macy conferences, in Wiener’s Cybernetics and its 
contemporary importance – the information discourse is only implicitly present with the 
Cyborg, in its reliance on feedback mechanisms. In my discussion, I will therefore 
emphasise cybernetics’ conceptual innovation that reintroduces teleology and purpose to 
science, mechanising them. I examine the contextual background for establishing the 
cybernetic field, both in Norbert Wiener’s own work, but also more in a more broad 
philosophical context regarding the role of teleology and vital principles in biology, 
which builds upon the philosophical foundations laid in the previous chapter. As such, 
cybernetics, though only touched on briefly, has wider implications for this thesis as a 
whole, given its importance in shaping the informational discourse so central to 
contemporary transhumanism. 
 
  
                                                
54 Ronald Kline, p. 332. 
  
163 
From cybernet i c s  to  evo lut ion:  purpose and adaptat ion55 
In May 1942, in New York City, the Mexican physiologist Arturo Rosenblueth surprised 
the academics gathered at the ‘Cerebral Inhibitions’ conference organised by the Josiah 
Macy Jr. Foundation with his paper on ‘Behavior, Purpose and Teleology’. The 
conference was concerned with psychological matters, presided over by Milton Eriksson, 
a pioneer in the use of hypnotism, but Rosenblueth’s presentation stole the limelight for 
many of the participants, who would later be central in the forming of a ‘Teleological 
Society’ with the aim of further developing the ideas first laid out in that paper. One of 
the participants at ‘Cerebral Inhibitions’, Margaret Mead, would later claim that she had 
found the discussion so engrossing that she would not notice until later in the day that 
she had broken a tooth.56 
 The paper, which was co-authored by Rosenblueth, Norbert Wiener and Julian 
Bigelow, contained the germinal philosophical outlines of what would later expand into a 
conference series on ‘circular causation,’ the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics. The 
paper, which was subsequently published in 1943, presented a model for purposive 
behaviour understood in communication engineering terms.57 
 Purposive behaviour – planning, intention, and so on – was regarded as the 
domain of mental activity. But by presenting their analysis as something which applied 
both to mental actions, the nervous system, and a certain class of machines, the ideas in 
‘Behavior, Purpose and Teleology’ would have consequences for many domains by 
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definitively joining the category of the living to the machine – albeit a particular type of 
machine. The ideas contained in ‘Behavior, Purpose and Teleology’ will be discussed in 
greater detail in a separate section, but for now it is important to note that 
communication, seen as a time series, was developed in that paper, as well as in other 
work by Norbert Wiener, as an essential aspect of control and regulation. 
 Arturo Rosenblueth was a Mexican physiologist based at Harvard. There, he 
presided over an interdisciplinary meeting to discuss matters of the philosophy of 
science. Norbert Wiener, a mathematician at MIT, was an enthusiastic participant at 
these meetings, where the two agreed that the increasingly rigid boundaries between 
scientific disciplines was hindering the scientific development in areas that were 
positioned at the intersections between several disciplines. As Wiener noted in the 
introduction to Cybernetics, ‘Behavior, Purpose and Teleology’ was the outcome of Wiener 
and Rosenblueth’s interdisciplinary discussion, alongside Wiener’s wartime work together 
with the MIT engineer Julian Bigelow. 
 Wanting to help the military from the beginning of the war, Wiener turned his 
attention to figuring out a mathematical method for predicting the future trajectory of an 
airplane which was going both higher and faster than the existing technology could 
handle. This was known as the so-called ‘fire control’ problem, and Julian Bigelow was 
asked to assist in constructing a machine to embody the mathematical theories of 
prediction that Wiener was developing. 
 It was in this context that Wiener, having asked military officials to share some of 
the details of his work with colleagues, showed his development of a machine that 
selected a probable future trajectory of an aircraft to Rosenblueth. The machine would 
occasionally go into fits of wild oscillations – behaviour that Bigelow would later suggest 
could be corrected by the introduction of negative feedback into the machines’ output 
loop – but Rosenblueth remarked to Wiener that the oscillating behaviour of the 
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machine was reminiscent of certain types of neural defects, in particular that of ‘purpose 
tremor’, in which, for instance, a patient could not bring a glass of water to their mouths, 
with the hands starting to shake and swing wildly when bringing a glass of water to their 
mouth. In developing this train of thought, Rosenblueth and Wiener suggested that the 
purpose tremor and the oscillation of the gun turret were both caused by a similar 
phenomenon, the lack of correction by a negative feedback mechanism. It is perhaps 
relevant to note that the name of the nervous illness, purpose tremor, is echoed in the 
language they used to develop the new theory of circular causation and teleological 
mechanisms. 
 Since the purpose tremor occurred due to a defect, in the lack of correction, 
Wiener and Bigelow saw the opportunity for building a machine that could correct its 
action on the basis of negative feedback, which had been theorised in communications 
engineering in the previous decade by the Bell Labs engineer Harold Black. Wiener, a 
mathematician who had worked extensively on the mathematical modelling of Brownian 
motion and Fourier transforms, saw a similarity between the seemingly random 
movement of evasive aircraft manoeuvres and his own work, and subsequently 
developed a model for prediction based on a probability selection of possible future 
flight trajectories. 
 Between the observed position of an aircraft, possibly several miles overhead, 
and its position when a missile would reach it, Wiener realised that proper guidance had 
to make better predictions of the future trajectory of the aircraft. As Wiener writes, ‘it is 
exceedingly important to shoot the missile, not at the target, but in such a way that 
missile and target may come together in space at some time in the future.’58 If a plane’s 
trajectory does not change, this becomes a simple problem to solve, yet an aircraft will 
almost never take a straight-forward and easily predictable path. In order to solve this 
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problem, Wiener and Bigelow attempted to develop a machine that coupled a self-
correcting servomechanism with correction from a feedback system, using statistical 
projections and input from the goal to correct for errors in the missile’s trajectory. The 
treatment of the aircraft’s future trajectory as the selection of the most probable among 
several possible trajectories marked a startling originality in the still-nascent 
communications theory. Wiener treated the projected flight path as a communicated 
message, and his use of probabilities to select it from several possible trajectories came to 
be one of the deepest insights in communication and information theory.  
 Early in his mathematical career, Wiener had developed a statistical measure 
(known as the Wiener measure) to predict the path of particles in Brownian notion, and 
thought that the evasive manoeuvres of the planes were similar to the Brownian motion 
seen at molecular level. Yet while the (to the observer) apparently random movement of 
an aircraft’s flight path was similar to the Brownian motion, it was also less chaotic, given 
the material limitations of a plane: a pilot could only bank so much before either the G-
forces became too much or the plane itself failed. The resulting apparatus (which itself 
was never implemented into a functional machine for the war effort) combined a 
probability selection of predicting flight paths based on radar observation with feedback 
control of the gun-turret’s movements, marrying automatic servo-control with negative 
feedback. At that time, feedback control was relatively new, having been developed for 
the use of limiting ‘singing’ in the expanding telephone network, but was already seeing 
wider implementation. 
 Negative feedback was gaining widespread usage following Harold Black’s 
publication on it in 1934.59 According to his oft-repeated personal legend, Black had 
been working on the problem of feedback on the telephone lines – ‘singing’ – when he 
came upon a possible solution while taking the ferry to Manhattan one morning in 1927, 
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and wrote down a schematic solution on a fortuitously blank page in the New York Times. 
Telephony was becoming widespread and telephone wires were being laid out on a grand 
scale. With the larger scale came problems, however. Given that wires were laid over 
increasingly longer distances, the gain of the signal had to be increased to ensure it 
reached its distance. With increased gain, however, came a loss of signal quality, which 
would often lead to the problem of singing, a result of the message output feeding back 
into the input (or ‘positive’ feedback, which was initially maligned by the cybernetic 
theorists). Unchecked, the feedback leads to the well-known wailing, such as is heard 
when a microphone is brought too close to its speaker. Black’s solution was to take some 
of the signal and reverse its electrical polarity, before feeding it back to the input, at the 
loss of gain, but greatly reducing the oscillation of the signal. While the basic theory was 
sound, it would take Black several years to work out some of the problems involved so 
he could publish his results and patent its implementation (a patent that was originally 
rejected on the grounds that it seemed too improbable).  
 Wiener had a wide-ranging academic background. Intentionally raised by his 
father Leo to be a child prodigy, Wiener entered university at age eleven, and graduated 
with a Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard at eighteen with a thesis on the mathematical 
logic of Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica. What is often brought up by his 
biographers, however, is his early interest in biology which he originally wanted to 
specialise in, but abandoned both due to pressures from his overly ambitious father and 
his clumsiness in laboratory settings. Following postdoctoral work at Cambridge under 
the guidance of Bertrand Russell and G. H. Hardy, Wiener was encouraged to pursue 
mathematics; while Russell’s interest in mathematics was waning, G. H. Hardy would 
champion Wiener’s mathematical work. In Wiener’s early career, he worked particularly 
on Brownian motion, a mathematical topic which, while not fashionable at the time, 
would have importance both in mathematics and in Wiener’s own work on cybernetics.  
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Arturo Rosenblueth was a physiologist and a student of Walter Cannon. Cannon 
pioneered the concept of homeostasis, the idea that the body – building on Claude 
Bernard’s distinction between the body’s milieu intérieur and the environment it resides in, 
the milieu éxtérieur – maintains a reasonably stable environment internally despite the ever-
changing pressures of the environment. From its first formulation in 1926, Cannon 
developed homeostasis throughout the 1920s and gave his definitive account of it in The 
Wisdom of the Body.60 While a physiologist, Rosenblueth was also deeply interested in the 
philosophy of science, and shared with Wiener the view that disciplinary boundaries were 
both artificial and hindered true progress in the areas that lay at the margins and 
boundaries between disciplines. Given his interdisciplinary focus and his foundation in 
biology and physiology, Rosenblueth became a close friend of Wiener’s who would often 
travel to Mexico to work with him after Rosenblueth was forced out of Harvard.  
 It was thus that Wiener intuited that the Radar observations were actually 
analogous to the transmission of a message as a time series. The oscillations of the gun 
turrets – the output of the machine – could therefore be checked by implementing a 
negative feedback loop into its mechanism. That the purpose tremor was seen as a 
similar phenomenon as the malfunctioning gun turret therefore laid the groundwork for 
seeing nervous activity as being time-series transmissions of ‘messages’ – or a form of 
communication – while the homeostatic mechanisms of the body could be modelled as 
negative feedback loops: controlled regulations of nervous activity. 
 Wiener wrote up a mathematical treatment of his and Bigelow’s work and 
submitted a report to his military superiors under the title Extrapolation, Interpolation, and 
Smoothing of Time Series. The report became known among the military engineers as the 
‘Yellow Peril’, referring both to the report’s bright yellow covers, but also to the daunting 
difficulty of its mathematics. Though Wiener and Bigelow’s machine was never 
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manufactured for use in the war, the principles of the report soon became implemented 
into other fire control machinery by the MIT Rad Lab and the Bell Labs team working 
on the fire control problem. The report, however, was classified, and did not see any 
wide circulation beyond the people who were cleared to read it, though when it was 
declassified and published in 1949 it gained wide influence on communications 
engineering.61 When Claude Shannon formalised information theory in two technical 
papers in 1948, he acknowledged the influence from Wiener, who formulated a very 
similar account of information theory in Cybernetics the same year (with the difference 
that where Shannon equates information with entropy, Wiener gave information as the 
negative of entropy).62 It is Shannon’s precise mathematical formulation which has 
become canonical, however, not least because he restricted its use to communication 
engineering in order to calculate the informational capacity of a channel of 
communication. Famously, Shannon restricted information to be only a quantitative 
measure, stating that while messages will typically have meaning, ‘semantic aspects of 
communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem.’63  
 Due to the similarity of the machine and the nervous system that Rosenblueth 
and Wiener observed, they perceived its wider application, but also its philosophical 
consequences. Wiener saw it as a resolution to the dichotomy of mechanicism and 
vitalism through the concept of circular causation, which also resonated with the 
contemporary view in biology of a holistic organicism. 
 ‘Behaviour, purpose and teleology’ is notable not only for its crucial role for the 
cybernetic movement as one of two founding document, the other being Warren 
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McCulloch and Walter Pitts’s paper on idealised neurons and neural nets.64 It is also 
notable for introducing purposive and teleological causal explanations that are not 
grounded in a vitalism which ascribes the apparent purpose in animals and evolution to 
an ineffable, vital supplement.  
 Descartes banished teleology and the substantial form from scientific 
explanation, yet vitalism’s appeal to teleological explanation was a persistent presence in 
biology after him, with an on-going debate in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries on 
what constituted the difference between living organisms and inert matter. What made 
animals alive? More specifically, how could an organism grow from a single cell into a 
fully formed organism if there was no intrinsic end or final cause that dictated its growth? 
Though Descartes had allowed for purposes in humans minds, he separated the mind 
from physical nature, and animals were allowed no intentions of their own, only reflexive 
automatisms. Even so, nature was full of apparent purpose which was difficult to explain 
by mechanical explanation alone. Nevertheless, as biology proceeded as a science, the 
domain of inscrutable purposes in nature shrank, as what was claimed to be 
unexplainable in physical terms by vitalists increasingly was by their opponents.65 By the 
twentieth century, the last major proponent of vitalism, the biologist Hans Driesch, was 
ultimately deemed to be a crackpot, and his philosophy of entelechies (with echoes of 
Aristotle and Leibniz) was largely dismissed as incoherent. By the 1940s, vitalism was 
completely out of fashion, but teleological explanations remained almost impossible to 
avoid. As is apocryphally attributed to J. B. S. Haldane, ‘[t]eleology is like a mistress to 
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the biologist: he cannot live without her, but he’s unwilling to be seen with her in 
public.’66 
 In this context, Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow’s paper shifted the attention 
regarding the nature of purpose itself. By adopting a behavioural analysis, which they 
defined as ‘the examination of the output of an object and of the relations of this output 
to the input,’ 67  they avoided recourse to explaining purpose in terms of internal 
mechanisms of mental states. The problem with teleological explanation is that we 
perceive the presence of purpose in nature but try to explain it by how an organism is 
organised internally. Their move, then, is to acknowledge that purpose is something we 
ascribe to what we perceive, and thus that when we ascribe purpose to an object it is an 
act of interpretation. This allows them to shift to a broader abstraction, as they impress 
upon the reader that voluntary action is ‘not a matter of arbitrary interpretation but a 
physiological fact. When we perform a voluntary action what we select voluntarily is a 
specific purpose, not a specific movement’ (p. 19). Thus, even as they admit that the 
physiological mechanism of purposes remains unexplained, purpose itself is real. This 
allows them to shift to the apparent purposeful behaviour in servomechanical machines, 
in which the mechanism is known, negative feedback. As such, they define purposes, or 
teleology, as feedback-controlled behaviour, stating that ‘all purposeful behavior may be 
said to require negative feed-back’ (p. 19). Teleology, they claim, moves out of the realm 
of causal explanation, where it has been accused of placing ends before causes; rather, 
teleology is concerned with behaviour alone, and not with functional relationships. 
 The defining factor for this conclusion was that feedback is understood as 
communication in a time-distributed series. The attainment of a feedback-mediated 
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purpose is achieved through continuous adjustment based on a signal from the goal. Just 
like the hand adjusts its trajectory in bringing the glass to the mouth, the torpedo adjusts 
its trajectory towards its goal based on the sound it emits. The goal’s position in time and 
space is not present from the beginning, but is arrived at by continuous adjustment. 
Thus, the apparent paradox of teleology, that ends are prior to causes, is avoided. It is 
this informational coupling between the object and its end which gives rise to the 
perception that cybernetics dissolves the boundaries between entities, as it proposes that 
the body’s ubiquitous communication flows, in its numerous homeostatic mechanisms, 
but also via nervous pathways, do not necessarily stop at somatic boundaries. In a stroke, 
then, Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow naturalised teleology and dissolved further the 
boundary between the natural and artificial, not just giving a physical explanation of 
purposive behaviour, but extending this essentially mental category to be present 
throughout the natural world, and not just in the human mind, as Descartes had claimed. 
Furthermore, it allowed for a new understanding of that problematic category, 
teleological explanation, which had vexed biologists. 
 Ever since Darwin had shown that teleological explanation had no role in natural 
selection it had been problematic for the explanation of how adaptive functions arose in 
the evolution of species. As Julian Huxley wrote in The Modern Synthesis, the teleological 
implication of adaptive function was to some biologists so problematic that they denied 
its existence at all; yet, as he held, the ‘teleology of adaptation is a pseudo-teleology, 
capable of being accounted for on good mechanistic principle, without the intervention 
of purpose, conscious or subconscious, either on the part of the organism or of any 
outside power.’ 68  As such, evolutionary adaptation was present and could be fully 
accounted for without recourse to ends or purposes in evolution itself, and, as Ernest 
Nagel held, all teleological statements about adaptive function could be perfectly 
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expressed in non-teleological language.69 Nagel was sceptical of the claims made about 
teleology made by the cyberneticians, but teleological explanation is often hard to avoid 
when speaking of adaptive traits, and has a tendency to sneak in almost unnoticed, not 
least because of the nature of language – and our minds – to imbue objects with 
purposes. Nevertheless, the teleology of cybernetics influenced Colin Pittendrigh’s 
introduction of a new term in evolutionary biology, ‘teleonomy,’ which was intended to 
be a new term for a bounded teleology with no reference to final causes,70 and he 
admitted that he had been influenced by the cyberneticians.71  
 Bodily augmentation is frequently proposed as a form of evolutionary advance, a 
‘next step’ on the imagined evolutionary ladder. Kline and Clynes’s talk of ‘participant 
evolution’ was latched on to from the beginning as the New York Times reported Cyborg’s 
as ‘literally super-human beings.’ The journalist D. S. Halacy, Jr. took it a step further, 
linking the Cyborg with the evolutionary humanism of Julian Huxley to prophesise that 
‘this hybrid human may well be a forerunner of the men of the future.’72 Ultimately, this 
being could be entirely artificially produced, ‘with a body superior to natural man; with 
none of the weaknesses or susceptibilities to disease, and with whatever causes aging in 
human beings eliminated or at least drastically slowed down’. 73  This evolutionary 
speculation follows a long line of evolutionary thinkers from Herbert Spencer and 
Samuel Butler to Huxley and Pierre Teilhard de Chardin; but moreover, it posits a 
functional equivalence between organs, limbs and tools, in a logic of equivalence which is 
reinforced by functional adaptation as teleonomic. 
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 If teleonomy is purposive, it is so only in the limited sense that was posited by 
Rosenblueth, Wiener and Bigelow, as something which apparently arises as a series of 
adjustments. In evolutionary terms, this is achieved through natural selection, where the 
‘adjustment’ is the slow tendency of evolving species to adjust over generations in 
relation to the environment, in what Sewall Wright had called ‘adaptive peaks,’ which 
described the degree of correlation of an organism’s physiological function to its 
environment. But when the apparent correlation between a functional adaptation and its 
environment is scientifically defined using purposeful language, as teleonomy, this opens 
up for the introduction of evolutionary language in the deliberate alteration of the body, 
where adaptation through natural selection is exchanged for the deliberate ‘adaptations’ 
of human purposes. In the cybernetic slippage between technology and biological 
function, ‘participant evolution’ relied on an understanding of adaptation as purposive, 
but where the adaptive purpose was no longer connected to a specific human 
environment.  
 The Cyborg was intended to adapt humans for the conditions for space: 
cybernetics had laid the groundwork in creating a language of machines that could 
accomplish this. The introduction of cybernetic ideas in evolutionary theory thus 
reinforces the idea that the cyborg is a form of ‘participant evolution’, but as a spiritual 
pursuit, participant evolution was intended to be a liberation from environmental 
limitations. I now turn to read Kline and Clynes’s paper more closely, to develop how 
they sought to implement their ideas for adaption to space, and ultimately the 
consequences they imagined it would have for the astronaut. 
 
Cyborg technique 
Given the background of cybernetics and the role of purposive mechanisms, we may 
begin with the formal definition of the cyborg given by Kline and Clynes: ‘The Cyborg 
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deliberately incorporates exogeneous components extending the self-regulatory control 
function of the organism in order to adapt it to new environments.’74 Two elements of 
this definition are notable in a cybernetic context, in particular ‘extending the self-
regulatory control function of the organism’ and the aim to ‘adapt it to new 
environments.’ The aim was for man ‘to be able to live in space qua natura,’ as if space 
were the altered body’s natural environment. Slipping easily between biological and 
engineering vocabularies, the self-regulatory control elements are, of course, referring to 
the body’s homeostatic aspects, and the equation of homeostatic functions with 
cybernetic self-regulation is peppered throughout the paper. Having already mentioned 
that they are describing a participant evolution, the adaptation to new environments 
should be understood in evolutionary terms. But the apparent purpose of teleonomic 
adaptation is too slow for the need to immediately adapt to a space environment. If 
teleonomy describes adaptation as a type of feedback, and feedback is a signal distributed 
in time, adaptation is ‘regulated’ by the slow approach of successive generations towards 
an adaptive peak, not the immediate change of behaviour seen in a torpedo seeking a 
target. But if adaptation is a correlation of physiological function to its environment, this 
can be instrumentalised; bodily functions, in particular metabolic function, can be 
intervened with and evolution’s apparent purpose is short-circuited by the deliberate 
intention of exchanging metabolic organs with technological substitutions.  
 These exogenous elements are necessarily feedback technologies: ‘self-regulation 
needs to function without the benefit of consciousness,’ and if it were necessary ‘to 
continuously check to maintain our heart at the appropriate rate, keep our respiratory 
rate at approximately 16 per minute, and see that digestion was proceeding with proper 
peristaltic waves, there would be little time left for other activities’ (p. 348). The use of 
‘exogeneous’ components is thus a way of enabling ‘participant evolution’. The osmotic 
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pump and control mechanisms ‘form a continuous machine-man controlled loop which 
will operate as an adjunct to the body’s own autonomous controls,’ but these 
mechanisms must be capable of variation, so that their functioning can be altered so as 
to operate in ‘various environmental conditions’ (p. 351). As they describe it, the Cyborg 
alters or exchanges the body’s existing homeostatic functions with technologies 
engineered to withstand varied environments, and not only the Earth environment that 
humans are adapted for. Looking at the specific technologies they suggest, however, we 
might question whether this is actually what they end up with.  
 As the Cyborg is intended to be a general model for technologising man’s 
adaptation to ‘whatever milieu he chooses’ (345), it is interesting to look at exactly what 
adaptive functions Kline and Clynes suggest are necessary for the ‘environment wished 
for by man at this present stage of development,’ namely ‘empty space’ (p. 347). The 
Rose osmotic pump and Kline’s psychic energizer are merely adjuncts in their 
considerations for how the various metabolic systems of the body need to be changed in 
order to cope with such a radically different environment – if it can be called an 
environment at all. 
 As mentioned, Cannon’s theory of homeostasis was based on Claude Bernard’s 
distinction between the milieu intérieur and the milieu extérieur, in which the internal 
environment needed to remain stable in response to the ever-changing variety of the 
external environment. The primary thing to note about a space environment is, firstly, 
that it is much, much colder than any Earth environment, but secondly, that in the 
regular, Earth environment there is a constant exchange and development of elements 
taken in from the external environment into the body in order for its internal fluid matrix 
to remain in homeostasis. As Kline and Clynes noted, the prevailing solution for how to 
bring people into space was to bring an Earth-like environment into space. This, they 
thought, is not only a temporary solution: ‘It is also a dangerous temporizing … The 
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bubble all too easily bursts’ (p. 347). Their solution, an at-least partial adaptation of 
human physiology to space conditions would actually entail collapsing the body’s internal 
environment with the external environment necessary for it to persist. While the general 
rhetoric of the paper is that the body should be intentionally altered so the body could 
cope with a space environment, some of the solutions that they propose would still bring 
the ‘bubble’ together with the astronaut into space, but that bubble would be a very 
different one from any conventional Earth environment. I will therefore look at some of 
the concrete problems and the solutions they suggest in detail. 
 The main problem they look at is metabolism and hypothermic control. They 
describe an essentially logistical problem of what to bring into space when considering a 
body’s daily need for fuel – as they estimate it, it is ten pounds of fuel per day: two 
pounds of oxygen, four pounds of fluid, four pounds of food. Is, they ask, all this 
consumption strictly necessary? Are there ways of changing human metabolism in order 
to minimise the amount of fuel? They note that for a prolonged spaceflight, that it might 
not be necessary for an astronaut to be awake all of the time. The immediate value of 
having the astronaut sleep is worth considering due to the ‘possibility of radically 
reducing the metabolic needs of the organism’ (p. 355). They propose hormonal control, 
again regulated by implanted homeostatic mechanisms, as a way of achieving such 
hibernation. 
 Early in the paper they make a tongue-in-cheek remark about the logistical 
problem: ‘don’t breathe!’ (p. 347). It turns out that they are quite serious about this 
prospect: 
Ideally, an artificial organ should be provided to replace the lung. Blood should be 
shunted from the pulmonary artery through a microsystem capable of reducing the 
CO2 and adding appropriate quantities of O2 after which it returned to the 
pulmonary vein. Theoretically, an inverse fuel cell process might convert the CO2 
to C and O2 with the latter remaining in the blood stream. Energy for such a 
system could be supplied either externally from solar energy or from atomic 
processes within the system. (pp. 356-357) 
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The uptake of oxygen from the environment is thus completely eliminated, rendering 
that aspect of metabolism entirely self-contained within the body. The elimination of 
breathing also conserves fluid loss; any fluid lost through the skin would be mitigated by 
lowered body temperature and ‘appropriate insulation through clothing and/or plastic 
coatings suitably applied’ (p. 358). Not only would breathing be unnecessary, but they 
come close to suggesting the complete elimination of the mouth. ‘The mouth could be 
opened for food intake and speech articulation for limited periods of time. Alternatively, 
a digestive tract tube (entering through the rectum) or intravenous feedings might be 
preferable’ (p. 357). In this scenario for ‘participant evolution’, the mouth, like the plica 
semilunaris, appendix and tailbone, becomes a vestigial organ, a remnant of an 
abandoned evolutionary function. 
 Furthermore, they note that the maintenance of the fluid matrix would be a 
major problem, and that one should follow the same general approach: 
It is theoretically possible to reshunt the urine after suitable processing directly 
into the bloodstream. The greatest problem in utilizing urine as a source of fluid is 
the occurrence of urea which amounts to 25-30 grams a day. If the urine could be 
fed directly from the ureter through a shunt containing urease, the urea would be 
converted into carbon dioxide and ammonia. The carbon dioxide could then either 
be handled by our postulated fuel pump or, if this were not available, serve as a 
source of substrate for conversion to oxygen by algae. (p. 357) 
On their estimate that humans produce up to twelve grams of faeces when fed 
intravenously, and only seven grams when fasting, they suggest introducing a 
miniaturized septic tank into the body, and that the ‘residual fluid could be again passed 
through columns and the filtrate containing the trace metals reinjected into the vascular 
system’ (p. 358). Or alternatively, the intestinal tract could be sterilized, hopefully 
eliminating faeces completely.  
 In all of these examples, the body is altered so as to withdraw completely from its 
environment. A well-known trope in science fiction, the hibernating and unconscious 
person is put in storage for the duration of a long journey, to be woken up at its 
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conclusion. But Kline and Clynes make no indications whether the body, reconstructed 
in a manner for reducing or eliminating any external environmental needs, would be 
restored once it reaches the destination of another world to explore. There, new 
environments introduce new needs, particularly fluctuations in temperature, temperatures 
for which the human body is poorly adapted. Yet they are confident that one can 
construct other adaptive technologies that regulate the body’s temperature and 
metabolism to suit the environment of alien worlds:  
At the present time a beginning is being made in the quantitative study of the 
multiple homeostatic functions of the cardiovascular system, from a control 
system point of view …. In this field the application of control system theory of 
biology … has already yielded some fruitful results. It can be expected that, 
eventually, enough will be known about the system dynamics involved to make it 
possible to alter the homeostatic functioning by the Cyborg technique. (pp. 360-
361) 
Clynes had done some work on this himself, publishing a run of papers in 1960 and 1961 
which analysed various homeostatic functions of the body.75 But will the Cyborg be 
reconstructed on arrival, or remain adapted to space as the ultimate ‘generalist’ 
adaptation? They do not say, as it is the conditions in space which interest them. But 
space, as a lack of environment, possibly has other consequences for the mind. 
 They therefore turn their attention to the possibility of psychotic episodes in 
space, primarily due to sensory deprivation, or as they prefer to call it, ‘sensory 
invariance’ (p. 367). Spending months or years in a space ship, there will be ‘very little to 
see, and that will be of negligible interest’ (p. 368). Again they offer hibernation as a 
possible solution, or at the very least of using ‘Dauerschlaf,’ a chemically induced long-
term sleep where the pilot sleeps for twenty-three hours a day, to avoid monotony and 
possible psychosis from lack of stimulation. As such, the problems inherent to long-term 
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space flight are mitigated, and ‘consideration of flights running several hundred or even 
thousands of years cannot be off-handedly dismissed as mere fantasy’ (p. 368). 
 It is when handling the challenges of consciousness and prolonged space travel 
that the limitations of the Cyborg are truly tested. For a paper which at first extolls the 
possible alteration of bodily function as a ‘spiritual challenge’ (p. 345), these brief 
windows of consciousness become problematic moments when the otherwise carefully 
honed biological machine might break down. As the unconscious, hibernating body 
carefully maintains its metabolic homeostasis at a physiological minimum, the waking 
astronaut is met with the possibility of existential terror: All his bodily functions have 
withdrawn into the background, and it is just about suggested that the body itself is 
merely a vessel for the mind it contains, a mind which only has the cosmos to 
contemplate. The impression one gets is that this lone astronaut, lonely travelling 
between the stars, is faced with staring blankly into madness as a consequence of this 
extreme liberation. Space is the ultimate escape, and to go there, the body must be freed 
from the adaptive shackles of Earth-bound existence: all corporeal needs are hermetically 
sealed off within and the minutiae of staying alive, eating, breathing, defecating, have 
been eliminated. But the elimination of metabolic exchange with the environment seems 
to have consequences for mental health. To stave psychosis off, the concert pianist 
Clynes suggests that creative pursuits are the solution to a lack of stimulation. Writing a 
journal is a good idea, but more so the practice of music; ‘of more pertinence would be 
the ability to play a musical instrument which would provide activity and direct pleasure. 
A violin would seem to be an ideal instrument for space travel’ (p. 369).  
 ‘The purpose of the Cyborg,’ as they write nearer the beginning of the paper, ‘is 
to provide an organizational system in which these robot-like problems are taken care of 
automatically and unconsciously, thus freeing man to explore, to create, to think, and to feel’ (p. 
348, my emphasis). But the environment they construct the cyborg for is apparently 
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completely unsuitable for these admirable pursuits. Free to explore, but trapped in a can 
in space; free to create, think, and feel – but introspection is the poorer option when 
both the mind and the body is closed off from its natural environment: 
Despite all the care exercised there remains a possibility, if not a probability, that 
somewhere in the course of events a psychotic episode might occur. This is one 
condition for which no servo-mechanism can be completely designed at the 
present time. An emergency osmotic pump containing one of the high potency per 
milligram phenothiazines together with reserpine would be included in the 
complete picture of the well-armed space man. Not infrequently the individual 
undergoing an acute psychotic episode denies that his mentation, emotions, or 
behavior are abnormal. Under these circumstances he would obviously refuse to 
voluntarily accept medication. For this reason, assuming that monitoring is 
adequate, there should also be a release device capable of being activated from the 
earth station or by a companion if there is a crew. (pp. 369-370) 
One might question what autonomy one has, when the supposed autonomous systems 
regulating one’s bodily functions are revealed to be under the control of others. But 
beyond the apparently inevitable space-madness, a number of things are worth noting 
from the preceding summary of the technologies that are proposed for creating a cyborg. 
First, as I have touched upon, is the manner in which the cyborg is ultimately 
constructed in response to a different environment; true, physiological functions are 
altered so that they respond differently to a different environment. This is, indeed, the 
common view of any cyborg technique, the alteration of bodily function through 
technology. But there is an additional component in the cyborg’s adaptation to 
environment, which is that it does not fully adapt to other environments, but it contains 
part of its adapted environment within itself. 
 As I have developed previously, cybernetic technology described a new class of 
technology which was not shut off from its environment like the clockwork machines 
from mechanistic philosophy. Cybernetic machines respond to and interact with their 
environments, making them more lively than the solipsistic machines that had 
determined function. The cyberneticians called them teleological or purposive machines, 
but I have called them gregarious, since they sense and react to, communicate with, their 
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environments. The Cyborg, however, withdraws into itself, shutting itself off from its 
environment. While the homeostatic mechanisms are fundamental for the 
biotechnological propositions they make, they reduce the scope of the system: where, as 
mentioned, the cybernetic system includes body, tool, and environment into a dynamic 
whole, the Cyborg disengages from the environment and the body’s processes that rely 
on interaction with it. The body is an open system; as Walter Cannon had remarked, ‘the 
system is open, engaging in free exchange with the outer world, and that the structure 
itself is not permanent but is being continuously broken down by the wear and tear of 
action, and as continuously built up again by processes of repair.’76 The Cyborg, however, 
closes the body off, to no longer be an open system. While cybernetics made a theory of 
gregarious technology central to its pursuits, ironically enough the Cyborg’s isolation 
entails a return to the solipsism of the Digesting Duck, as the milieu extérieur is, in effect, 
internalised. It has often been remarked that science fiction has a tendency to literalise 
metaphors; my solipsist machine was intended to illustrate a machine operating 
independently of its environment. Solipsism, of course, is an idealist philosophy which 
posits that we can only know that we ourselves are real and that we create the world we 
perceive. The Cyborg, then, makes my metaphor literal: it constructs the body as the 
environment of the mind and shuts itself off from the world. 
  As noted, compared to Kline and Clynes’s cyborg, it is Bernal’s mechanized man 
which more closely resembles the idea we have of the cyborg today. Bernal’s idea, while 
striking, remains a speculative polemic with no real conception of how the future 
evolution of man into a technological butterfly would obtain. Whereas he pushes the 
evolutionary rhetoric strongly, his mechanised man remains in a classically mechanistic 
conception of biology than was possible anymore by the time of Kline and Clynes. His 
future man reflects at once his mechanistic outlook as a physicist, but also that biology 
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was not yet adequately explain in terms of mechanism. Kline and Clynes’s Cyborg, then, 
is in some ways an updated vision of Bernal’s mechanized man, taking into account the 
influence cybernetics, as a discipline of communications engineering, had on biology and 
evolution, but retaining the solipsistic nature of a mechanism dissociated with its 
environment. 
 
Conclusion 
In the past two chapters, I have looked in depth at and idea: that the body is a machine, 
first by exploring how it arose with the rise of scientific explanation, with emphasis on 
Descartes’s reduction of the classical causes to only the efficient. In this chapter, I have 
examined how this idea was expressed in the Cyborg, a speculative figure which has 
gained in cultural currency ever since it was introduced in 1960. Introducing how the 
cyborg – I emphasise again the distinction between the lower-case cyborg of critical 
theory and the spacefaring Cyborg – has been treated in the critical literature as a 
representative figure for the information discourse in cybernetics, I have aimed to 
contrast that position by situating it as a fringe proposal made by outsiders in the military 
context it has normally been placed within. The Cyborg I present adopted a cybernetic 
and evolutionary language to promote the liberating potential of space travel, where its 
potential for enhancement is not moored in political machinations for ‘national 
efficiency’, concern about the degenerative effects of modern technology, or even the 
adaptive needs of the environment; rather, if Kline and Clynes’s Cyborg was a 
technological enhancement, it was for the cause of a spiritual liberation and self-
expression. Yet, as I show in my final reading, the opening of bombastic possibilities 
gives way to showing it carrying out a solitary existence, teetering at the edge of madness, 
isolated in space. This Cyborg shares little with the imagined cyborgs of popular culture 
or the cyborgs in critical and feminist theory. Yet the possibility of the cyborg endures as 
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a possible avenue for enhancement; even Clynes articulated something like this in his 
ruminations on the further developments of the Cyborg. But it remains a singular 
expression of a more general idea that the body is, at base, a machine; a form of 
technology, and therefore something which can be altered at will. 
 Cyborgs have often been used as emblematic of an informational discourse. 
Here, I have shown that it was not originally so, but in the following chapters I engage 
further with the idea that the body is informational, plastic, and can be shaped according 
to our will, such as it is expressed in transhumanism. Where evolutionary progression has 
only been hinted at in the current chapters, with transhumanism it becomes an 
underpinning belief that motivates a drive towards endless, technologically driven 
progress. 
 
 
  
185 
Chapter four: Transhumanism 
After and between humanisms 
 
 
 
Introduct ion 
Today, most efforts at promoting human enhancement technologies fall under the 
banner of transhumanism. Transhumanists rally under a shared banner of transformative 
technologies that are supposed to achieve a state of ‘posthumanity.’ But though it is 
situated in a transformational, materialist view of human potential, transhumanist 
rhetoric often carries with it a promise of transcendence, and thus has religious 
undertones despite a frequently professed antagonism to religiosity.  
 But even as I concern my self with transhumanism in this and the next chapter, 
there is – again – a terminological confusion, owing to overlapping uses of ‘posthuman’ 
and ‘transhuman’ and their associated -isms. My first object is therefore to distinguish 
transhumanism from posthumanism, since the frequent confusion of the two betrays a 
fundamental antagonism between them on the legacy of Enlightenment humanism. 
Continuing from the terminological discussion, I trace out some of the early sources 
where it has been used – first in Dante, though I emphasise its trajectory in the post-war 
decades before it was fully canonised in the early 1990s. The trajectory of its use leads me 
to look in greater depth at some motivations behind transhumanist thought. While the 
ideas therein are stripped of religious reference, I try to tease them out to extract some of 
the metaphysical underpinnings that have motivated speculative transhumanist 
technologies. The articulation of transhumanism in a humanist framework and its first 
use by Julian Huxley connects it twice over to eugenics, a connection I therefore discuss 
at some length. Finally, I look at two speculative technologies, cryonics and uploading, 
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which have fed into transhumanist thought, as a bridge to the next and final chapter. 
Cryonics and uploading are both enhancement technologies in their most speculative 
forms; both promise radically extended lives, mind uploading the preservation of the 
mind in any physical vessel capable of computing. In this chapter, transhumanism is an 
ethical appeal to why one should enhance. As such, it situates itself as an ahistoric moral 
impulse, in that it attempts to articulate its appeal on objective grounds. In the next 
chapter, I look more closely at how transhumanism is tightly coupled to the speculative 
technologies it advocates. 
 
Posthuman transhumanists  
First, it is necessary to establish some terminological distinctions. Even the human is 
hard to define – is it a discursive category? A species? An abstract ideal of a rational 
individual? – the sands shift according to who is speaking, and doubly so when ‘post-’ or 
‘trans-’ is prefixed to ‘human.’ Posthumanism and transhumanism are to some degree 
fluid concepts which are frequently confused with each other, and the academic literature 
on them frequently take pains to establish the distinction between them.1 The situation is 
not helped by transhumanists referring to a ‘posthuman’ state that is unrelated to 
posthumanism as a philosophical successor to humanism – in fact, some transhumanists 
emphasise their philosophical kinship to Enlightenment humanism. In addition, 
academic discussions of the difference between them will occasionally muddy the waters 
by trying to classify them according to each other, for example stating that 
transhumanism is a specific instance of the more general posthumanism, but also vice 
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versa,2 refer to them as ‘cultural posthumanism’ (for posthumanism) and ‘philosophical 
posthumanism’ (for transhumanism).3 The labels could easily be reversed, however, as 
both posthumanism and transhumanism are culturally and philosophically oriented. A 
more convincing distinction is made by David Roden, who divides them into ‘critical’ 
and ‘speculative’ posthumanisms – the former referring to the critical philosophical 
tradition of posthumanism, the latter to the imagined future posthumanity envisioned by 
transhumanists, achieved through speculative and projected technologies. 4 The 
association between the two is persistent, not least because of the clear linguistic 
association between them; both post- and transhumanism are concerned with the 
relationship between modern technology and the human. Both are concerned with 
humanism, though they take quite opposite stances on it. I will retain the separate labels, 
and though I am primarily concerned here with transhumanism, I will shortly discuss the 
difference between them to establish the relationship of humanism to both 
posthumanism and transhumanism. 
In critical theory, posthumanism is a critique of the humanism which first arose in 
the Renaissance and was firmly established by the Enlightenment, at which point the 
human was associated with rationality. Posthumanism questions classical humanist ideals, 
and grew out of continental philosophy following World War II. As such, posthumanism 
is often associated with, and even equated with antihumanism, which rejects both the 
tenet that humans are rational, and its implicit anthropocentrism. Louis Althusser coined 
the term ‘antihumanism’ as a response to Marxist humanists, and figures such as Jacques 
Derrida and Michel Foucault are typically associated with it – for example, Foucault’s 
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critique of humanism in The Order of Things, which, towards the end, famously declares 
that ‘man is an invention of recent date […] one perhaps nearing its end.’ 5  In 
contemporary critical theory, posthumanism is particularly associated with the 
technologically oriented works of scholars such as Donna Haraway, N. Katherine Hayles 
and, recently, Rosi Braidotti.6 It is also associated with the philosophical orientation 
loosely known as speculative realism, which seeks to move beyond what Quentin 
Meillassoux has termed ‘correlationism,’ or the primacy of the correlate between human 
and world which has been dominant in philosophy following Kant. Meillassoux identifies 
correlationism as something which must be countered if one is to defend a realist, non-
anthropocentric philosophy.7 
But there is also the term ‘posthuman,’ commonly used by techno-progressive 
interest groups that identify themselves under the ideological blanket term of 
‘transhumanism.’ In this sense, ‘human’ refers not to a philosophical humanism, but to 
humans as a species, Homo sapiens. To transhumanists, the posthuman is a desirable, 
evolutionary successor to the human species, to be achieved through the convergence of 
increased scientific knowledge and speculative technologies. They call themselves 
‘transhumanists’ because they identify with being in a transitional, transcendent or 
transformational state between humans and posthumans. 
Though these two meanings of posthumanism and the posthuman are quite 
different, there is, depending on the writer, an overlap between them. In N. Katherine 
Hayles’s definition, for example, ‘the posthuman view privileges informational pattern 
over material instantiation, so that embodiment in a biological substrate is seen as an 
                                                
5 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 
422. 
6 Donna J. Haraway; Hayles, How We Became Posthuman; Rosi Braidotti, The Posthuman (Cambridge, UK: 
Polity, 2013). 
7 Quentin Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency, trans. by Ray Brassier (London: 
Continuum, 2008). 
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accident of history rather than an inevitability of life.’8 Hayles connects the concept of 
the posthuman to the rise of cybernetics following World War II, and by her definition, 
the posthuman position is one that gives information, as it was constructed in 
cybernetics and communication engineering, metaphysical primacy. Furthermore, in her 
judgement this informationally oriented posthumanism followed an accidental and 
unjustifiable reification of information to become a metaphysical category in its own 
right, in which information became disembodied. As such, Hayles’s excavation of the 
posthuman as the result of the cybernetic project is articulated as a history of ‘how 
information lost its body, that is, how it came to be conceptualized as an entity separate from 
the material forms in which it is thought to be embedded.’9 For Hayles, the result of this 
process of separating ubiquitous informational patterns from matter is, firstly, the idea 
that absolutely everything can be translated and transferred into other material vessels, 
but also that the mind as a disembodied pattern is a return to Cartesian dualism.  
Some transhumanists associate themselves with Enlightenment humanism, seeing 
it as a continuation of that tradition into the technologically altered future of the human 
species. In this formulation, to be human is not confined to what constitutes the species, 
but is defined by a set of abstract principles, such as rationality and equality, that entail 
enlightened ethical principles, such as liberty and progress. As such, it is argued, even as 
we move into a biological posthumanism, we will remain spiritually human if we 
continue to embody the virtues and ideals of rationality and liberty. 
Transhumanism’s commitment to an Enlightenment humanism is therefore 
opposed to posthumanism as a critical project that goes against humanism as 
anthropocentric. But this professed humanism aligns it with one version of an earlier 
enhancement ideology, eugenics. I explore this connection in a later section, but first it is 
                                                
8 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, p. 3. 
9 Hayles, How We Became Posthuman, p. 2. 
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worth looking at where the word itself comes from, and whether any meaning has been 
preserved from its previous uses. 
 
Linguist i c  and eugenic  or ig ins o f  t ranshumanism 
Whether by intent or chance, the transhumanists have named themselves by selecting a 
word with a prior history. The ‘trans-‘ in ’transhumanism’ is ambiguous: a Latin prefix, 
‘trans-’ means ‘between,’ but, as indicated in the previous discussion of the posthuman 
and the transhuman, the trans- can be understood as both ‘transcendental’ or 
‘transformational’. 
In its contemporary meaning, the term ‘transhumanism’ is typically attributed to 
Julian Huxley, but prior to Huxley the term has a history of usage in Christian writings, 
stemming from its first coinage by Dante in the ‘Paradiso’ section of the Commedia, where 
he uses the word trasumanar – a Dantean neologism meaning ‘to transhumanate.’ Robert 
and Jean Hollander’s English translation indicates Dante’s intended meaning: 
Nel suo aspetto tal dentro mi fei,  As I gazed on her, I was changed within, 
qual si fé Glauco nel gustar de l'erba  as Glaucus was on tasting of the grass  
che 'l fé consorto in mar de li altri dèi.  that made him consort of the gods in the sea. 
Trasumanar significar per verba  To soar beyond the human cannot be described  
non si poria; però l'essemplo basti  in words. Let the example be enough to one  
a cui esperïenza grazia serba.   for whom grace holds this experience in store.10 
The Hollanders’ commentary on this section explains that, ‘For Dante 
“transhumanization” is the passing beyond normal human limits by entering into a state 
at least approaching that enjoyed by divinity. […] Dante's claim is lodged in self-
conscious language that, in a single verse, includes an Italian neologism (trasumanar), 
literally “to transhumanate,” an intransitive verb signifying “to become more than 
human.”’11 Dante borrows the man-become-god Glaucus from Ovid’s Metamorphoses; a 
                                                
10 Dante Alighieri, Paradiso: A Verse Translation, trans. by Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander (New York: 
Doubleday, 2007), I:67-72, my emphasis. Dante’s Commedia is available in full online, at 
http://etcweb.princeton.edu/dante/index.html together with the Hollanders’ translation and commentary. 
11 Robert Hollander and Jean Hollander, in Dante, Paradiso, commentary on I:70. 
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fisherman, Glaucus finds himself drawn to the sea after eating some herbs. There, he is 
welcomed by the gods and is transformed into a god himself.12 While Dante compares 
Glaucus’s destiny to his own journey, it is not strictly in the sense of apotheosis. He 
equates Glaucus’s deification with his own spiritual transformation on the path towards 
heaven; Dante transcends his humanity on the journey towards God. That this particular 
word construction has been used in religious discourse is thus not very surprising; in this 
context, the ‘trans-’ in transhuman therefore refers to transcendence, with that word’s 
attendant spiritual and religious connotations. 
References to ‘transcendence’ are frequently found in transhumanist writings. Even 
when they profess a strict materialist approach and argue for using the prefix ‘trans-’ in 
the sense of transformation rather than transcendence, spiritual, intellectual or bodily 
transcendence is rife in the transhumanist literature. But is transhumanism, then, about 
transcendence or transformation? In some sense it may be both: just as transcendence is 
so frequently referred to by transhumanists, metamorphosis is one of its many declared 
aspirations. Glaucus represents both: to Dante, he is a metaphor for Dante’s own 
spiritual transcendence, but the Greek myth Ovid drew upon emphasises Glaucus’s 
changing shape, from being a man to a fish-like creature of the sea, and his many 
resulting capabilities the transformation brings with it: transformation with 
transcendence.  
But it is Julian Huxley, the evolutionary biologist, popular science writer and 
advocate for humanism who is most strongly associated with introducing 
‘transhumanism’ in a context not strictly religious. In ‘Transhumanism,’ an introductory 
essay to the book New Bottles for New Wine (1957), Huxley writes: 
                                                
12 Dante may have been punning on the transhumance, or transhumanza, the seasonal herding of livestock 
between pastures, typically between lower and higher ground. As such, the transhumance is quite literally 
associated with ascension. Cf. Hallvard Haug, ‘Between Humanisms’, Science Fiction Studies, 42 (2015), 391–
95. 
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The human species can, if it wishes, transcend itself – not just sporadically, an 
individual here in one way, an individual there in another way, but in its entirety, as 
humanity. We need a name for this new belief. Perhaps transhumanism will serve: 
man remaining man, but transcending himself, by realizing new possibilities of and 
for his human nature.13 
Even though this passage is commonly acknowledged as the first usage of 
transhumanism at least approaching the contemporary meaning, Huxley in fact first used 
‘transhumanism’ in a 1951 lecture, ‘Knowledge, Morality and Destiny,’ which was 
published in a journal that year and also included in New Bottles for New Wine.14 It is likely 
that the provenance of Huxley’s use of the term is complicated by the fact that the index 
entry on ‘transhumanism’ in New Bottles also refers to the chapter ‘Evolutionary 
Humanism’ from the revised 1957 edition of Huxley’s earlier Religion without Revelation, 
which has led some scholars to assert that Huxley mentioned transhumanism in the first 
edition of that work, which he does not. However, the link between the two terms 
suggests the role ‘transhumanism’ played in Huxley’s developing humanist thought.15 The 
evolutionary humanism developed in Religion without Revelation is strongly reminiscent of 
his concept of transhumanism, and he tested various names for his approach to 
humanism. Huxley, who was a central figure among British humanists, developed his 
evolutionarily influenced humanism over the course of his adult life. In this context, 
transhumanism was only one of the many names he gave it, eventually landing on 
‘evolutionary humanism.’ Even if the word’s meaning has been twisted over the years, it 
is likely that it is Huxley’s use of it which led to its contemporary name for the 
movement. 
I say this because its usage features in several works of popular futurism following 
Huxley. D. S. Halacy, Jr., who described the cyborg as a step towards the evolution of 
superhuman beings, linked the evolutionary possibilities of the cyborg with Huxley’s 
                                                
13 Julian Huxley, New Bottles for New Wine (London: Chatto & Windus, 1957), p. 17. 
14 Julian Huxley, ‘Knowledge, Morality and Destiny: I’, Psychiatry: Journal for the Study of Interpersonal Prcesses, 
14 (1951), 129–40. 
15 Julian Huxley, Religion without Revelation: New and Revised Edition, 2nd edn (London: Max Parrish, 1957). 
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transhumanism.16 Furthermore, as Kline and Clynes’s Cyborg had invoked the prospect 
of hibernation in space, Halacy refers to some mechanicist passages in Alexis Carrel’s 
Man, the Unknown. Carrel, a 1912 Nobel laureate for medicine and physiology, was an 
early pioneer in research on the possibility of organ transplantation, and also studied how 
senescence was stalled in cells through low temperature. Another writer who was 
influenced by Carrel’s work on senescence was Robert Ettinger, the founder of the 
cryonics movement. Ettinger refers to ‘transhumanity’ in the opening pages of Man into 
Superman, a speculative futurist book about enhancement technologies from a 
scientifically informed viewpoint.17 It is hard to ascertain quite how important Ettinger’s 
work was to the adherents of cryonics, a group which formed the core of the early 
transhumanists, but it is likely that it was high. Ettinger’s use of the word later inspired 
the journalist Ed Regis’s title for a book on fringe science and technology, a highly 
popular book in the growing transhumanist community, especially as it gained traction in 
the early days of public access to the internet and the introduction of the World Wide 
Web.18 
In the ‘Extropy FAQ,’ however, the modern usage of ‘transhuman’ or 
‘transhumanism’ is dated to Max More’s (born Max O’Connor) first use of it in a 
statement of purpose from Extropy magazine, which he co-founded and edited, in 1990, 
and the ‘Extropy FAQ’ claims that More was unaware of any prior usage. More’s wife, 
the artist Natasha Vita-More (born Nancy Clark), gives a detailed timeline of isolated 
usages of the various instances and variants of ‘transhuman,’ noting for example that T. 
S. Eliot (an acquaintance both of Huxley and Norbert Wiener) uses the word 
‘transhumanised’ in The Cocktail Party, though in a sense closer to Dante’s than 
                                                
16 Halacy. 
17 Robert C. W. Ettinger, Man into Superman: The Startling Potential of Human Evolution – And How to Be Part of 
It (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1972), p. 1. 
18 Ed Regis, Great Mambo Chicken and the Transhuman Condition: Science Slightly Over the Edge (Reading, MA: 
Addison-Wesley, 1990). 
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Huxley’s.19 As an artist, Vita-More has long been a central figure in the transhumanist 
movement and has created a number of speculative designs for the future of the human 
body, including the ‘Primo Posthuman’, a redesign of the human body based on 
extropian principles, in the presentational style of a sales brochure.20 Before meeting the 
extropians, Vita-More had been inspired by the work of Iranian futurist and lecturer F. 
M. Esfandiary (1930-2000), who changed his name to FM-2030 to signal his hope to live 
for at least 100 years. When he died earlier than he had planned to, his head was severed 
from his body and cryonically preserved, or ‘vitrified,’ in anticipation of a future 
technology which will not only revive him, but regrow the rest of his body.21 The 
frequently asked questions section on the website of Alcor, the company which froze 
Esfandiary’s brain, claims that while growing a new body from scratch is an extremely 
complex procedure, it ‘is arguably a simpler problem than other needed repairs.’22 
As one of the earliest advocates both for the ideas of transhumanism and one of 
the popularisers of the term, it appears that Esfandiary first used ‘transhuman’ in the 
chapter ‘Transhumans-2000’ from the anthology Woman in the Year 2000. There he 
describes a future of radical liberty, pleasure and choice, marked by multiple states of 
‘trans,’ such as transgender and transnationalism, an indication of Esfandiary’s ideas of 
what constitutes the ‘transhuman,’ though he gives no actual definition or explanation of 
the word’s meaning.23 By 1989, Esfandiary had legally changed his name to FM-2030 to 
signal his futurist outlook. His book Are You a Transhuman?, which promoted his techno-
optimistic Up-Winger philosophy, is entirely composed of questionnaires intended to 
                                                
19 T. S. Eliot, The Cocktail Party: A Comedy (London: Faber and Faber, 1950), p. 147. 
20 Natasha Vita-More, ‘Radical Body Design “Primo Posthuman"’, Kurzweil AI 
<http://www.kurzweilai.net/radical-body-design-primo-posthuman> [accessed 18 September 2015]. 
21 Fred Chamberlain, ‘FM-2030 Now Hurtling into the Future’, Cryonics, 21 (2000), 10–11. 
22 ‘Neuropreservation FAQ’, Alcor Life Extension Foundation 
<http://www.alcor.org/Library/html/neuropreservationfaq.html> [accessed 15 July 2015]. 
23 F. M. Esfandiary, ‘Transhumans-2000’, in Woman in the Year 2000, ed. by Maggie Tripp, 1974, pp. 291–
98. 
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ascertain whether the readers have a ‘transhuman’ outlook.24 Though, as Nick Bostrom 
has noted, ‘it was never satisfactorily explained why somebody who, say, rejects family 
values, has a nose job, and spends a lot of time on jet planes is in closer proximity to 
posthumanity than the rest of us.’25 Before his death, Esfandiary became something of a 
legendary figure within the transhumanist Extropian community on the west coast of the 
United States, acting as mentor and ideologue of the possibility of enhancement. But 
despite his central position and quasi-legendary status in the community, the ambiguity 
of his writing raises the question: what, exactly, do transhumans want? In Esfandiary’s 
writing, to be a transhuman seems more about having a techno-optimistic attitude than 
literally being in a transitional phase towards posthumanity. 
 
Transhuman goals  
So what do transhumanists want? Even beyond terminological confusions between 
descriptive categories and philosophical orientations, the prefix ‘trans-’ can be read 
ambiguously. Firstly, it can be read in the sense of across or between, as in ‘transition’ or 
‘transformation’; but secondly, as beyond, as in ‘transcendence.’ The fleetingness of the 
meanings one can read into the word makes it invite the spiritualism of Dante’s Glaucus, 
who ‘soared beyond the human.’ But more concretely, transhumanists generally wish for 
the things that have stayed with enhancement proponents since the beginning, with a 
twist. 
Succinctly, transhumanists seek three things: increased longevity and health; greater 
intelligence or general mental faculties; and what has been called ‘morphological 
freedom.’ The first two are well known and in many ways common obsessions, seen in 
                                                
24 FM-2030, Are You a Transhuman?: Monitoring and Stimulating Your Personal Rate of Growth in a Rapidly 
Changing World (New York: Warner Books, 1989). 
25 Nick Bostrom, ‘A History of Transhumanist Thought’, Journal of Evolution & Technology, 14 (2005), 1–25 
(p. 11). 
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political and private fussing over national statistics on life expectancy at birth, or the 
hand-wringing over how school children compare to their international peers on 
standardised testing – proxies for measuring national intelligence. On the one hand, such 
statistical measures of a nation’s abilities originates with the eugenics programme as a 
programme of national concern – but on the other hand, increased intelligence and 
healthy life expectancy are equally resonant to individuals as well.  
Bostrom, perhaps the leading philosophical advocate for transhumanism, defends 
‘extreme human enhancement’ for the expressed intention of achieving a posthuman 
state. In an article called ‘Why I Want to Be a Posthuman When I Grow Up’ – a title 
which implies that he, an adult by conventional definitions, will come to some greater 
maturity one day – he defines the posthuman as ‘a being that has at least one posthuman 
capacity … a general central capacity greatly exceeding the maximum attainable by any 
current human being without recourse to new technological means.’26 Bostrom divides 
the general capacities into three categories for enhancement: healthspan – meaning the 
length of the healthy lifespan; cognition – meaning both intelligence and the ability to 
appreciate various types of cultural expression; and emotion, ‘the capacity to enjoy life’ 
(p. 108). He emphasises that they are intended only as general examples, and that 
extreme enhancement need not be limited to those categories. Bostrom’s aim is to show 
two things: not only that ‘some posthuman modes of being would be very good’ but, 
also that ‘it could be very good for us to become posthuman,’ since ‘for most current 
human beings, there are possible posthuman modes of being such that it could be good 
for these humans to become posthuman’ (p. 108). Bostrom’s article is intended as an 
entry into the bioethical debate on enhancement, and as such its claims about 
enhancement are somewhat more conservative than some of the claims made in more 
                                                
26 Nick Bostrom, ‘Why I Want to Be a Posthuman When I Grow Up’, in Medical Enhancement and 
Posthumanity, ed. by Bert Gordijn and Ruth Chadwick (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), pp. 107–36 (p. 108). 
Further references are given after quotations in the text. 
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bombastic popular books on transhumanism. And even if the actual method by which 
enhancement would be achieved is deliberately avoided in Bostrom’s account, it is 
nonetheless an interesting example of where the enhancement debate has moved since 
the days of eugenics; even as the technologies to achieve it remain science fiction, 
transhumanists see their proposed future existence as inevitable: science and technology 
will, eventually, master nature.  
As is common with the utopias of enhancement ideas, Bostrom introduces his 
posthuman with a hypothetical fiction of a person at the beginning stages of achieving 
posthuman capacities, rhetorically situating the reader as the recipient of the 
enhancements through the use of second-person narrative:  
At the early steps of this process, you enjoy your enhanced capacities. You cherish 
your improved health: you feel stronger, more energetic, and more balanced. Your 
skin looks younger and is more elastic. A minor ailment in your knee is cured. You 
also discover a greater clarity of mind. You can concentrate on difficult material 
more easily and it begins making sense to you. You start seeing connections that 
eluded you before. You are astounded to realize how many beliefs you had been 
holding without ever really thinking about them or considering whether the 
evidence supports them. (p. 111) 
As the transformation advances, Bostrom’s imagination stretches towards what currently 
improbable activities those enhanced capacities would entail. Lifespans past 170 years; 
creating new art forms; the ability to create and listen to ‘music that is to Mozart what 
Mozart is to bad Muzak’; games that are ‘more fun than anything you ever did during the 
first 100 years of your existence.’ Posthumanity even entails a heightened sense of 
morality: ‘You are always ready to feel with those who suffer misfortune, and to work 
hard to help them get back on their feet’ (p. 112). Indeed, the posthuman project is 
promoted as grand and morally worthwhile, and Bostrom believes that it could be 
extended even further, but that the poverty of our unenhanced minds limits what we are 
even able to imagine would lie ahead. 
Bostrom’s improved capacities appeal to a commonsensical view of what is good; 
other than increased healthspan and increased intellectual and emotional capacities he 
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omits is the last, and perhaps strangest suggestion among transhuman aspirations: 
morphological freedom. To Max More, who first wrote about it in Extropy in 1993, 
morphological freedom is a principle which runs counter to the habitual accusation of 
cyborgisation that transhumanists are charged with. Responding to one such claim made 
by the philosopher Don Ihde, More says that ‘transhumanists generally look down on the 
Cyborg concept as primitive and unhelpful,’ though he does not convincingly elaborate 
how. 27  Rather, he says, the true transhumanist seeks the ultimate freedom that 
technology allows them, seeking ‘[t]he ability to alter bodily form at will through 
technologies such as surgery, genetic engineering, nanotechnology, uploading.’28  
More’s concept has subsequently been promoted by Bostrom, who expresses it as 
an ethical claim on liberty, where people should ‘have broad discretion over which of 
these [enhancement] technologies to apply to themselves.’ 29  Similarly, Bostrom’s 
colleague Anders Sandberg situates morphological freedom as ‘an extension of one’s 
right to one’s body, not just self-ownership but also the right to modify oneself 
according to one’s desires.’30  As such, Sandberg articulates it as a negative liberty: 
morphological freedom is a freedom from intervention into bodily autonomy; while at the 
same time emphasising its role for enabling the self-expression of the liberal humanist 
subject. Yet it is evident that both Bostrom and Sandberg are outwardly promoting it in 
terms of the right to carry out existing varieties of altering the body, from tattoos to 
gender reassignment. In this respect, they are participating in an on-going debate in 
bioethics concerning therapy, disability and normative conceptions of health, and in this 
                                                
27 Max More, ‘True Transhumanism’, MetaNexus, 2011 <http://www.metanexus.net/essay/h-true-
transhumanism> [accessed 10 May 2015]. 
28 Max More, ‘Technological Self-Transformation: Expanding Personal Extropy’, 1993 
<http://www.maxmore.com/selftrns.htm> [accessed 10 May 2015]. 
29 Nick Bostrom, ‘In Defense of Posthuman Dignity’, Bioethics, 19 (2005), 202–14 (p. 203). 
30 Anders Sandberg, ‘Morphological Freedom – Why We Not Just Want It, but Need It’, 2001 
<http://www.aleph.se/Nada/Texts/MorphologicalFreedom.htm> [accessed 18 September 2015]. 
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respect, morphological freedom has also been criticised.31 But the participation in this 
debate underplays the radical ontological commitment their concept actually involves. To 
espouse a commitment of freeing morphology is not just about the right to elective surgery, 
whether for aesthetic or functional purposes, but, I argue, entails the metaphysical 
dissolution of the body as a peripheral extension of the mind; the whole body is treated 
as a prosthesis, while the liberal humanist subject remains.  
The ontological commitment morphological freedom entails makes it read like a 
palimpsest of the Cyborg and Bernal’s machine-man explored in the previous two 
chapters, and makes its appeals to liberty read like science fiction sophistically translated 
into the moral philosopher’s language. I hold that the ultimate consequence of 
morphological freedom is much like Hayles’s charge of the disembodiment of 
information. But furthermore, in terms of Descartes’s overturning of Scholastic 
metaphysics, which I explored in chapter two, I believe it represents a return to 
substantial form, but where the relationship of matter and form is reversed, where form 
becomes primary.  
I explore this further in the next chapter, but will note this first: while metaphysics 
can be strange and science fictional – an approach some philosophers invite – there is a 
tendency among transhumanists to disregard the reduction ad absurdum that pushes a 
position to its logical extreme. Several arguments made by Bostrom, for example, 
demonstrate flawless logic but absurd consequences. Bostrom first gained wider 
attention with a paper which claimed that it is more probable that we are living in a 
simulation than not. 32  In his recent best-selling book on the dangers of artificial 
intelligence, he rehearses a previous argument that a paperclip factory run by a 
                                                
31 See for instance Heather G. Bradshaw and Ruud ter Meulen, ‘A Transhumanist Fault Line Around 
Disability: Morphological Freedom and the Obligation to Enhance’, Journal of Medicine and Philosophy, 35 
(2010), 670–84. 
32 Nick Bostrom, ‘Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 53 (2003), 243–55. 
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benevolent AI will eventually dismantle the universe in order to create more paperclips.33 
When believing that science and technology can render anything possible, it appears 
difficult for some to examine the premises of their argument, yet as I explore in the next 
chapter, the commitment to morphological freedom can entail strange metaphysical 
beliefs. 
 
Organis ing under the transhuman banner 
Transhumanism today has splintered off into a series of interest groups, most notably 
Humanity+ and the Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technology (IEET), the 
apparently defunct Extropy Institute, and even religious groups such as the Mormon 
Transhumanist Association.34 Recently, there has also been a surge of politically active 
transhumanists, and as liberty is again and again given prominence in transhumanist 
ethics, political articulations are rife. 
Max More founded the Extropy Institute in 1992, three years after launching the 
interest magazine Extropy, which converged several topics of interest now commonly 
acknowledged by transhumanists into one format. The word ‘extropy’ was borrowed 
from Robert Ettinger, conceived of as a force opposed to thermodynamic entropy and 
inevitable decline. The Extropy magazine collected the fascination with several areas on 
the fringes of science and technology, such as cryonics, nanotechnology and 
biotechnology, and in the magazine, More, along with ‘Tom Morrow’ were unifying their 
interests under a common definition, establishing a forum for fellow-minded 
‘extropians.’ Extropianism was described in Wired as ‘a carefully worked out 
                                                
33 Nick Bostrom, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Nick 
Bostrom, ‘Ethical Issues in Advanced Artificial Intelligence’, in Cognitive, Emotive and Ethical Aspects of 
Decision Making in Humans and in Artificial Intelligence, ed. by Iva Smit, Wendell Wallach, and George E. 
Lasker (Windsor, Ont.: International Institute for Advanced Studies in Systems Research and Cybernetics, 
2003), II, 277–84. 
34 ‘Humanity+’ <http://humanityplus.org/>; ‘Institute for Ethics and Emerging Technologies’ 
<http://ieet.org/>; ‘The Extropy Institute’ <http://www.extropy.org/>; ‘Mormon Transhumanist 
Association’ <http://transfigurism.org/>. 
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philosophical movement, one whose rituals, symbolism, and mind-set are rooted in a 
deep and rich body of principles,’ despite having ‘gonzo metaphysics’. 35  As such, 
transhumanism arguably predates any attempts at formulating it as a movement or 
ideology, insofar as there existed a fascination for speculative technologies that pointed 
towards what was perceived as limitations of humans’ genetic legacy. What More did was 
to establish an intellectually and philosophically grounded stance that attempted to define 
that fascination as a legitimate pursuit and purpose. Thus with the Extropian flavour of 
transhumanism More tried to establish a coherent ideology:  
Transhumanism  is a class of philosophies that seek to guide us towards a 
pos thuman  condition. Transhumanism shares many elements of humanism, 
including a respect for reason and science, a commitment to progress, and a 
valuing of human (or transhuman) existence in this life rather than in some 
supernatural ‘afterlife’. Transhumanism differs from humanism in recognizing and 
anticipating the radical alterations in the nature and possibilities of our lives 
resulting from various sciences and technologies such as neuroscience and 
neuropharmacology, life extension, nanotechnology, artificial ultraintelligence, and 
space habitation, combined with a rational philosophy and value system.36 
Even though More explains that Extropy is the ‘foremost example of transhumanism’ in 
a language frequently reminiscent of religious writing, the essay is an extended attack 
upon religiosity, which is seen as destructive and entropic, whereas transhumanism 
celebrates the principles of Extropy as a celebration of the battle against entropy. Despite 
this, More’s rhetoric is religiously tinged, with frequent references to transcendence: ‘Life 
and intelligence must never stagnate; it must re-order, transform, and transcend its limits 
in an unlimited progressive process. Our goal is the exuberant and dynamic continuation 
of this unlimited process, not the attainment of some final supposedly unlimited 
condition.’37 
                                                
35 Ed Regis, ‘Meet the Extropians’, Wired, 1994 
<http://archive.wired.com/wired/archive/2.10/extropians_pr.html> [accessed 10 May 2015]. 
36 Max More, ‘Transhumanism: A Futurist Philosophy’, 1990 
<http://web.archive.org/web/19991012135924/http://maxmore.com/transhum.htm> [accessed 10 May 
2015]. The original website is unfortunately defunct. 
37 More, ‘Transhumanism: A Futurist Philosophy’. 
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The nature of such Extropian ‘transcendence’ is qualified, however, as it is seen as 
a surpassing our biological limits: future technologies are the means for releasing us from 
our shackles. Consider ‘The Transhumanist Declaration,’ one of the founding documents 
of the World Transhumanist Association (later renamed to Humanity+), which was 
anonymously authored by Nick Bostrom as a ‘consensus statement’ of the association’s – 
and by extension the transhumanist movement’s – aims.38 
Humanity will be radically changed by technology in the future. We foresee the 
feasibility of redesigning the human condition, including such parameters as the 
inevitability of aging, limitations on human and artificial intellects, unchosen 
psychology, suffering, and our confinement to the planet earth.39 
Compared to More’s earlier definition, the declaration more strongly emphasises that 
transhumanism is a continuation of humanism, and not in opposition to it. In a more 
recent article, More has updated his definition, claiming it is ‘shared by other 
transhumanists’: 
Transhumanism is both a reason-based philosophy and a cultural movement that 
affirms the possibility and desirability of fundamentally improving the human 
condition by means of science and technology. Transhumanists seek the 
continuation and acceleration of the evolution of intelligent life beyond its 
currently human form and human limitations by means of science and technology, 
guided by life-promoting principles and values.40⁠ 
Transhumanism has been described in many ways: as an attitude; a movement; a 
philosophy; a religion; an ideology. Unsurprisingly, then, some transhumanists have 
political aspirations – there have been transhumanist candidates for Italian parliament; in 
the United States, the Transhumanist Party has the journalist Zoltan Istvan (also the 
author of a novel, The Transhumanist Wager) as presidential candidate for 2016. There is a 
UK Transhumanist Party which supported an independent transhumanist candidate for 
the Parliamentary election in 2015.41 
                                                
38 Bostrom, ‘A History of Transhumanist Thought’, p. 12. 
39 Bostrom, ‘A History of Transhumanist Thought’, p. 21. 
40 More, ‘True Transhumanism’. 
41 ‘The Transhumanist Party’ <http://www.transhumanistparty.org/>; Zoltan Istvan, The Transhumanist 
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Transhumanist politics are often associated with libertarianism, not least because 
of its strong connection to the strongly libertarian ‘Extropian’ movement that was the 
main locus of transhumanism in the 1990s. Yet transhumanists can fall across the 
spectrum of traditional politics. James Hughes, a transhumanist sociologist interested in 
political questions, has claimed that the bulk of transhumanists are left-leaning, despite 
its association with right-libertarianism, preferring to refer to them as ‘techno-
progressive.’42 As such, the traditional questions of liberty and economic distributions are 
not wholly descriptive, given that the people identifying themselves as such do not 
necessarily share viewpoints concerning traditional political questions. Rather, they share 
the ‘techno-progressivist’ attitude, which sees the development of technology as a good 
in itself. As a political orientation, transhumanism is not a coherent stance, other than a 
commitment to the transformative capacities of technology, which is seen to widen our 
possibilities of expression, create more wealth for everybody, and provide everlasting 
happiness. 
In fact, transhumanism, like the other subjects of this study, is plausibly a new 
incarnation of an old aspiration: the wish to change oneself into something which is 
believed to be better, through whatever means one believe can achieve it. As an ideology, 
transhumanism, like the eugenics movement, is a political chameleon; like the eugenics 
movement, transhumanist ideals can be endorsed both by the left and the right. 
Ultimately, if transhumanism enters the political arena, it is in service of a particular set 
of ideas on how technology relates to the human condition.  
Some of these ideas are set out explicitly in the ‘Transhumanist Declaration,’ a 
document which was created for the World Transhumanist Association in 1998, and 
                                                                                                                                      
Transhumanist Party <https://transhumanistparty.wordpress.com/2015/04/02/tpuk-2015-election-
announcement/> [accessed 10 May 2015]. 
42 Hughes primarily discusses the term in Citizen Cyborg; see also ‘Politics’, in Post- and Transhumanism: An 
Introduction, ed. by Robert Ranisch and Stefan Lorenz Sorgner (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 2014), pp. 
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which has been revised a number of times since.43 There we read: ‘Humanity will be 
radically changed by technology in the future. We foresee the feasibility of redesigning 
the human condition, including such parameters as the inevitability of ageing, limitation 
on human and artificial intellects, unchosen psychology and physiology, suffering, and 
our confinement to the planet earth.’44 That is only the first clause; the remaining six 
clauses of this particular incarnation of the declaration are dedicated to how redesigning 
the human condition might be secured: promoting research, an open attitude towards 
technology, and the right for any individual to enhance themselves through technology, 
but also to establish forums in which the use of technology is debated. However, in the 
first version of the declaration, the final sentence reads ‘Transhumanism does not 
support any particular party, politician or political platform,’ something which has been 
removed from the current version on the Humanity+ website, which was adopted by the 
organisation in 2009.45 While the clauses (beyond the first) are undeniably political in 
nature, establishing a set of necessary conditions, it is apparently not important by which 
political means the transhumanist future comes about. For the transhumanists, 
traditional politics comes second to the Great Work. 
I highlight the first clause of the declaration (which, though the wording has been 
changed, carries much the same meaning in the current version) precisely because it 
establishes the conditions for the political and philosophical ideas that are necessary for 
any transhumanist agenda. The words in the various versions are carefully chosen for 
their emotional associations: limitation, shortcoming, suffering and confinement all 
convey a negative view of the contemporary condition that the wonders of future 
technology will ameliorate: our ‘unchosen’ psychologies and physiologies will become 
                                                
43 The World Transhumanist Association, which is now known has Humanity+, was first set up by the 
philosophers Nick Bostrom and David Pearce. 
44 ‘The Transhumanist Declaration’, UK Transhumanist Association 
<http://www.uktranshumanistassociation.org/declaration.shtml> [accessed 25 May 2015]. 
45 ‘Transhumanist Declaration’, Humanity+ <http://humanityplus.org/philosophy/transhumanist-
declaration/> [accessed 25 May 2015]. 
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object to new possibilities for volitional change. The coming technology is undeniably 
positive, whereas the world we live in is one in which our potential remains untapped 
and unrealised. 
The paradoxical nature of this potential, of course, is that it is assumed that it will 
exist despite that it categorically does not: it is reliant on a set of technologies that are 
projected to come into being, technologies which will have the capability to change us in 
any way we might desire, or even imagine. As a manifesto, it acknowledges the necessary 
coming reality of a future reality, and lays out a limited number of conditions that will 
help to achieve it. Its faith in the actuality of that technological condition is so 
unwavering as to leave it unspecified. Yet it is the technological condition itself which 
makes the manifesto interesting, as the other points are by comparison relatively 
unthreatening. The technology is coming, so we must make sure that the political 
conditions when it arrives is suitable for it to be used. 
Like Huxley’s original definition, then, contemporary transhumanism advocates 
itself as a form of humanism. But even though transhumanists acknowledge Huxley’s 
role in coining the word, they nevertheless reject his importance, though it is not always 
clear specifically to what it is that they object. In the ‘Transhumanism FAQ,’ originally 
written by the philosophers Nick Bostrom and David Pearce in 1998 for the World 
Transhumanist Association, they comment that ‘the sense in which [Huxley] used it, 
however, was not quite the contemporary one.’46 It is never made quite clear what the 
differences are, however, and this silence invites scrutiny.  
 
  
                                                
46 ‘Transhumanist FAQ’ <http://humanityplus.org/philosophy/transhumanist-faq/> [accessed 28 April 
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The eugenic  connect ion 
One reason for the rejection may be Huxley’s support for a eugenic programme. 
Huxley’s transhumanism can hardly be separated from his advocacy of eugenics, which 
he saw as an extension of the humanistic ideals which he explored throughout his adult 
life. As such, Huxley’s ‘transhumanism’ was only one of a series of names he gave his 
personal approach to humanism grounded in a biological, evolutionary view, such as the 
‘evolutionary humanism’ that he described in the second edition of Religion without 
Revelation.47 Huxley was a prominent eugenicist, particularly prior to World War II. He 
had been the president of the Eugenics Society, and was one of the numerous signatories 
to the so-called ‘Eugenics Manifesto’ from 1939, a statement of intent against the war 
and the German negative eugenics programme⁠.48 Like Huxley’s own political convictions, 
the manifesto argued that humanistic ideals and universal equality would have to be 
implemented before considering the implementation of a eugenics programme. 
In this context, there appears to be a strained if complex relationship between 
transhumanists and eugenics. For example, the ‘Transhumanism FAQ’ claims that 
‘Eugenics in the narrow sense refers to the pre-World War II movement in Europe and 
the United States to involuntarily sterilize the “genetically unfit” and encourage breeding 
of the genetically advantaged. These ideas are entirely contrary to the tolerant humanistic 
and scientific tenets of transhumanism.’49 ⁠ Defining eugenics in this ‘narrow sense’ seems 
to be a rhetorical move to disassociate with the negative connotations of eugenics, and as 
such it does not ring entirely true for the eugenicists of Huxley’s generation. Conversely, 
however, the philosopher Nicholas Agar has advocated for human enhancement 
technologies, fully aware of their connection to transhumanism, under the label ‘liberal 
                                                
47 Julian Huxley, Religion without Revelation: New and Revised Edition. 
48 F. A. E. Crew and others, ‘Social Biology and Population Improvement’, Nature, 144 (1939), 521–22. 
Other prominent signatories included J. B. S. Haldane, Lancelot Hogben, Hermann Muller and Theodosius 
Dobszanski, central actors in the development of the Modern Synthesis of evolution. 
49 ‘Transhumanist FAQ’. 
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eugenics.’ Agar argues that genetic enhancements should be made available to the public 
but that their use should be a matter of individual choice, rather than something which is 
enforced by a national authority.50 Agar’s defense of human enhancement, however, has 
later become tempered by not endorsing the more extreme enhancement ideas of 
transhumanists.51 The practical ethicist Julian Savulescu is another proponent of a liberal 
eugenics with ties to the transhumanist movement. Savulescu launched and defends a 
concept of ‘procreative beneficence’ (which he also refers to as ‘eugenic selection’), but 
claims it is distinct from classical eugenics, on the basis of individual choice and 
procreative liberty, rather than the authoritarian imposition of improving populations.52 
Savulescu’s approach has been repeatedly challenged, also for his claim that procreative 
beneficence is unrelated to eugenics.53 Yet, along with Ingmar Persson he has recently 
argued for a technologically speculative ‘moral enhancement’ of entire populations. In 
the ominously titled Unfit for the Future, Persson and Savulescu make the case for a 
hypothetical threat of a morally corrupt individual’s capacity to cause ‘ultimate harm’, 
meaning the capacity of an individual to destroy humanity or parts of it.54 By their 
analysis there is no room for dissenters on such enhancement, and hence, in such a 
situation there is no room for issues of personal liberty. If they are indeed sincere in this 
proposal, to morally improve an entire population, it places Persson and Savulescu’s 
position on enhancement comfortably within the tradition of authoritarian eugenics. 
                                                
50 Agar, Liberal Eugenics. 
51 Nicholas Agar, Humanity’s End: Why We Should Reject Radical Enhancement (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
2010). 
52 Julian Savulescu, ‘Procreative Beneficence: Why We Should Select the Best Children’, Bioethics, 15 (2001), 
413–26 (p. 424); see also Julian Savulescu, ‘In Defence of Procreative Beneficence’, Journal of Medical Ethics, 
33 (2007), 284–88; Julian Savulescu and Guy Kahane, ‘The Moral Obligation to Create Children with the 
Best Chance of the Best Life’, Bioethics, 23 (2009), 274–90. 
53 Kean Birch, ‘Beneficence, Determinism and Justice: An Engagement with the Argument for the Genetic 
Selection of Intelligence’, Bioethics, 19 (2005), 12–28; Robert Sparrow, ‘Procreative Beneficence, Obligation, 
and Eugenics’, Life Sciences Society and Policy, 3 (2007), 43; Rebecca Bennett, ‘The Fallacy of the Principle of 
Procreative Beneficence’, Bioethics, 23 (2009), 265–73. 
54 Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu, Unfit For the Future: The Need for Moral Enhancement (Oxford: Oxford 
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 In The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics, Alison Bashford draws attention 
to the connection between contemporary transhumanism and eugenics: ‘An insufficiently 
analyzed trajectory of eugenics is its place in the long history of human enhancement, 
imagined and realized, of which “transhumanism” and “posthumanism” are current 
versions.’55 Bashford argues that the connection between eugenics and transhumanism 
should be considered to exist on a continuum of enhancement ideologies, a connection 
often made, though rarely convincingly substantiated. Critics of transhumanism accuse 
its adherents of merely being eugenicists in a new guise, a charge which is vigorously 
denied by transhumanism’s proponents. However, I contend that both accusations and 
denials of this connection tend to appeal to superficial, received impressions of what 
‘eugenics’ means, shaded as it is by its connection to Nazi Germany and associated with a 
racist and authoritarian politics. Prior to the rise of the Third Reich, eugenics was 
considered to be progressive and much favoured by socialists, and Ashford has 
investigated the similarity between Julian Huxley’s transhumanism with that of Nick 
Bostrom. Huxley was part of a group of English socialists that championed social reform 
and equality – and eugenics.56 In this respect, Huxley was one of the signatories to the 
so-called ‘Eugenics Manifesto’ from 1939, where eugenics was promoted as a means of 
developing human potential and self-expression, but that a truly egalitarian society was a 
necessary condition, since ‘the effective genetic improvement of mankind is dependent 
upon major changes in social conditions, and correlative changes in human attitudes.’57 
Bostrom’s ‘Transhumanist manifesto’ is explicitly inspired by Enlightenment ideals of 
rationality, progress and improvement, and appeals for the role of technology in 
achieving the lofty goals of human aspiration and self-expression. For Bashford, the 
                                                
55 Alison Bashford, ‘Epilogue: Where Did Eugenics Go?’, in Oxford Handbook of the History of Eugenics, ed. by 
Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 539–58 (p. 544). 
56 This group has been dubbed the ‘reform eugenicists’ by Daniel Kevles, in In the Name of Eugenics. 
57 Crew and others. 
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similarities between Bostrom’s enlightened transhumanism and Huxley’s humanist 
eugenics outnumber their differences.58 
The most explicit charge made to transhumanists is their support of genetic 
engineering even for non-therapeutic reasons – even therapeutic interventions has by 
some been characterised as a ‘back door’ to eugenics.59 As of yet, even therapeutic 
genetic engineering is extremely limited, where only a few, well understood heritable 
diseases have the potential for treatment, and even then the treatments are impermanent. 
Yet even if genetic therapy and engineering proper is still mostly an imaginary 
technology, it has been treated as an inevitability since the 1970s, and has been debated 
vigorously. Already in 1972, the year that recombinant DNA – the first technique for 
inserting DNA into molecules – was pioneered, a moratorium was called on for genetic 
therapies.60 Following the recent introduction of CRISPR/Cas9, a method which vastly 
simplifies and accelerates the alteration of DNA, a group of scientists have called for a 
moratorium on the alteration of germ-line modification. Yet is this kind of alteration of 
the genes of individual people the same as eugenics? Bashford admits that the ethical 
discussion regarding what can be considered as eugenic practice in current and expected 
future developments in biomedical technology is unclear on the issue. 
It is unsurprising that transhumanists broadly oppose any direct connections to 
eugenics given its chequered history, typically understood as an expression of fascist 
reproductive control and death mongering. Hence Bostrom refers to eugenics in terms 
of ‘the dangers of totalitarian utopianism.’61 Bostrom and other transhumanists view the 
approaches that informed the theory and practice of eugenics, which was not limited to 
Nazi Germany, as a blind alley in governing reproductive rights in the twentieth century. 
                                                
58 Alison Bashford, ‘Julian Huxley’s Transhumanism’, in Crafting Humans: From Genesis to Eugenics and Beyond, 
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59 Duster. 
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By rejecting the politics and methods of eugenics, they make the claim that their 
enhancement ideology has no strict connection to those of the misguided past utopians. 
This disavowal of their own intellectual past, however, lacks nuance, either by outright 
dismissing the connection between transhumanism and eugenics, or by underplaying its 
significance.  
Following World War II, and especially in the 1970s and 80s, the word ‘eugenics’ 
has become linked to Nazi racism, and particularly to the Lebensborn programme which 
was an outright attempt at breeding a master race – but also with the death camps of the 
holocaust. This understanding of eugenics is in terms of the politics of reproduction 
alone, yet the accusation of eugenics arises again and again in the context of new 
reproductive technologies and the promise of genetic augmentation. Some of the 
technologies transhumanists are proponents of can also be seen as eugenic technologies. 
But is it right to call these technologies eugenic, with the word’s associated negative 
connotations? What is meant by eugenics when raised in such contexts? It is usually to 
point a finger, a rhetorical strategy to undermine novel technologies by associating them 
with past atrocities. Others seek to reappraise the word’s use as politically neutral. 
Yet even if there are similarities between transhumanism and eugenics, they are not 
a complete fit. Critics that equate transhumanism with eugenics are only partially correct, 
if at all. It is worth noting that some of the most prominent critics of transhumanism, 
such as Francis Fukuyama, Bill Joy and Leon Kass, conflate genetic technologies with 
transhumanism in general, and any reproductive technology with eugenics.62  
The fault line between eugenics and transhumanism thus appears to be formed by 
an uneven terrain of ethics and politics, but there is a bridge between them in a shared 
focus on human enhancement through technology and science. Ultimately, however, 
                                                
62 Fukuyama declared transhumanism to be ‘the world’s most dangerous idea’, expanding on this in Our 
Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution (London: Profile, 2002); Jürgen Habermas is 
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transhumanists are as ideologically scattered as the eugenicists, though united in a wish 
for enhancement through technology. As such, the transhumanists emphasise a radical 
liberty of bodily autonomy, whether in the form of the right-libertarianism of the 
Extropians or the classical liberalism endorsed by Agar in Liberal Eugenics and James 
Hughes in Citizen Cyborg. For the transhumanists’ enhancement project, politics is a 
means to an end; much like the signatories to the ‘Eugenics Manifesto,’ socially minded 
transhumanists such as Agar and Hughes agree that society must be organised in a way 
that transhuman enhancements can be distributed equally among the members of 
society, and not only be limited to the select few who can afford them. By this logic, 
Utopia comes first. This makes the purpose of enhancements as a relative advantage 
obsolete; enhancement would be a matter of individual expression alone. 
Bashford notes that, while transhumanists are eager to suppress eugenics as an 
authoritarian relic, ‘Huxley himself would have been the first to agree with Bostrom’s bid 
for freedoms.’63 As she argues, the association of eugenics solely with the atrocities 
committed in its name suppresses its strong mid-twentieth century association with 
liberal politics. Transhumanism’s emphasis on biological and procreative liberty is 
therefore disingenuously framed as novel; if anything, it appears that the modern 
definitions of transhumanism are congruent with Huxley’s 1957 definition. Though 
Huxley’s formulation is somewhat vague, like transhumanism it champions both 
humanism and the use of science and technology to further the potential of and enhance 
humanity itself. With time, the means to that end which Huxley expressed may have 
become different, but his ideals were strikingly similar. Whenever transhumanists refer to 
the guided progress of humanity they therefore inevitably, if inadvertently, carry an echo 
of eugenics: the transcension of human limits, but the preservation of abstract ideals of 
humanity. 
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But transhumanism is not a monolithic enterprise. While the Enlightenment 
humanism expressed in the declaration of the World Transhumanist Association appears 
to be a continuation of Huxley’s transhumanism, the similarities my be explained by 
transhumanists’ interest in being taken seriously. In this respect, the flurry of 
organisational activity which took place in the mid-to-late 90s was an intentional 
enterprise for garnering broader political acceptance. Where the libertarianism of the 
Extropians is on the political fringe, the appeal to Enlightenment humanism is an appeal 
to the political mainstream. In this respect, then, the claim transhumanists make that they 
are a continuation of Enlightenment humanism is strategic: by establishing that they 
already operate within a morally acceptable framework, much of the work of wider 
acceptance is already done. This portrays transhumanism as an ideological framework 
that transcends the enhancement technologies that it advocates. But does such a latter-
day revisionism of own origins adequately reflect the roots of its technological 
ambitions? 
 
 
The fr inges  o f  s c i ent i f i c  speculat ion:  cryonics  and uploading  
As David Roden has put it, transhumanism is ‘an ethical claim to the effect that 
technological enhancement of human capacities is a desirable aim’.64 But such a generalist 
claim dissociates it from the specific technologies that its adherents advocate, as the 
ethical claim is made in extension of a belief in the coming of a number of technologies 
that do not yet exist. In gathering disparate scientific, technological and what are 
essentially science fictional ideas, transhumanists construct their ideals to fit their 
technological desires, paradoxically wishing both to control future developments and to 
ride the inexorable wave of progress. But where the ideals describe a general attitude of 
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enhancement, transhumanists tend to advocate a very specific suite of coming 
technologies and their transformational promises: nanotechnology, biotechnology, 
artificial intelligence. But the enhancement potential of any of these speculative 
technologies is still absent – and in the absence of technologies that could be of benefit 
to the individual, an early concern was how to prolong life in order to benefit from those 
technological innovations that inexorably have to come. 
In respect to what technologies will arrive in the future, Haldane’s Daedalus and 
Bernal’s The World, The Flesh, and the Devil are seminal and influential works, both relying 
on their author’s scientific knowledge, political beliefs, and a penchant for unfettered 
technological imagination. Though I have discussed Haldane and Bernal previously, they 
garner mention here as they arguably inaugurated the modern tradition of scientifically 
based technological speculation.⁠ Both books are works of futurism, through scientific 
and technological speculation and were wildly popular on publication. Though H. G. 
Wells was an obvious precursor in the genre, they seem to be well-regarded particularly 
for their scientific backgrounds and later, for the nature of their predictions of altering 
the body technologically; Bostrom mentions both books in his history, but does not 
elaborate on their influence.65 Bernal’s book in particular seemed to have stoked the fires 
of the imagination of writers and scientists alike, and was greatly admired by Arthur C. 
Clarke and Freeman Dyson.66 
But one of the works that mostly clearly outlines the general aims of modern 
transhumanism is Robert Ettinger’s Man into Superman. Ettinger was one of the founders 
of the cryonics movement, which gained attention with his book The Prospect of 
Immortality.67 Cryonics is the practice of freezing either the body or the head at death, 
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66 Clarke referred to the book as ’the most brilliant attempt at scientific prediction ever made’; Dyson gave 
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usually the latter for reasons of price, typically in liquid nitrogen. The reason for doing 
this is because, at such low temperatures, the thermodynamic entropy of bodily tissues is 
greatly slowed down, in the anticipation that future medical technology will become 
advanced enough to repair the tissues and revive those who have been preserved. As 
such, for the companies who carry out it out (the largest is the Arizona-based Alcor, 
whose current CEO happens to be Max More), this ‘cryonic suspension’ is in practice 
indefinite cold storage, a costly operation to maintain. Indeed, several of the early 
cryonics companies went bankrupt, resulting in frozen bodies thawing out and 
succumbing to entropy. The most ardent believers in cryonics not only hope for radically 
prolonged lives, however; in practice they wish for immortality, echoed in the name they 
gave themselves in tribute to Ettinger’s book – ‘immortalists.’ Ettinger had been 
fascinated with the prospect for a long time. Originally, it was sparked by a classic 
science fiction story, Neil R. Jones’s ‘The Jameson Satellite’, which describes an astronaut 
who is preserved in the near-absolute zero of space, to be resurrected by aliens forty 
millions years hence.68 (Intriguingly, the aliens have machine bodies that only preserve 
their brains, much like Bernal’s machine-men.) After reading the story, Ettinger thought 
it could be done in practice, on Earth rather than in space, but initially didn’t see himself 
as qualified to elaborate on the necessary scientific principles. Eventually, after nobody 
else took up the gauntlet, he wrote Prospect, though he underplayed the idea’s roots in a 
science fiction story. 
Cryonics, then, is the promise of extreme longevity and even immortality, one of 
the central transhuman ambitions, a technology in anticipation of coming enhancement – 
which indeed requires unthought-of technologies to revive those in suspension.69 Ettinger 
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was already susceptible to imagining the enhancement technologies of the future. In this 
vein, Man into Superman explores ideas that later have become important to 
transhumanism. Ettinger devotes the book to the ‘superman,’ noting that the word ‘is 
laden with emotional freight, clouded with semantic confusion and distorted by childish 
romanticism,’ dismissing the connection to Nazi notions of a Master Race, and with the 
characteristic optimism and engineering sensibility of transhumanists, he claims that 
‘Instead of inventing superman, we can assemble him. We already have examples of all 
the traits and abilities required for a very respectable superman indeed.’70 
Over the course of the first chapters, Ettinger traces how man beyond capability 
has been portrayed in literature and philosophy but ultimately dismisses them as mostly 
fanciful thinking. Ettinger acknowledges that the word ‘superman’ is Nietzschean, but 
refuses any other similarities beyond that. Finally, he introduces the concept through the 
lens of evolutionary thinking, with special reference to Jean Rostand and Alexis Carrel. 
Both Rostand and, more notoriously, Carrel were eugenicists – Carrel had collaborated 
with the Vichy regime during World War II. A particularly interesting example is a 
passage where Ettinger approvingly quotes Carrel via Rostand’s Can Man Be Modified?, a 
book which discusses the possibility of directed evolution and eugenics:  
For the first time since the beginning of its history, humanity has become master 
of its destiny ... In order to grow fresh, it is forced to make itself anew. And it 
cannot make itself anew without pain, for it is both the marble and the sculptor. 
Out of its own substance it must send the splinters flying with great hammer-
strokes, in order to recover its true face.71  
Ettinger, like Rostand and Carrel (and Galton and Darwin before them), believed that 
biological evolution has halted due to modern medicine and the technological society, 
and while Ettinger isn’t as explicit as either in his denigration of ‘weaker genetics,’ he is 
an advocate for improving ‘weak stock.’ 
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However, Ettinger dismisses eugenics as a social policy, but this appears not to be 
because he rejects the ethical grounds for it, but rather that eugenics is an ineffective, 
time-consuming strategy that has to take place over the course of generations. Eugenics 
can do nothing for him. The promise of genetic and biological engineering makes him 
open to the promise of improving upon the individual adult – which makes the practice 
both morally more sound, but also more applicable to himself. He can safely disregard 
the fact that it is a purely speculative prospect which would, if it is feasible, lie far in the 
future. To him, that problem is solved through his personal drive to immortality through 
being cryonically preserved – which he was upon his death in 2011, when he was 
cryonically suspended alongside the two wives that he survived. 
With Ettinger, then, we find a nascent thinking of how the future evolution of 
humans must be self-directed directly through coming technologies, coupled with the 
creation of a means to possibly experience it. To Ettinger, evolution means an ever-
increasing intelligence, and he conjures a fantastical and grotesque vision of planet- or 
galaxy-sized ‘multicorporeal titans’ with bodies ‘divided into myriad components 
attenuated over a large and increasing volume of space, integrated by something like 
radio waves.’ 72  There are a number of surprising resonances here with what are 
apparently completely serious publications by Nick Bostrom. In the 1990s, 
transhumanists proposed planet- and solar system-sized computers they called Jupiter 
and Matrioshka brains; Bostrom refers to the Matrioshka brain in his infamous article on 
the ‘simulation argument,’ which argues that it is likely we are living in a simulation.73 
Bostrom is also responsible for the nascent field which studies ‘existential risk,’ in an 
article which defines such risks as not only technological threats to the survival of 
                                                
72 Ettinger, Man into Superman, p. 80. 
73 Bostrom, ‘Are We Living in a Computer Simulation?’, p. 246 n4. 
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humankind, but also threats that will hinder achieving a posthuman state.74 There, 
Bostrom assesses existential risks on the basis of the so-called Fermi-paradox: the 
observation that even if intelligent life in the galaxy were probable, there is no sign of it. 
As such, the argument goes, there must be a ‘Great Filter’ hindering evolutionary 
progression towards civilizations that can ‘develop advanced technology, using it to 
colonize the universe in ways that would have been detected with out current 
instrumentation.’75 In 1972, Ettinger laconically noted of his planet-sized brains,  
As always, there will be a price to pay. In particular, the giants will live slowly, of 
necessity, in Einstein’s world: if you are spread over a trillion cubic light-years, and 
your nervous system signals from one part of you to another at the speed of light, 
it will take you a long while to think and act. It is interesting to speculate, however, 
that this may explain the mysterious absence of emissaries from higher civilizations: 
any culture much beyond the present human stage enters the macrocosmic phase 
and is more or less out of touch.76 
Back then, even Ettinger recognised that his idea was ‘blue-sky thinking.’ Now, 
transhumanist ideas have invaded the best-seller lists, the boardroom and the academy. 
But as the prehistory of its ideas show, even though its current self-presentation as a 
continuance of Enlightenment humanism resonates strongly with Huxley’s humanism, it 
began as a technological presentism that favoured the enhancement of the individual 
over the community. Politically, the libertarianism of the Extropians echoes this attitude, 
and indeed Max More, the co-founder of the Extropians, was first introduced to 
transhumanist ideas through his interest in cryonics. The Extropians, even as they paid 
lip service to Enlightenment ideals, favoured an idea of liberty in which the individual is 
freed from any obligation to the community, reflected in, for instance, their choice of 
recommended literature, which included libertarian economists like Friedrich Hayek 
along with other anarcho-capitalist literature.77  
                                                
74 Nick Bostrom, ‘Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards’, Journal of 
Evolution & Technology, 9 (2002) <http://www.jetpress.org/volume9/risks.html>. 
75 Bostrom, ‘Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards’, p. 14. 
76 Ettinger, Man into Superman, p. 80. 
77 Hughes, Citizen Cyborg, p. 188. 
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Form, information,  uploading  
Transhumanism should therefore be seen as an ideology which is rooted in a particular 
view of the capabilities of science and technology, and how it is reflected in a politics of 
individuality and choice. In the diverse fields that comprises modern transhumanist ideas, 
evolutionary biology, computer science, medicine, physics and philosophy of mind are 
stirred together, but also spiritualism and religion, all shaping transhumanists’ 
understanding of what is possible to do with the human body. And while transhumanist 
ideas are taken from the works of a broad range of authors and disciplines, some 
professional, some popularizing, the transhumanist view of science and technology is 
grounded in an informational epistemology. Thus, to understand transhumanist 
technologies an appraisal of how information theory and computing serve to unify each 
technological and scientific approach is necessary. 
Transhumanist writing lends itself to popularizing rather than academic writing, 
though there are philosophical defences of it, particularly of human enhancement 
technologies. Though many transhumanist works have been written by scientists, these 
works stand as a category unto themselves, in that they not only frequently use the 
scientific findings of the authors (sometimes referring to peer-reviewed original articles) 
but also the ‘philosophical’ conclusions the authors have made based upon their prior 
research.  
As such, it is strongly reliant on one of the most central and transformative 
innovations in scientific epistemology following World War II: information theory. 
Arising out of the circle around the cybernetics group and the attendees at the Macy 
Conferences on cybernetics, the role of information theory and computing can scarcely 
be stated strongly enough. This is evident in the core technologies that are featured in 
just about all books and articles on transhumanism: genetic engineering, nanotechnology, 
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artificial intelligence or whole brain emulation and so forth – each of these largely 
speculative technologies are fundamentally information theoretical.  
As I have mentioned, for N. Katherine Hayles the rise of information theory has 
led to a reconceptualisation of the human as ‘posthuman.’ Moreover, Hayles sees the 
emphasis and privileging of information over matter as an extension of Cartesian 
dualism. I believe there is something to Hayles’s charge of dualism, but I do not think it 
is entirely Cartesian in nature – in fact, I believe it is a more expansive dualism that has 
more in common with Descartes’s Aristotelian precursors. 
Informational approaches to technology carry with them a central distinction that 
appears again and again when considering computing: the dichotomy of hardware and 
software. Though this dichotomy may not be as clear-cut as typically thought,78 the 
perceived distinction between software and hardware is nevertheless fruitful for 
understanding the transhuman vision of speculative technologies which have the capacity 
for radically changing the human, both in appearance and capacities. Put simply, 
hardware is the physical structure for computation, whereas software is a set of 
instructions to perform a computation. The instructions, instantiated in the hardware via 
electronic on/off switching, are normally symbolically represented as zeroes and ones; 
this binary representation in practice conflates mathematics (through the binary number 
system), Boolean logical operations (in which the numbers represent true or false) and 
symbolic representation in general. Information, as a pattern which is independent of its 
material instantiation and which therefore can be replicated in any substrate, is also taken 
to be the underlying element which gives rise to the human mind itself, a mind which to 
the transhumanists is limited by the physical instantiation (i.e., our brain) it arises from. 
The mind, in this view, is essentially a computation, and since we have created machines 
                                                
78 Wendy Chun has an excellent analysis of the unclear boundaries between hardware and software, in 
Programmed Visions: Software and Memory (Cambridge, MA; London: MIT Press, 2011). 
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which may soon equal or surpass the computational capacity of the human brain, we 
should therefore also soon be able either to create artificial minds that equal our own, or 
be able to transfer our own minds to a different physical medium (or substrate), one 
which might afford us increased capacities, whether these would be intelligence, 
creativity, emotional states, heightened perceptions, or other possible things to do if the 
compositions of our minds becomes plastic and possible to improve upon.79 
In this view, information is equated with the mind itself. Much has been written 
about this, however, and so I am not going to concentrate on the relationship between 
information, mind, and cybernetics. In that particular view, commonly held among 
transhumanists, information is self-contained, separate from the physical world. While 
Hayles believes this is a dualist fallacy due to the cybernetics group, arguing that this 
dualism ignores the embodied nature of mind at their peril, John Johnston has 
convincingly argued that this dualism more precisely arose with the post-cybernetic 
artificial intelligence program that self-consciously rejected the cyberneticians, all the 
while eagerly building their program on the foundations cybernetics laid.80 This dualist 
legacy remains strong in transhumanist ideas of AI and mind uploading, not least 
because of the central role Marvin Minsky, perhaps the most important pioneer of post-
cybernetic AI research at MIT, has played in mentoring some of the central technological 
ideologues of transhumanism.  
The foundational principle that unites the speculative technologies in 
contemporary transhumanism is information – the technical articulation of information 
that sprang out of the cybernetics of the 1940s and which is foundational to modern-day 
computing. But the importance of information is not limited to being foundational for a 
computational concept of mind, but has expanded into explaining biological form. As 
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Lily E. Kay has shown, genetics underwent an epistemological shift in the period from 
1930s to the 1960s and after, shifting from a terminological emphasis on organisation 
and specificity towards the linguistic metaphors that arose out of using the language of 
information.81 The turning point for this was the discovery of the structure of the DNA 
molecule in 1953, which was conceived of in information-storage terms, but the 
information-view began prior to Watson and Crick. In this period, central actors in 
cybernetics, most notably Norbert Wiener, had sought to establish it as an 
interdisciplinary theory, creating a universal language and theory to unite the 
fragmentation of scientific disciplines. Information theory, developed by both Wiener 
and Claude Shannon, gradually became a scientific common currency, and terms 
associated with communication began to be established in genetic parlance: codes, 
editing, reading, writing, transcription, message, became the new lexicon in genetics as 
the information metaphor hardened its grip and lost its metaphoricity. 
As the metaphorical nature of informational language became eroded, there were 
ontological consequences. Information, while sometimes dismissively punned on for its 
assonance with form, does, in fact, have strong association with the formal cause, which, 
as Descartes had noted, was intrinsically teleological. Arguably, then, the emphasis on 
information reintroduces the Cartesian notion of ‘little minds’ into any number of natural 
and artificial structures. 
Before I conclude, it is worth taking a closer look at the book which launched 
Hayles’s critique of disembodied information, Hans Moravec’s Mind Children. This book 
has been enormously influential for transhumanists, in that it treats a number of themes 
as part of a unified, informational field: artificial intelligence, the computational nature of 
the mind, and the acceleration in computational speed. 
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In Mind Children, Moravec proposes a technical solution to achieving what has 
come to be known as the ‘uploading’ of the mind to a computer (Moravec refers to it as 
downloading, though this is a point of perception).82 In a certain sense, Moravec’s 
proposal builds on a view of the human mind that went back at least as far as cybernetic 
information theory. In The Human Use of Human Beings, Norbert Wiener considered the 
possibility of transferring people over the telegraph: ‘the fact that we cannot telegraph 
the pattern of a man from one place to another is probably due to technical difficulties 
and in particular, to the difficulty of keeping an organism in being during such a radical 
reconstruction. It is not due to any impossibility of the idea.’83 In fairness, Wiener is not 
describing the transfer of a mind alone, but the transfer of what amounts to a 
description; he does not equate neither the mind nor the body to information as such.  
In terms of Hayles’s charge of dualism, Moravec’s uploading is the ultimate 
expression of an informational, disembodied mind. The origins of the informational view 
of mind arguably lie with the AI programme at MIT, led by Alan Newell and Marvin 
Minsky, who saw the mind not as embodied neural networks as they had been articulated 
by the cyberneticians, but as an abstract entity which could be modelled as propositional 
statements, and thus straightforwardly be programmed on a computer. Like Ettinger’s 
cryonics, Moravec’s proposal is made in a hope to ‘extend human life,’ since he looks 
forward to ‘a few eons of exploring the universe’ (p. 109). For Moravec, the prospect 
that our evolutionary successors would reach the stars is a disappointment. So what can 
we do to make sure we eventually reach them ourselves? Moravec, a roboticist, sees the 
durability of a robot’s body far superior to our own, and achieving longevity would 
therefore ‘call for a process that endows an individual with all the advantages of the 
                                                
82 Hans Moravec, Mind Children: The Future of Robot and Human Intelligence (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1988). Other references to Mind Children will be given after quotations in the text. 
83 Norbert Wiener, The Human Use of Human Beings: Cybernetics and Society (Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 
1950), p. 110. 
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machines, without loss of personal identity’ (p. 109). Like Bernal or the Cyborg, we 
might transplant the human brain into a robotic chassis, yet ‘while this solution might 
overcome most of our physical limitations, it would leave untouched our biggest 
handicap, the limited and fixed intelligence of the human brain.’ What we want, then, is 
‘a way to get the mind out of our brain’ (p. 109). 
Though uploading is more familiar today, it must have seemed outlandish when 
Moravec was first writing about it. Given the assumptions that, firstly, the mind is 
describable in informational, computational terms, the mind can as a consequence be 
copied and placed within a computer simulation of a human brain which will perfectly 
reproduce it given enough computing power. Rather than interrogating his assumptions, 
Moravec’s argument takes as axiomatic the computational nature of the mind, using it as 
a springboard for further technological speculation:  
 
A computation in progress – what we can reasonably call a computer’s thought 
process – can be halted in midstep and transferred, as program and data read out 
of the machine’s memory, into a physically different computer, there to resume as 
though nothing had happened. Imagine that a human mind might be freed from 
its brain in some analogous (if much more technically challenging) way.  
(p. 4, my emphasis) 
The computer’s ‘thought process’ reveals Moravec’s basic belief that a computer’s 
information processing is analogous to the workings of the human mind. As such, the 
mind as computation can be expressed as an algorithm: the philosopher Daniel Dennett, 
who is arguably sympathetic to many of the viewpoints the transhumanists hold about 
the mind, information and computation, refers to it as the mind’s ‘substrate 
independence.’84 
A consequence of viewing the mind as a computational entity is, naturally, to bring 
up comparisons with technological capabilities. If the mind is merely a program, when 
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will it be technically feasible to simulate a mind on a computer? Moravec makes an 
operation similar to Moore’s Law (which I discuss in greater depth in the next chapter). 
Moore’s Law describes the tendency of computation becoming ever smaller and cheaper, 
but refers only to the amount of components on an integrated circuit. Moravec, 
however, extrapolates the law across computational media, from early mechanical 
operations from around 1900 and towards the future. Like the law, he finds that the 
development of the speed of computation follows an exponential function, and with that 
in hand, he makes a calculation of how many floating point operations (flops) a computer 
needs to run at the speed of a human mind (by his calculations, around ten trillion flops, 
or ten tflops), based on the number of neuronal connections in the brain. Finally, on his 
chart he finds when that amount of calculations will be possible, in 2010, and when it 
will be available to a general public for $1000, in 2030 (p. 68). The argument thus goes 
that the human mind will be easily transferrable to a computer at that stage; at the same 
time, ‘human-level’ AI will be possible. 
The point made with AI is this: Moravec believes that since human minds can be 
transferred to a digital medium, our intelligence will naturally be assisted by artificial 
intelligence, because it is situated in the same type of medium. This is an argument that 
crops up again and again, and is an interesting view from an intelligence prosthetic point 
of view. However, due to his extrapolation of computing power tendencies, he also 
theorises that in the future, the transferred human mind will be able to run faster and 
faster, and concurrently one can choose to alter one’s relative perception of time, an idea 
reminiscent of Bergson’s durée. 
Moravec proceeds to actually describe the process of mind uploading, in a passage 
which gained him notoriety in the robotics department at MIT several years before Mind 
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Children.85 The passage is the same as found in an earlier article, ‘The Rovers’, with minor 
modifications. Like Bostrom’s tale of the future posthuman, it is written in a 
conspiratorial second-person narrative: ‘You are in an operating room. A robot brain 
surgeon is in attendance. Near you is a potentially human-equivalent computer, dormant 
for lack of a program to run.’86  He proceeds to describe how the robot surgeon 
dismantles the brain, layer by layer and neuron by neuron, each of which is recreated and 
simulated on the computer, until the brain in its entirety is simulated on the computer. 
All the while, ‘you’ are still alive, observing the process. Then: 
Though you have not lost consciousness, or even your train of thought, your mind 
(some would say soul) has been removed from the brain and transferred to a 
machine. 
 In a final step, your old body is disconnected. The computer is installed 
in a shiny new one, in the style, color, and material of your choice. You are no 
longer a cyborg halfbreed; your metamorphosis is complete.87 
We could say, however, that this metamorphosis is complete only in the sense that the 
physical body has changed. The mind, as a pattern, is reproduced faithfully in a 
computational medium that allows for further transformations of it, to speed up and 
expand.  
Is there a connection between the fact that Moravec adopts a second-person 
narrative, just like Bostrom does in his appeal to the appeal of posthumanity? Perhaps – 
Bostrom refers to Moravec’s uploading scenario in the course of an earlier paper, the 
argument that we are likely living in a computer simulation.88 Even though Bostrom is 
referring to one of Moravec’s calculations on the computational capacity of the brain, 
citation alone implies a tacit approval of Moravec’s scenario; Bostrom’s paper is 
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otherwise full of references to transhumanist speculations to construct his premises, and 
he personally thanks a number of transhumanists for reading drafts. Notoriously, 
Bostrom concludes that either we will never be able to run ‘ancestor simulations,’ or 
conversely, that it is most probable that we are already living in one.89  
But the simulation argument is perhaps already implicit in the way Moravec 
implicates the reader in the second-person narrative. As a rhetorical strategy, it is 
unusual; in literature it is typically experimental, with mixed success. In a narratological 
sense, it is a metafictional technique to obscure the boundaries between fiction and 
reality. But given Moravec’s institutional context, a computer science department in the 
80s, it is unlikely that his inspiration was experimental metafiction, but there is a 
candidate that may have inspired his choice of narrative voice. The clipped, descriptive 
sentences of the opening (‘You are in an operating room. A robot brain surgeon is in 
attendance.’) is strongly reminiscent of a now forgotten, but in the 80s very popular, 
genre of computer games where second-person description was ubiquitous: the text 
adventure. Mixing prophetic narrative with the text adventure’s mode of description thus 
situates the reader, if implicitly, already within the computer to which their brain is being 
transferred. Bostrom’s simulation argument has often been compared to The Matrix; 
perhaps it should be compared to Colossal Cave Adventure or Zork. 
 
Conclusion 
Returning to Dante’s Glaucus, the deified fisherman might possibly be a fitting symbol 
for transhumanist aspirations but for a last character of the oft-criticised dualism of 
transhumanists. The idea of uploading, that the mind is an algorithmically defined entity 
which is separable from the body, is not just a Cartesian concept, but is a philosophical-
religious idea that goes back at least as far as Pythagoras, in the guise of metempsychosis, or 
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the transmigration of souls. Fittingly, perhaps, by the end of the Metamorphoses, Ovid 
shifts his story from bodily transformations to metempsychosis, in a long section 
describing a visit to Pythagoras himself. 
These concepts, transcendence, metamorphosis and metempsychosis, are 
traditionally religious or mythological: they do not happen to humans in the world, but 
are descriptions of the capacities of supernatural beings, or the passing of humans into 
the supernatural realm. All the while that there are seemingly religious undercurrents in 
transhumanism (also studied by several religious scholars), it would appear that the 
transhumanist project is often an articulation of a New Ageist appeal to preserve such 
spiritual concepts in the continuing disenchantment of the world. Even if transhumanist 
transcendence (articulated as cognitive upgrades resulting in a qualitative shift in 
consciousness) or metempsychosis (articulated as the transfer of consciousness into 
computers or other bodies as being possible due to the computational, propositional 
nature of the mind) has such strong religious undertones, the apotheosis is consistently 
posited as being within the realms of the natural, as within the world rather than being a 
passing beyond it. In the manner of science fiction narrative, it is a structural way of 
explaining the fantastical to disenchant it by positing seemingly plausible technologies 
that will achieve it. I now turn to Ray Kurzweil, the most prominent advocate of 
transhumanism, and the Singularity. In the intermingling of information, evolution and 
nanotechnology, the world is dissolved. 
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Chapter five 
The ghost in the machina mundi 
 
 
 
Ray Kurzwei l ’ s  computat ional  transhumanism 
In this chapter I will present some of the main ideas that contribute to his transhumanist 
vision of technologically enhancing human beings: The Technological Singularity, an 
informational view of progressive evolution, and the speculative enhancement 
technologies that are essential to achieving the Singularity, with particular emphasis on 
molecular nanotechnology. In introducing these topics, I pay particular attention to one 
of the best known public advocates of transhumanism, Ray Kurzweil, who presents these 
ideas in his published works. 
The American technologist Raymond Kurzweil (b. 1948) has in the course of his 
entrepreneurial career developed a number of products within what is broadly recognised 
as artificial intelligence: voice recognition, optical character recognition and speech 
synthesis. Beyond his technological innovations, he is the author of several books that 
advocate transhumanist ideas and the concept of the Singularity, discussing at length the 
possibilities of ‘strong AI,’ life extension and mind uploading – or whole brain 
emulation. In 2009, Kurzweil founded the ‘Singularity University’ in partnership with 
Google and NASA, to educate entrepreneurs towards developing novel technologies; 
and in 2012, Google hired Kurzweil as a director of engineering to explore ways to 
implement his ideas on artificial intelligence and machine learning. Google’s founders 
Larry Page and Sergey Brin, alongside the executive chairman Eric Schmidt, have 
frequently given public support for transhumanist ideas. In 2013, Google (now renamed 
Alphabet after a corporate restructuring) established a life extension arm in 2013 called 
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Calico. As one of the largest companies in the world, Google has proven to be a 
transhumanist company as well.  
There are several reasons for choosing Kurzweil as a leading example for 
transhumanist thought. Firstly, Kurzweil’s books are arguably the most widely read of 
the many books promoting transhumanist ideas, and with several bestselling books, 
Kurzweil’s flavour of transhumanism – and in particular his advocacy for the ‘Singularity’ 
– has become fairly well-known. Second, even as Kurzweil engages to some degree with 
the philosophical basis and arguments for transhumanism, this is not where his true 
expertise lies: Kurzweil is first and foremost a technologist and entrepreneur. While 
transhumanist academics tend to focus on the moral and ethical sides of transhumanist 
thought, Kurzweil’s writings are on the technologies that would enable his vision in 
coming true.1 Lastly, Kurzweil is arguably the most publicly visible spokesperson for 
transhumanism. His books are bestsellers, he has a top position in one of the world’s 
largest companies, and he is frequently in the media, unafraid to speak his mind on his 
ideas. In addition to producing a companion film to his book, The Singularity is Near, he is 
the subject of a documentary, Transcendent Man.2 He appears on numerous occasions in 
popular culture: for example, he is featured in the music video of Steve Aoki & Angger 
Dimas’s song ‘Singularity’.3 
As a futurist, Kurzweil emphasises specific future technologies. In a trilogy of 
books, The Age of Intelligent Machines, The Age of Spiritual Machines and The Singularity is Near, 
he develops extensive future timelines of how he expects current and speculative 
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Transcendent Man (Isis International Pictures, 2009). 
3 Gille Klabin, Steve Aoki and Angger Dimas, Singularity (Ultra Records, 2013). 
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technologies to progress.4 In the latter two, as well as in his latest book How To Build A 
Brain and several articles on his website, he discusses how well his predictions have 
done.5 Kurzweil’s self-assessments are always positive, though third-party assessments 
are not necessarily as sanguine about the precision of his predictions.6 Nevertheless, 
Kurzweil places great emphasis on his own role as a technological innovator and 
forecaster, and is frequently cited as a thought-leader, praised as having an ability to peer 
into the future, both near and far. 
 
The Singular i ty  
The Singularity is Kurzweil’s guiding metaphor for his predictions of the future, an event 
which completely upends what it means to be human. The Singularity is the point at 
which evolution transitions from being a biological phenomenon, with human beings as 
the current pinnacle, to becoming and progressing through the technological. Humans 
will remain, however, at the top, if ambiguously so. Though we will let ourselves be 
altered and enhanced by technology, we will persist in being human: ‘Before the next 
century is over, human beings will no longer be the most intelligent or capable type of 
entity on the planet. […] The truth of that last statement depends on how we define 
human.’7 
 The Singularity is the axis which Kurzweil’s book The Singularity is Near revolves 
around, a bestseller which introduced the concept to a wider audience. But even though 
it was the first of his books to seriously foreground this concept, he had been developing 
the underlying ideas for over a decade. We glimpse it first, though not nearly so radically, 
                                                
4 Ray Kurzweil, The Age of Intelligent Machines (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990); Ray Kurzweil, The Age of 
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in Kurzweil’s first book, The Age of Intelligent Machines, a large-format book that explores 
the present and future of artificial intelligence technologies, interspersed with essays by 
various academic luminaries and other experts on AI and related topics. Here, Kurzweil 
begins his career of technological predictions in earnest, and as a first foray into futurism 
his predictions seem tame compared to some of his more recent prognostications. Being 
careful not to push it too far, he limits himself to the consequences of likely 
developments in the AI field, and the book predicts things like computer chess-masters, 
self-driving cars and artificially intelligent assistants.8 Indeed, while the book ends with 
Kurzweil’s first timeline of future technological breakthroughs, it stops at computers 
passing the Turing Test. Nine years later, in The Age of Spiritual Machines, the timeline of 
the future is much more detailed, to culminate in 2099 with ‘a strong trend toward a 
merger of human thinking with the world of machine intelligence’.9 In this respect, 
Spiritual Machines is similar to Singularity in that it explores a host of ideas and arguments 
about the merging of biology with information technologies and progressive evolution 
which are nearly identical to what he presents in the later book – but the Singularity is 
still not at the centre.10  
In The Singularity is Near the Singularity is explained in the following:  
 [The Singularity is] a future period during which the pace of technological change 
will be so rapid, its impact so deep, that human life will be irreversibly 
transformed. Although neither utopian nor dystopian, this epoch will transform 
the concepts that we rely on to give meaning to our lives, from our business 
models to the cycle of human life, including death itself. Understanding the 
Singularity will alter our perspective on the significance of our past and the 
ramifications for our future.11  
The term was originally coined by the science fiction writer and mathematician Vernor 
Vinge, who describes an ever-accelerating process of technological change. The word 
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Technological Singularity’, which I discuss below, is included in the bibliography. 
11 Kurzweil, The Singularity Is Near, p. 7. 
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refers to the mathematical concept of singularities: if technological change is plotted as a 
linear expression, it plots a hyperbolic curve, tending towards infinity: an asymptote. 
Though Kurzweil’s singularity is only one near-future manifestation of a general 
progressivist attitude towards the future, it is instructive in how explicitly teleological, 
even eschatological it is. Through the singularity and after it, he believes the universe will 
eventually be saturated with intelligence, and that matter itself will be transformed into a 
means for digital computation and used as the physical basis for even higher orders of 
intelligence. The road there is littered with the dreams of contemporary transhumanism 
for technologically enhancing the body. As such, looking closer at Kurzweil’s ideas is a 
portal into an unruly world of disparate ideas concerning why and how we should alter, 
enhance, our bodies.  
 
Vinge’s  s ingular i ty  
In January of 1983, Vernor Vinge wrote an opinion piece for OMNI, a magazine which 
combined speculative futures and the latest in technology with fringe- and 
pseudoscience, in addition to publishing original science fiction stories by both 
established and up-and-coming authors. At the time, OMNI’s circulation was around one 
million, and the editors claimed that the total readership was as high as four million.12 
The audience for Vinge’s musings was in other words large – much larger, in fact, than 
the paper where he later gave his thought experiment the name ‘singularity.’ 
‘Something drastic happens to a species,’ Vinge writes, ‘when it reaches our stage 
of evolutionary development.’13 Already, Vinge is conflating the presence of intelligence 
and culture in a species as evidence of progress, to imply that evolution has a progressive 
trajectory. In a way, his observation is spurious – what other species would we compare 
                                                
12 W. Patrick McCray, The Visioneers: How a Group of Elite Scientists Pursued Space Colonies, Nanotechnologies, and 
a Limitless Future (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2012), p. 131. 
13 Vernor Vinge, ‘First Word’, OMNI, 5 (1983), 10 (p. 10). 
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ourselves to? – but the argument has its basis in a thought experiment about the 
possibility of intelligent life in the universe and its apparent absence besides ourselves. In 
1950, the Italian physicist Enrico Fermi, famous for his ability of making rough 
mathematical estimations, estimated that given certain assumptions about the evolution 
of life in the universe, it should be teeming with it; consequently, intelligent should be 
ubiquitous. The argument opened for a paradox: why is there no evidence of intelligent 
life elsewhere in the universe?  
I touched upon the Fermi-paradox in the previous chapter, as it has vexed 
transhumanists for a long time. One answer is that there is no life out there which can 
communicate. There could be several reasons for this conclusion: for one, the Earth 
could be the only planet where life has developed, though this is considered an unlikely 
conclusion given the size of the universe. Or: the universe could be teeming with life, but 
humans are alone in being intelligent. Another possibility is that the evolution of 
intelligence is common, perhaps even inevitable, but there is a tendency for intelligent 
species to eradicate themselves once they reach a certain level of development.  
The economist Robin Hanson has suggested a reason for either of the 
explanations for the absence, that there is a ‘great filter’, a factor somewhere along the 
trajectory from development of life to the evolution of intelligence which hinders further 
evolutionary progression. As such, he gives a short, inexhaustive list of events necessary 
for an evolutionary path from the beginning of time towards the colonisation of space, 
from the creation of reproducing organisms to the rise of intelligence and beyond. Since 
we see no evidence of anyone else out there, Hanson argues, one or several extremely 
unlikely events must lie along the evolutionary path for a galaxy-spanning species to 
develop from unicellular life. 14  Vinge, though writing before Hanson, posits an 
                                                
14 Robin Hanson, ‘The Great Filter’, 1998 <http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/greatfilter.html> [accessed 
22 June 2015]. 
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alternative to the apparent lack of intelligence out there: that the continuous acceleration 
of computing speeds point towards an event which upends what we are capable of 
predicting in terms of current knowledge. Increasing computing speeds heralds the 
arrival of artificial intelligence, which will then become faster and more intelligent until 
there is an ‘intelligence explosion.’  
In 1983, Vinge was speaking from the vantage point of a post-war technological 
boom, observing that innovation appears to have reached an ever-accelerating pace. The 
reason for why it must continue, however, is an evolutionary progressivism: evolution is a 
ladder taking us upwards, and due to accelerating computing speeds we are on track 
towards the next rung. ‘We will soon create intelligences greater than our own,’ is the 
claim; when this happens, the human species will reach ‘a kind of singularity, an 
intellectual transition as impenetrable as the knotted space-time at the centre of a black 
hole, and the world will pass beyond our understanding.’15 Helped by powerful artificial 
intelligence, or what the philosopher John Searle has called ‘strong AI’ in his critique of 
functionalism in the philosophy of mind, 16  humankind stands at the cusp of an 
evolutionary next step – one which almost certainly will happen. Echoing Bernal, Vinge 
uses the image of the butterfly’s transformation: ‘now we might regard ourselves as 
caterpillars, soon to be butterflies, and, when we look to the stars, take that vast silence 
as evidence of other races already transformed.’17 
In OMNI, Vinge was writing as a science fiction writer, but he took his own 
speculations seriously. Ten years later, he returned to the idea in a talk held at NASA for 
‘The Vision-21 Symposium on Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in the Era of 
                                                
15 Vinge, ‘First Word’, p. 10. 
16 John R. Searle, ‘Minds, Brains, and Programs’, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980), 417–24. 
17 Vinge, ‘First Word’, p. 10. 
  
235 
Cyberspace’. 18  The conference’s emphasis on different visions for the future was 
intended to foster ‘unique insights and new ideas to keep NASA technology on the 
cutting edge.’19 In other words, at this event Vinge was speaking in his capacity as a 
mathematician, rather than the science fiction author he appeared as in OMNI. Under 
the title ‘The Coming Technological Singularity,’ the abstract for the paper famously 
claims that ‘Within thirty years, we will have the technological means to create 
superhuman intelligence. Shortly after the human era will be ended.’20 
 According to Hanson, the great filter may already have passed; for Nick Bostrom, 
‘there must be (at least one) Great Filter’, and it may well be in our future.21 Vinge’s idea, 
however, proposes a possible solution for the silence: rather than expanding outwards to 
colonise space, humans’ ‘next step’ in the evolution of intelligence is an informational 
transcendence catalysed by relentless and accelerating computation. Yet Vinge’s solution 
to the paradox may well also be the filter itself. As computer ‘intelligence’ increases, the 
resultant super-intelligent AI may spell the end of humanity as we know it. In this 
respect, super-intelligent AI is one of the many ‘existential risks’ Bostrom lists, and the 
sole topic of his recent book Superintelligence.22 Worries about AI have recently become 
prevalent in mainstream media, with major business leaders such as Elon Musk and Bill 
Gates voicing their concerns; academic institutions (mostly funded by the business 
leaders) are being founded for the study of existential risk. Based on the assumptions, I 
note, of a back-of-the-napkin calculation. But speculations on alien life is not the only 
                                                
18 Vision-21: Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in the Era of Cyberspace (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 1993). 
19 Linda S. Ellis, ‘NASA - Press Release 93-17’ 
<http://www.nasa.gov/centers/glenn/news/pressrel/1993/93_17.html> [accessed 25 March 2015]. 
20 Vernor Vinge, ‘The Coming Technological Singularity: How To Survive in the Post-Human Era’, in 
Vision-21: Interdisciplinary Science and Engineering in the Era of Cyberspace (National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration, 1993), pp. 11–22 (p. 11). 
21 Bostrom, ‘Existential Risks: Analyzing Human Extinction Scenarios and Related Hazards’, p. 16. 
22 Bostrom, Superintelligence. 
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aspect at play, of course; the important observation is the accelerating speeds in 
computation. 
 
Moore’s  Law 
To support his argument, Vinge refers to a well-known prediction in the development of 
computing technology. 
The acceleration of technological progress has been the central feature of this 
century. We are on the edge of change comparable to the rise of human life on 
Earth. The precise cause of this change is the imminent creation by technology of 
entities with greater-than-human intelligence.23 
The argument conflates two observations. First, Vinge builds upon the general 
observation that technological change has accelerated in the twentieth century. But 
specifically he invokes Moore’s Law, which, without fault, comes up when the 
accelerating pace of technological change is brought up. Moore’s Law refers to a famous 
article by Gordon E. Moore, the co-founder of the computer chip manufacturer Intel, 
‘Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits’.24 With only four data points, 
Moore plots a logarithmic curve of the relative cost of chip components versus the total 
amount on integrated circuits and predicts that the amount of transistors on a chip will 
double every year. As such, Moore forecasts that ‘by 1975, the number of components 
per integrated circuit for minimum cost will be 65,000.’25 Ten years later, Moore revised 
his estimate for doubling time, from one to two years; at that time, he thought that the 
reservoir of ‘cleverness’ in manufacturing was exhausted.26 
                                                
23 Vinge, ‘The Coming Technological Singularity: How To Survive in the Post-Human Era’, p. 12. 
24 Gordon E. Moore, ‘Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits’, Electronics, 38 (1965), 114–
17. 
25 Gordon E. Moore, ‘Cramming More Components onto Integrated Circuits’, Proceedings of the IEEE, 86 
(1998), 82–85 (p. 83). 
26 Gordon E. Moore, ‘Progress in Digital Integrated Electronics’, in Electron Devices Meeting, 1975 
International (IEEE, 1975), XXI, 11–13 (p. 12). 
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But Vinge’s singularity also recalls a number of earlier observations made from the 
beginning of modern computer science. In 1950, in a famous paper on testing machine 
intelligence, Alan Turing wrote of the prospect that future intelligent machines would 
take over from humans.27 In 1965, I. J. Good, Turing’s colleague at Bletchley Park, wrote 
of a possible ‘intelligence explosion.’28 Developing the cybernetician W. Ross Ashby’s 
thought experiment on whether a chess-playing machine could outplay its designer,29 
Good reasoned that if we are to design computers that are more intelligent than us, these 
computers would be able to create more intelligent machines still – and so, by this 
continuing recursive improvement, there is an intelligence explosion. 
If Good’s intelligence explosion is exponential, it eventually tends towards the 
infinite, mathematically described as an asymptote. Vinge, however, also plays on the 
word’s use in physics which refers to the infinite mass at the centre of black holes, and 
the accompanying event horizon that surrounds one. It is impossible to have any 
knowledge of what lies beyond the event horizon of a black hole; similarly, he argues, the 
technological singularity will create a world which is so vastly different from what we 
know that it is impossible to have the remotest understanding of what lies beyond. 
All technological change brings with it changes that are impossible to foresee, 
something which many critics of the singularity are quick to point out, noting that we 
might as well call the technological changes of the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries 
singularities. The difference for both Vinge and Kurzweil, however, is that they place the 
coming explosion in machine thought as an event that signifies an evolutionary next step: 
this is not technology as crafted, but technology as life itself. For Kurzweil, the 
singularity is a name for the technologies that alter the conditions and capacities of 
                                                
27 Alan M. Turing, ‘Computing Machinery and Intelligence’, Mind, 1950, 433–60. 
28 Irving John Good, ‘Speculations Concerning the First Ultraintelligent Machine’, Advances in Computers, 6 
(1965), 31–88. 
29 W. Ross Ashby, ‘Can a Mechanical Chess-Player Outplay Its Designer?’, The British Journal for the 
Philosophy of Science, 3 (1952), 44–57. 
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humans completely. The slip here is between the evolution of life and the development 
of technology. By articulating life in terms of technology, as intrinsically technological, 
the technologised future becomes as inescapable as it is inevitable. Contrasted with 
Vinge, however, for Kurzweil, the impenetrable change that lies at the other side of the 
Singularity is not as unknowable as the metaphor implies. It signifies a time when 
machine intelligence reaches human capacity, and then goes beyond it. 
Not all transhumanists are as sanguine about the idea of a coming singularity, 
however. Since the early days of the transhumanist movement, there has been a degree of 
ridicule towards the eschatological undertones of believing in a future event of universal 
disruption, even within transhumanist circles. The science fiction author Ken MacLeod 
famously refers to it in the novel The Cassini Division as the ‘rapture of the nerds.’30 While 
this phrase has now become associated with MacLeod, he has repeatedly said that he 
took the phrase from a self-consciously sarcastic article in Extropy Magazine.31 As such, 
ridiculing the singularity as an eschatological fantasy began with the transhumanists 
themselves, and Max More, the leading figure in the Extropian transhumanist movement, 
dismissed the singularity early on.32 Similarly, the sociologist James Hughes, who is 
otherwise a prominent advocate for transhumanist ideas in politics, compares those who 
believe in the singularity as akin to ‘pre-millennialist Christians who believed that 
Christians had only to prepare themselves for salvation and the millennium would be 
established for them.’33 It is thus clear that not all transhumanists believe in a future 
technological singularity. However, it arguably remains an important signifier within the 
                                                
30 Ken MacLeod, The Cassini Division (New York: Tor, 1999), p. 97. Though the canonical phrase is ‘rapture 
of the nerds’, MacLeod refers to it earlier as the ‘rapture for nerds’, pp. 91, 93. 
31 Paul Graham Raven, ‘Science Fiction and Politics – Ken MacLeod’, Velcro City Tourist Board, 2007 
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2015]; Ken MacLeod, ‘The Ends of Humanity’, Aeon, 2012 <http://aeon.co/magazine/philosophy/ken-
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32 Max More, ‘Comments on Vinge’s Singularity’, 1998 <http://mason.gmu.edu/~rhanson/vc.html> 
[accessed 22 June 2015]. 
33 Hughes, Citizen Cyborg, p. 173. 
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movement, and other figures in transhumanism still take it seriously. For example, 
Eliezer Yudkowsky, an advocate for developing ‘friendly AI’, formed the Singularity 
Institute (now known as the Machine Intelligence Research Institute), and has become 
something of an intellectual beacon in Silicon Valley. John Smart, a futurist concerned 
with the study of accelerating change, has developed Vinge’s singularity into a 
‘transcension hypothesis’: that the evolution of sufficient intelligence leads a species to 
leave this universe altogether.34 
While Vinge intended the technological singularity to be a serious future 
projection, its immediate impact was in science fiction, with plenty of ‘singularity fiction’ 
appearing in the late nineties, stories which attempted to describe the intrinsic 
unknowability of what lies beyond that event. But after Kurzweil’s appropriation of the 
concept, it has gained more and more public attention. Still the stuff of science fiction, 
there are nevertheless numerous futurists who are taking it seriously, even if many 
ridicule it. More recently, there has been interest in philosophical circles. In 2010, David 
Chalmers published a philosophical assessment of the singularity in The Journal of 
Consciousness Studies, which had a follow-up issue with responses in 2012.35 A book of 
philosophical essays on Singularity Hypotheses has also been published.36 
 
  
                                                
34 John M. Smart, ‘The Transcension Hypothesis: Sufficiently Advanced Civilizations Invariably Leave Our 
Universe, and Implications for METI and SETI’, Acta Astronautica, Searching for Life Signatures, 78 
(2012), 55–68. 
35 David Chalmers, ‘The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis’, Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17 (2010), 7–
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Transhuman technolog ies :  Convergence and computat ion 
According to Kurzweil’s prediction, the first half of the twenty-first century ‘will be 
characterized by three overlapping revolutions – in Genetics, Nanotechnology, and 
Robotics,’ a development which in turn will usher in ‘the beginning of the Singularity.’37  
Kurzweil refers to these technologies as ‘GNR’ – an abbreviation he somewhat 
perversely borrows from an article by the computer scientist Bill Joy. Joy was apparently 
the first to articulate the three technologies as part of a unified trend. In an article in 
Wired on the dangers of future technology, he also refers to them as ‘GNR’.38 Joy 
recounts a meeting with Kurzweil in 1998 where Kurzweil proselytised on accelerating 
technologies and how humans would be succeeded by superintelligent robots. But while 
Kurzweil had been enthusiastic, Joy fears that the technologies we are creating would 
render us obsolete. Variations on Kurzweil’s projected technological revolutions take the 
centre stage in most transhumanist-related discussions of future developments and 
human enhancements. In 2002, Mihail C. Roco and William Sims Bainbridge coined the 
acronym NBIC, standing for ‘nano-bio-info-cogno,’ in a report for United States 
congress on improving human performance.39 NBIC-technologies make up what they 
call coming ‘converging’ technologies, where these separate areas of technological 
development will run together to become a single field of development, an idea they 
have developed further in numerous subsequent publications. In the same vein, genetics, 
nanotechnology and robotics – with information technology underpinning all of them – 
have been referred to by a number of different acronyms to describe the same idea as 
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Kurzweil proposes: GRIN;40 GRAIN (where ‘AI’ is for ‘artificial intelligence);41 and 
BANG – Bits, Atoms, Neurons and Genes.42 
Kurzweil takes these technologies and places them at the centre of his 
technological evolutionary shift, confidently proclaiming that each area will experience a 
developmental revolution in the coming decades. That GNR technologies are subsumed 
under the informational umbrella is key. For instance, in his discussion of the future of 
genetics, he states that behind ‘all of the wonders of life and misery of disease are 
information processes, essentially software programs,’43 which means that ‘we are starting 
to learn to reprogram our biology to achieve the virtual elimination of disease, dramatic 
expansion of human potential, and radical life extension’ (p. 205). In fact, Kurzweil refers 
to genetics as ‘The Intersection of Information and Biology’ (p. 206), whereas 
nanotechnology takes it a step further to be the ‘intersection of information and the 
physical world’ (p. 226). But where genetics and nanotechnology will enable us to 
‘redesign and rebuild,’ it is robotics that heralds the most radical possibility for 
enhancement:  
human-level robots with their intelligence derived from our own but redesigned to 
far exceed human capabilities. R represents the most significant transformation, 
because intelligence is the most powerful ‘force’ in the universe. Intelligence, if 
sufficiently advanced, is, well, smart enough to anticipate and overcome any 
obstacles that stand in its path. (p. 206) 
Robotics thus represents the final stage towards Kurzweil’s singularity, in which the 
human mind is ‘uploaded’ to robot bodies. As discussed at the end of the previous 
chapter, uploading is the scenario that was first developed by Hans Moravec in Mind 
Children and Robot. Arguably, uploading is a logical consequence of functionalism in the 
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philosophy of mind, the view that the mind arises from symbolic manipulation, as if it 
were a computer. Crucially, from the functionalist stance, if the mind is the outcome of 
symbolic manipulation, a computation, it is the expression of an algorithm which can is 
independent of the medium in which it is expressed. An algorithm, as Daniel Dennett 
explains, is ‘substrate independent’44 – it can be implemented in any medium, by any 
form of symbolic representation, and nevertheless, any such implementation is formally 
equivalent to yield the same outcome (or rather, output). This would mean that a mind 
could arise out of any appropriate algorithmic implementation, whether it is in a brain, in 
a computer, or via the manipulation of symbols in a book, such as is in John Searle’s 
famous ‘Chinese room’ thought experiment, one of the most famous papers in the 
philosophy of mind.  
In ‘Minds, Brains and Programs,’ Searle seeks to show, generally, that the 
functionalist conception of mind is impossible; and specifically that the possibility of 
what he calls ‘Strong AI’ must therefore be impossible as well. ‘Strong AI’ is the position 
that ‘the appropriately programmed computer literally has cognitive states and that 
programs thereby explain human cognition.’45 Searle posits a scenario in which he, a man 
without any knowledge of spoken or written Chinese, is locked in a room with a large 
batch of Chinese-language papers. There, he receives a second batch of papers, together 
with a set of rules in English that shows him how to correlate the symbols in the second 
batch with the first. He then receives a third batch with another set of rules in English 
that tell him to correlate the symbols in the third batch with the ones in the first two, and 
to return certain symbols according to the correlations. Unbeknownst to Searle, the first 
set of papers is a ‘script,’ the second a ‘story,’ the third are ‘questions’, and the rules are 
actually ‘programs.’ By following the rules, what Searle has actually been doing is to reply 
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45 John R. Searle, p. 417. 
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to a set of questions posed in relation to a story, by executing a program set by his 
Chinese custodians – all of which in Chinese, but without Searle knowing Chinese. 
According to Searle, this is formally equivalent to the operation of a computer, and is 
thus how the proponents of Strong AI claim the human mind operates. To Searle, that 
this situation is even possible is beyond credibility. 
 I will not, however, debate Searle’s argument, which has generated an enormous 
philosophical literature, even if Kurzweil has publically debated Searle on the question 
and includes sections in his books in which he attempts at refuting the argument. 
Nevertheless, it is relevant to highlight Searle’s conclusion in his critique of 
functionalism, since it applies not only to Kurzweil’s concept of mind, but to what 
amounts to Kurzweil’s entire computational ontology. As Searle points out, ‘[u]nless you 
believe that the mind is separable from the brain both conceptually and empirically – 
dualism in a strong form – you cannot hope to reproduce the mental by writing and 
running programs since programs must be independent of brains or any other particular 
forms of instantiation.’46 Moreover, Searle points out that if one believes that ‘mental 
operations consists of computational operations,’ this entails that the mind has ‘no 
interesting connection with the brain’; the brain is merely one of an indefinite number of 
machines which is capable of computing minds.47 While the mind is somehow the 
outcome of running the program, the machine it runs on is incidental – hence minds can 
be run on computers as well as on brains. 
 To Searle, the question whether machines can think has an obvious answer: yes, 
and those machines are brains, but brains are unlike computers. This is a crucial 
difference in Searle’s stance compared to the functionalists. Since the very beginning, 
mechanical computers have been thought of and articulated in terms of human minds, 
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not least because of the historical connection between human cognition and rationality, 
of which computation is arguably the ultimate extension of. In Alan Turing’s 1937 paper 
which describes a paper machine capable of instantiating any computing machine,48 the 
machine’s different states are referred to as ‘states of mind.’49 At the time, computers 
referred to actual people performing calculations according to sets of rules, and Turing is 
provisionally describing what they do in order to construct an abstract machine to 
perform the same functions. Crucially, however, Turing keeps referring to the machine’s 
computational states as states of mind. Later, Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts’s 
formalisation of the working of the brain via idealised neurones and neural nets was an 
attempt at showing that the brain, given appropriate (i.e., infinite) storage, could function 
as a UTM.50 John von Neumann, describing the stored-program computer, referred to 
the construction of the computer in terms of the McCulloch-Pitts neurone as an 
instantiation of a universal computer. Thus, even from the early days of computing, the 
computer was conceived as a kind of brain, and a brain was reflexively conceived in 
terms of a computer. That a brain’s idealised physical structure could implement a 
universal computer does not necessarily mean that the whole of a brain is a computer: 
UTMs have been implemented in many unusual places, such as in cellular automata (e.g., 
Stephen Wolfram’s ‘Rule 110’ and John Conway’s ‘Game of Life’), in several computer 
games which can simulate logic gates (Turing machines have been constructed in 
Minecraft and Dwarf Fortress, both games in which players can construct environments 
with building blocks that have strictly defined functions). It has even been proposed that 
the card game Magic: The Gathering is Turing complete, given certain conditions. The 
example of the games is instructive, and is perhaps illustrative of the nature of the 
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analogy posited by McCulloch and Pitts: that a Turing machine can be implemented 
within a particular structure does not mean that the structure is itself a Turing machine. 
Or, in other words, that a particular machinic assemblage can be organised in a way that 
it can be a computer does not mean that the nature of the machinic assemblage is itself 
computational. 
 This is the broader point which is applicable to the class of technologies which is 
central to the Singularity argument, since the Singularity, such as it is posited by 
Kurzweil, is itself a computational argument which is dependent on several nested 
arguments that each depend on computation. The human mind is computational; the 
metric that signals the arrival of the Singularity is computational (i.e., that the processing 
speed of the human mind has been matched by computers); the technologies that lead to 
the singularity are computational technologies (i.e., GNR). Ultimately, even the 
underlying process that leads us there is computational, as Kurzweil posits both that 
evolution itself is a program, but also that it tends towards complexity and order, terms 
that have been appropriated by information theory.  
 
Moore’s  Law unmoored 
Kurzweil explains that the singularity will come about due to what he calls ‘the law of 
accelerating returns’. In brief (in a move reminiscent of what we saw Moravec do in the 
previous chapter), Kurzweil’s ‘law’ takes Moore's Law and universalises it. Moore's law is 
often mistakenly taken to be that computing performance doubles every 18 months, 
associated with a statement by David House, who said that computing performance 
doubled every 18 months.51 And though Moore's law is predictive, it is limited by the 
physical constraints of constructing computational circuits; currently it is believed that 
                                                
51 Gordon E. Moore, Excerpts from A Conversation with Gordon Moore: Moore’s Law, 2005 
<http://large.stanford.edu/courses/2012/ph250/lee1/docs/Excepts_A_Conversation_with_Gordon_M
oore.pdf> [accessed 28 April 2015]. 
  
246 
the law as it applies to transistor density has slowed down and will soon reach its physical 
limit. As such, the apparently hyperbolic exponential curve that plots the increase in 
transistor density is in fact a sigmoid function – an s-shaped curve which is similar to the 
hyperbolic up until the curve flattens out rather than tending towards the infinite. As a 
descriptor of the rate of change over time, the sigmoid curve shows the acceleration to 
slow and stop at the top of the function. The sigmoid curve is a common futurists tool 
for extrapolating current trends into the future, but it can be unreliable, since the ultimate 
shape of the sigmoid – and thus the timeline it models – is nearly impossible to 
determine when one is still in the middle of the trend curve. For Kurzweil, however, the 
specific sigmoid of Moore's law as it applies to transistor density and cost is only part of 
the picture. 
Kurzweil takes Moore's law as only a specific instance of what he believes is a 
universal law of the acceleration of information processing. While Moore’s law 
specifically describes the cost and density of transistors on a chip, Kurzweil believes that 
it can be generalised to describe all instances, both technological and biological, of 
information processing. As such, if one takes numerous sigmoid curves and add them 
together, they form a single hyperbolic trajectory upwards. For Kurzweil, this describes a 
universal tendency towards increased computational speeds. The amount of transistors 
on a chip and its associated speed of computation is only a single manifestation of a 
sigmoid curve among a long line of past and future sigmoid curves that all express a 
tendency towards increased complexity, order and computational speed – not only does 
Kurzweil believe that a new paradigm of computation will take over after the current 
limits of silicone transistors are exhausted, he also extrapolates the function backwards in 
time as an expression of computational speeds in different types of computational media. 
Where Moore’s law applies to the cost and amount of, first, transistors, and then 
integrated circuits, Kurzweil claims that you can plot previous computational 
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technologies onto the same exponential function before transistors and integrated 
circuits: ‘there were actually four different paradigms – electromechanical, relays, vacuum 
tubes, and discrete transistors – that showed exponential growth in the price-
performance of computing long before integrated circuits were even invented. And 
Moore’s paradigm won’t be the last.’52 
In 1961, the science fiction writer G. Harry Stine made a similar approach as 
Kurzweil’s compounding sigmoid curves. In an article in Analog Science Fact and Fiction, 
Stine wrote about an increasing problem for the business of writing science fiction: how 
to extrapolate current trends to predict future technologies, but also how to do it 
accurately. ‘Old training as an s-f writer taught me the value of future trend curves,’ Stine 
writes, but ‘just when you think you have things well under control, the program planned 
nicely, and the future well in hand, through the door walks someone with something 
new.’53 Stine claims that once future technologies are envisioned, they are likely to arrive 
much faster than conservative estimates tend to believe. On nuclear fusion, for example, 
he notes that ‘scientists in 1930 were predicting a controlled nuclear reaction not before 
2000 A.D.’54 There is therefore a prevailing fault in the ability of scientists, but also 
science fiction writers, to predict coming technological trends. The solution to the 
problem is, of course, the exponential curve. Stine goes overboard with it. 
Stine refers to an unnamed Air Force Office of Scientific Research report from 
1953, which he believes is ‘probably first’ in using an exponential curve to predict future 
technology. There, technologies of locomotion are mapped out, beginning with walking, 
through riding horses, travelling by ship, train, car, plane, and so forth, to the final data-
point in 1953, the rocket. Combined, the individual sigmoid curves form a single 
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hyperbolic trend curve. Stine actually, and without apparent irony, extrapolates the curve 
to propose that ‘manned vehicles will be able to achieve near-infinite speeds by 1982.’55 
Not wanting to be too conservative, Stine notes that it may even be sooner. Neither does 
he limit himself to trends in transportation, and proposes that similar asymptotic trends 
can be observed in life expectancy, population, controllable energy and, familiarly by 
now, the number ‘circuits in cybernetic devices,’56 though his estimate of computation 
rivalling the capacity of the human brain arrives as early as 1970 – fully 55 years before 
Kurzweil’s estimate. 
In some ways, then, Stine pioneered the promotion of using exponential trends to 
forecast future developments. But at the same time, his analysis highlights its limitations 
as well. Regardless of whether he believed the speed of light was an absolute limit or not, 
it is completely clear that the current fastest speeds achieved by technological means are 
no closer to the infinite now than they were in 1982. Stine saw an asymptotic curve, but 
the data points were actually on the accelerating part of a sigmoid curve.  
Stine, of course, couldn’t see the limits of his model from his vantage point, as the 
curve had not yet reached its apex. Kurzweil, however, believes that the current observed 
accelerating change in computing speeds is actually an aspect of a universal evolution, 
which he divides into six ‘epochs’. These epochs are, respectively, Physics and Chemistry; 
Biology; Brains; Technology; Merger of Technology and Human Intelligence; and The 
Universe Wakes Up. 57  We are currently within the fourth epoch, Technology; the 
Singularity is actually the transition to the next or epoch, the merging of technology with 
human intelligence.  
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Technologi ca l  evo lut ion 
For Kurzweil, evolution is both a computational process and a ‘master programmer.’58 
Though his language concerning it is at times ambiguous, Kurzweil emphasises his view 
that evolution as conventionally understood – Darwinian natural selection – is too ordered 
that it can be considered merely a blind and coincidental causal process where objects of 
greater complexity and order only happen to be created over time. He concludes that 
evolution must be a process of deliberation and design: evolution is itself, somehow, 
intelligent.  
Kurzweil’s idea of intelligence, however, is somewhat idiosyncratic. He sees the 
intelligence of evolution, if it were to be measured on a conventional scale, as having an 
IQ only infinitesimally above zero. A consequence of this reasoning (though not exactly 
spelled out in so many words) is that, for Kurzweil, the selection of natural selection is 
not merely the outcome of one species being better adapted to its environment than 
others, and thus prevailing, but a deliberate selection, done with some degree of intention 
and planning for increased fitness and adaptation to the environment. In this sense, the 
evolution Kurzweil describes is a reversal of the blind process of natural selection as 
described by Darwin and reintroduces an element of Lamarckism. The purposive, 
evolutionary force lies not in the species themselves, however, rather evolution is itself a 
separate, computational agent.  
In this respect, Kurzweil’s purposive evolution essentially acts as a Maxwell’s 
Demon, James Clerk Maxwell’s theoretical entity which would create and preserve order 
in a closed thermodynamic system that otherwise tends towards entropy. While Kurzweil 
makes no reference to the Demon, the similarity is evident in his computational view of 
evolution and in his computational ontology. Kurzweil considers evolution to be 
computational, an information processing phenomenon which orders matter into new 
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and more complex configurations. This is close to how Norbert Wiener originally 
explained information in Cybernetics: as a Maxwell’s daemon, creating order in spite of 
entropic forces.59 Wiener built upon Leo Szilard’s 1929 paper on the Demon which 
argued that for the Daemon to order matter it would have to gather precise information 
about all the particles in the system.60 Szilard argued that the information would have to 
be gathered by an ‘intelligenter Wesen’ – an intelligent creature – which the Daemon was 
always considered to be. With the development of computers and cybernetic theory in 
the 1940s, however, a particular concept of ‘intelligence’ – sensing and adaptive response 
through feedback – was mechanised, and thus no longer required any organic creature to 
function. As we saw in chapter three, the development of a cybernetically informed 
evolutionary language for adaptation came about in the late 1950s. But adaptive 
teleonomy resides not in the process of evolution itself, but is a name given to an 
apparently emergent phenomenon that seems purposive. What Kurzweil does, through 
his language of evolution’s purpose and calling it a ‘master programmer’ to assign it an 
intelligence quotient, is to situate the adaptive response outside of evolving species, 
reifying evolution itself into an entity which purposively selects – somewhat like saying 
that the body’s centre of gravity is a real thing inside us that keeps us from falling. 
In taking this view of evolution, Kurzweil is also building on a long tradition in 
para-evolutionary thinking that conflates biological with technological evolution. At the 
same time, while current accounts of Darwinism has it that evolutionary teleology was 
ousted with the triumph of natural selection, there is nevertheless a tradition that thinks 
of species as existing within a hierarchical relationship to each other and as evolving in a 
progressive manner. In some respects, this was a hangover from the Neoplatonic 
tradition of the scala naturae, the ‘great chain of being’, in which all of God’s creatures 
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exist in a hierarchical continuum from the lowest beetle, past humans, through the angels 
and up to God himself.61 This point of view lent itself to the distinction between ‘lower’ 
and ‘higher’ animals, which, even as it is considered outmoded thinking today, was used 
even by Julian Huxley in The Modern Synthesis despite his disavowal of teleology.62 In fact, 
Huxley, while advocating a non-teleological evolution, promoted the idea of evolutionary 
progression 
 A clear expression of evolution as a progressive trajectory towards increased 
complexity is found in Herbert Spencer, who in 1857 described evolution both as 
universal, progressive, and as an increase in complexity, in an article which subsequently 
formed the beginning of his magnum opus, First Principles of a New System of Philosophy.63 The 
idea that technology evolves was expressed by others around the same time as well: for 
example, the archaeological anthropologist Augustus Pitt-Rivers, inspired by Spencer, 
compiled a vast collection of tools and exhibited them to demonstrate their progressive 
construction, and his collection is still on display today at the Pitt-Rivers museum in 
Oxford. Famously, Samuel Butler wrote of technological evolution in Erewhon, in the 
section called ‘The Book of the Machines’, which was incorporated from an earlier essay 
Butler had written for a New Zealand newspaper soon after reading Darwin’s Origin.64 In 
Erewhon, Butler describes a society which reacts to the threat of the machines by 
abandoning them altogether. In this respect the book was of particular interest to the 
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cyberneticians, who frequently refer to it, especially Norbert Wiener who from the 1950s 
frequently discussed increasing automation in industry.65 
Others carried their speculation on evolutionary progress into more esoteric and 
mystical realms, even when such musings are grounded in the science of the day. Pierre 
Teilhard de Chardin’s posthumously published The Phenomenon of Man (1955), is notable 
for introducing the ‘noosphere’, a planetary mentalism that tends towards the proposed 
endpoint of planetary evolution and consciousness, called the Omega Point.66 Teilhard 
intended to synthesise evolutionary theory and theological mysticism, and for him the 
natural stages of evolution are conceived of successively as the geosphere (inanimate 
matter); the biosphere (animated matter); and the noosphere: the envelopment of the 
planet by mind itself.  
Teilhard was trained both as a Jesuit and an anthropologist, and his scientific views 
were frequently at odds with the views of his religious superiors. Some of his writings on 
theories of complexity and evolution ended in his forced exile from his native France to 
China, a move which secured that he not only participated in the discovery of the Peking 
Man, but also in his writing The Phenomenon of Man in the years around 1938-40. It was 
published posthumously, since his Jesuit superiors denied him publication when he was 
still alive, but became a sensation once it was. The English translation still carries the 
original introduction by Julian Huxley, who despite his professed agnosticism was drawn 
to Teilhard’s evolutionary mysticism.67 
In an attempt at synthesising his religious and scientific views, Teilhard constructs 
an eschatology based on his concept of the noosphere, in which the universe reaches a 
point Oméga, the state of maximum organised complexity. This state (which he also terms 
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‘christogenesis’) is effectively equal to godhood. As such, the Omega Point is both an 
elaboration on previous ideas of teleological evolution and increased complexity, and 
though Teilhard was ridiculed by the academy, his immense popular success ensured a 
lasting legacy. 
Teilhard has a teleological view of evolution, and defines it as the continued 
increase in complexification of matter, which he traces back in time from the simple 
formation of atoms and molecules and up to biological life. At the same time, he 
differentiates between material energy and what he calls radial energy (what would we 
can also think of as mental energy), assuming that evolution, as evidenced by the 
superiority of man’s intellect, naturally evolves towards a state of increased complexity, 
towards a complex organisation of ‘radial,’ rather than material energy. But because the 
complexification leads to a universal consciousness, that space-time contains and 
engenders consciousness is described to be ‘necessarily of a convergent nature.’68 This brings 
again a link to evolution of informational technologies as described by Roco and 
Bainbridge, who describes the NBIC suite as convergence, saying it is a reference to 
mainstream evolutionary thought. But in fact, evolutionary biology describes convergent 
adaptation as a tendency of different species to adapt similar traits in similar 
environments. As Teilhard’s convergence describes a mental unification, and not similar 
adaptive developments, Roco and Bainbridge’s technological evolution is based on the 
idea that technologies will converge in terms of a unifying, cognitive process. As such, 
even as teleology and vitalism has been banished from mainstream evolutionary thought, 
fringe views on evolution frequently crops up in transhumanist thought. Even as many 
transhumanists eschew religiosity and appeal to atheism and reason, the impact of 
Teilhardian thought and its successors is palpable, and, I would argue, present in even 
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surprising areas, particularly when technological development is discussed in progressive 
terms of increased complexification. 
There is, furthermore, a cybernetic connection to this purposive evolution, 
especially relevant as modern complexity is grounded in cybernetic theory. As such, there 
is a tradition, if minor, among a group of cybernetic complexity theorists to 
conceptualise evolution as progressive complexity. One central theorist in this respect is 
the Russian cybernetician Valentin Turchin, who described evolution as a series of 
‘metasystem transitions,’ which he describes as a qualitative change in the organisation of 
matter as it increases in complexity. ‘The human being becomes the point of 
concentration for Cosmic Creativity,’ he writes: ‘The pace of evolution accelerates 
manyfold.’69 Turchin was forthright in his inspiration from Teilhard: the title of his book, 
The Phenomenon of Science, is a deliberate homage. The echoes in Kurzweil’s evolutionary 
ideas are evident, and there is an explicit connection. Several other cyberneticians have 
developed Turchin’s ideas, including Alexis Jdanko, Francis Heylighen, and Richard L. 
Coren, whose The Evolutionary Trajectory is referred to by Kurzweil as one of his sources 
for the Law of Accelerating Change. In that book, Coren describes evolution as a 
continuous informational trajectory towards increased complexity, pointing out that his 
calculations point to a future event, around 2140. According to his calculations, 
the entire super-macroevolutionary process will have progressed to a juncture 
beyond which it cannot continue, at least not in its usual mode. Any subsequent 
change would seem to call for a qualitatively different methodology, a ‘super-
escalation’ of a sort that is fundamentally distinct from its predecessors. We are 
looking to the beginning of an entirely new mode of change and a completely 
novel concept for the future; a conversion of the present evolutionary trajectory 
into something markedly different.70 
The similarities to Kurzweil and Vinge’s singularity run deep, though Coren’s prediction 
is grounded in a mathematical language. And while Coren is much more cautious about 
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making predictions, his book is replete with references to the cyborgisation and 
technologisation of the body. 
The shadow of Teilhard’s teleological evolution seems cast over transhumanist 
thought. This may partly be due to some of the more striking components of Teilhard’s 
thinking, such as that increasing complexity leads to convergence. The result of this line 
of thinking, in transhumanist thought, is the continuation of biological evolution into the 
technological. To conceive of technological change as evolution and progress is, firstly, 
to grant the concept of increased complexity truth, itself teleological, but secondly to 
reify the metaphor that technological change can be conceptualised in evolutionary 
terms. The leap is thus not far in thinking that technological change is a continuation of 
biological evolution, since they therefore are both expressions of the same mechanism. 
Yet at the same time it necessitates a view of evolution that is regressive and abandoned 
in contemporary scientific thought – and has been for the past seventy years.  
 
Genes,  genet i c  engineer ing,  and the contro l  o f  matter  
The prospect of changing the genome predates the transhumanist discourse, and is, 
perhaps, the proposed transhumanist technology which bears the strongest affiliation 
with any sort of eugenics. Nathaniel Comfort has called the wish for genetic 
enhancement the ‘eugenic impulse.’71 Though eugenics has effectively been sequestered 
from current discussions of genetic treatments by ‘the historical firewall of World War 
II,’ Comfort argues that recent years of scholarship on medical genetics ‘have 
transformed the firewall into a membrane, multiply pierced with postwar eugenic 
practices and affiliations.’72 Recent public and academic debate on enhancement has been 
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centred on techniques of genome alteration and the distinction between therapy and 
enhancement. In this context, as scientific knowledge about the genome is increasing, 
and techniques for altering it are being developed, eugenics has become equated with the 
authoritarian reproductive control of a bygone era – and less about the role of 
enhancement in eugenics as such. Transhumanists thus avoid the association with 
eugenics precisely because they define eugenics as an historical artefact, defined by its 
only available technique: the manipulation of populations through reproductive control. 
Indeed, the impulse for improvement is deemed a worthy one, to the degree that some 
advocates for genetic enhancement argue that it is in fact a moral imperative for parents 
to ensure that their unborn children will have the best possible genomes, such as in 
Agar’s ‘liberal eugenics’ of personal genetic choice or Savulescu’s ‘procreative 
beneficence’ – a concept startlingly similar in its meaning to ‘eugenics.’ 
As I mentioned in the introductory chapter, in April 2015, a group of Chinese 
scientists caused controversy when they announced that they had carried out germ-line 
manipulation of human embryos using the relatively new and powerful genome editing 
technique CRISPR/Cas9, which led to a public debate on how the technique should be 
used.73 The ethical fear raised by CRISPR/Cas9 is of so-called germ-line editing: the 
alteration of the genome in DNA which can be passed on to the next generation. For 
Kurzweil, however, germ-line editing is not the most interesting promise in genetic 
engineering, quite possibly because it is not immediate enough. What he sees as the true 
breakthrough for genetic engineering is the alteration of DNA in somatic cells, calling it 
the ‘holy grail of bioengineering’ for its promise to ‘block undesirable disease-
encouraging genes or introduce new ones that slow down and even reverse aging 
processes.’ 74 As such, genetic engineering is for Kurzweil only one bridge towards 
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extending life in order to live to see the singularity. The prospect of enhancing 
populations through germline engineering, such as Agar and Savulescu suggest, are of 
minor concern: Kurzweil’s enhancement project is individualistic, and his emphasis on 
genetic engineering is therefore due to the benefits it could confer on him personally. But 
even altering the DNA of somatic cells is an intermediate step towards his goal, which 
down the line is to manipulate his body’s matter at the molecular level. As such, the 
informational view of genetics is the foundation for the more transformative 
nanotechnology, and it is worthwhile to take a look at how understanding genes as a 
computation of matter connects to a more general, abstract idea of matter as 
computational. 
In 1944, the physicist Erwin Schrödinger published a small book based on a series 
of public lectures given at Dublin’s Trinity College in February of the previous year. The 
book, What is Life?, asked how the persistence of life was possible in the face of the 
inexorable torrent of entropy in the universe described by the second law of 
thermodynamics. Schrödinger argued that life was an ‘aperiodic crystal’ which consumes 
orderliness from a ‘suitable environment,’75 a self-replicating structure which is variable 
and locally ‘negentropic,’ defying entropy because it maintains its structure and 
organisation before reproducing itself. The apparent paradox of how life can preserve its 
integrity in an entropic universe is thus resolved: life, as islands of order within a larger 
thermodynamic system, consumes order locally, increasing the entropy of the whole. 
Schrödinger’s argument is therefore often seen as a theoretical prediction of the 
discovery of the structure and function of the DNA molecule. His line of reasoning led 
him to conclude that, in order to replicate itself without error, the genome would have to 
be reliant on a ‘code-script’ – a metaphor that would be highly influential and would 
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come to inspire a generation of scientists in probing the genetic mechanisms of life. 
Even Craig Venter, the bioinformatician who headed the Human Genome Project to 
sequence a reference genome in 2001, states that he was inspired by Schrödinger’s slim 
volume.76 
 By the early 1950s, the cybernetic information discourse had meteorically risen 
into prominence. Following the discovery of the structure of the DNA molecule in 1953 
by Watson, Crick and Franklin, DNA was soon established as an informational entity.77 
Many contributed to the development of an informational understanding of DNA, but it 
was perhaps the work of Jacques Monod and François Jacob that secured the 
understanding of DNA as a set of instructions that specify the protein structure of the 
organism most securely. In a number of publications in the 1960s, Monod and Jacob 
established the function of DNA as an ‘enzymatic cybernetics’; they discovered 
‘messenger’ RNA, and theorised cellular replication to be a complicated computational 
process. According to Evelyn Fox Keller,78 Jacob and Monod were in 1961 the first to 
refer to the genome as a computational program: ‘the genome contains not only a series 
of blue-prints, but a co-ordinated program of protein synthesis and the means of 
controlling its execution.’79 The computer became a dominating metaphor for genetic 
expression in the course of the 1960s, and in The Logic of Life, Jacob’s popular account of 
the history of heredity he describes the then scientific understanding of how the genome 
and heredity functions: ‘What are transmitted from generation to generation are the 
“instructions” specifying the molecular structures: the architectural plans of the future 
organism. They are also the means of executing these plans and of coordinating the 
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activities of the system.’; as he succinctly sums the position up, ‘The organism thus 
becomes the realization of a programme prescribed by its heredity.’80 
 As Wendy Hui Kyong Chun points out, the program – or software, code – has 
been conceptualised as a conflation of law and its execution.81 As such, the many 
abstractions of a program, in relation to source code and hardware operations, renders 
opaque the actual operations that happen between compiling a program from source 
code and its execution. The ‘source code’ of a program is in truth not the source of 
execution: it is a description of what is to be done in the computer, in a structured 
language which is intelligible to the programmer. The actual execution of a program goes 
through a series of translations from source code, compiled program, machine language, 
down to electronic switching. The abstraction of the program from electronic switching 
renders the role of the programmer as much freer, and ‘empowers the programmer and 
insists on his/her ignorance – the dream of a sovereign subject who knows and 
commands is constantly undone.’82 Schrödinger invokes the code-script as a return to the 
Laplacian demon, in that the entirety of the organism is contained within the script and 
thus that the future of the organism is known from the beginning. Chun points out that 
in Alan Turing’s classic paper on artificial intelligence, ‘Computing Machinery and 
Intelligence,’ Turing also invokes Laplace’s demon to compare it to the discrete 
computing machine.83 Crucially, however, the move of abstracting programming from its 
material instantiation renders it far more malleable, as it in its abstract, legible form is 
separated from its execution. Hence, if DNA is a program, it stands to reason that one 
should be able to alter it in order to change and improve upon its execution.  
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Lily E. Kay argues that establishing DNA as an informational code-script was not 
inevitable, but the result of the scientific discourses that dominated at the time of the 
discoveries of the foundations of genetics. 84  And while code and information is 
commonly seen as abstract, ephemeral and materially independent, information is always 
and necessarily grounded in its material embodiment. Likewise, the speed of 
computation is dependent on its material instantiation, and as such, accelerating speeds 
in computation is always grounded in material innovations. Curiously, while both the 
brain’s operation and the human genome are seen as executions of code, as ‘master 
programs,’ nobody suggests that ‘uploading’ our genomes will lead us to living freely in 
the computational cloud. Rather, as DNA’s ‘execution’ leads to the determination of the 
material organism, the brain, when understood to compute the mind, gives rise to 
something conceived as immaterial. So while the informational computer metaphor is 
used in both genetics and about the mind, they have very different consequences. For the 
mind, it becomes attached to an idea of intelligence and increasing computational 
capacity, while in genetics it leads to an understanding of the material composition of the 
world being malleable, programmable. Consequently, this view led to the idea of 
molecular nanotechnology. 
 
Nanotechnology :  Programmable matter  
 ‘Molecular’ nanotechnology, occasionally known as ‘deterministic nanotechnology’ (as 
opposed to the probabilistic approach contemporary molecular-scale manufacturing 
takes), was developed by K. Eric Drexler in the 1980s. Kurzweil characterises Drexler’s 
concept of nanotechnology as the combination of two approaches: the idea of 
manipulating matter directly at the atomic scale, first proposed by Richard Feynman in a 
speech in 1959, with John von Neumann’s self-replicating automatons. 
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Today, the word nanotechnology is well known. It is referred to in policy and gives 
its name to university research departments, Occasionally, it pops up in science news 
about ‘nanomaterials’ such as graphene and carbon nanotubes. However, this type of 
nanotechnology is not exactly the same as what Drexler originally envisioned. Key to 
Drexler’s idea is what he calls the molecular assembler, a molecule-sized machine which 
can bond individual atoms to each other, and, in theory, if produced as a ‘swarm’ of 
assemblers, would be capable of building literally anything that can be specified at the 
molecular scale, composed from precisely placed individual atoms.  
Drexler’s vision of nanotechnology is controversial, not least because there are 
serious doubts whether the scenario of direct atomic manipulation that he describes is 
even feasible. His counter claim to this is simple: nature did it first. Organic life is proof 
of atomic manipulation and self-replication, of which the function of cells, DNA 
replication and protein construction is evidence. Consequently, his project is merely a 
theoretical explication of what must surely be possible to accomplish technologically. As 
Kurzweil states, there is the caveat that ‘Drexler did not provide a detailed design for an 
assembler,’ but dismisses the objection because ‘his thesis did provide extensive 
feasibility arguments for each of the principal components of a molecular assembler.’85 
The way he promoted his idea was that it was supported by one of the greatest physicist 
of the century. 
In a 1959 lecture to the American Physical Society called ‘There’s Plenty of Room 
at the Bottom’, the physicist and later Nobel laureate Richard Feynman suggested a new 
possibility in chemistry: the direct manipulation of individual atoms. Observing that, at 
the very smallest scales, there is more space than matter, Feynman envisioned a possible 
technology where one could manipulate matters directly via remote manipulation. Back 
then it was outlandish; Colin Milburn claims Feynman was directly inspired by Robert 
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Heinlein’s 1942 short story ‘Waldo’ which has a similar concept. 86  For possible 
applications he suggested creating miniature medical robots to be injected into the 
bloodstream and to observe atoms at a smaller scale than was possible with the current 
electromicroscopy.87 
Despite some initial interest, not least because of two $1000 prizes that Feynman 
promised – one for whoever could create a motor only 1/64th of an inch across, the 
other for printing the first page of a book at only 1/25000th of its original size – the 
lecture gained little attention until K. Eric Drexler came across it while he was 
developing his own ideas on molecular manipulation. As Milburn has pointed out, the 
association with Feynman, a Nobel laureate and one of the most famous physicists of the 
twentieth century, lent the new concept prior approval and a ready-made pre-history: an 
endorsement from one of the greats of twentieth-century science was an ‘easy way of 
garnering scientific authority.’88 Similarly, W. Patrick McCray has observed that the 
association of Feynman with molecular nanotechnology ‘serves as a rhetorical anchor to 
scientific authority.’ 89 According to Milburn, this legitimises a technological scenario 
which otherwise is cast in the language and rhetorical strategies of science fiction. 
The popular idea of nanotechnology, as championed by Drexler, and the 
institutional research which is carried out under its name, are two different beasts, a 
point which I will return to. The nanotechnology which is publicised today is more 
accurately a name for new types of chemical manufacture of materials – that, or simply 
used as a marketing term for chemical elements included, for instance, in beauty 
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products. The nanotechnology that Drexler envisioned, and which occasional 
technological fears and fantasies are attached to, is quite different. 
The ‘nano’ in nanotechnology refers to the scale of operation, nanometres, 10-9m, 
or a billionth of a metre. Drexler first began working on developing his vision of 
nanotechnology as an undergraduate at MIT, and in 1981 he published an article on 
‘Molecular Engineering’.90 It was only in 1986, after the publication of Engines of Creation, 
a popular account of his vision, that his ideas started gaining popular traction. 
Subsequently, Drexler pursued a Ph.D. at MIT’s Media Lab (with the support from 
several departments) to further develop his idea more rigorously.91 
After the publication of Engines of Creation, nanotechnology soon became a 
commonplace, to the degree that by the time Drexler completed his Ph.D. at MIT’s 
Media Lab in 1992, he was called to testify before the US congress about the possibilities 
of molecular nanotechnology, stating that ‘major, large-scale applications’ would be 
available fifteen years hence – by 2007.92 
‘Arranged one way, atoms make up soil, air, and water; arranged another, they 
make up ripe strawberries,’ Drexler writes, and claims that our ‘ability to arrange atoms 
lies at the foundation of technology.’93 From the very start, it is clear that what he 
envisions is a completely new way of how to approach manufacture itself – a method 
which will, as he sees it, eventually have such wide-ranging repercussions that the 
consequences are nearly impossible to imagine. As a new method of manufacture, 
nanotechnology envisions a way of constructing objects from the bottom up, right form 
the smallest constituent parts – atoms. 
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For Drexler, the traditional methods of technological manufacture are extremely 
crude. Even highly sophisticated processes like the production of extremely small-scale 
microprocessors is essentially a stone-age way of doing things: ‘The ancient style of 
technology that led from flint chips to silicon chips handles atoms and molecules in bulk; 
call it bulk technology. The new technology will handle individual atoms and molecules with 
control and precision; call it molecular technology’ (p. 4). To Drexler, ‘we can use the terms 
“nanotechnology” and “molecular technology” interchangeably’ (p. 5) – hence why he 
later renamed it ‘molecular nanotechnology’ to avoid association with the various ‘nano’ 
products that were marketed in the 1990s. 
Handling individual atoms means the capacity for making machines at the atomic 
scale, and Drexler draws an analogy to organic cells: ‘More complex patterns make up 
the active nanomachines of the living cells’ (p. 5). In fact, technological analogies abound 
in Drexler’s account of how biological mechanisms work to grow the organism. Proteins 
can ‘push and pull, some act as cords or struts, and parts of some molecules make 
excellent bearings,’ a ‘reversible, variable-speed motor drives bacteria through water by 
turning a corkscrew-shaped propeller’; and ’[s]imple molecular devices combine to form 
systems resembling industrial machines’ (p. 8). These molecular machines have come 
into being because of the encoding-decoding machinery of DNA, RNA and ribosomes 
which construct proteins out of chains of amino acids, where in the bewildering array of 
proteins, each has its own molecular function. Taking advantage of the advances in 
molecular biology and the then emergent industry of genetic engineering, Drexler sees 
the possibility of a ‘first wave’ of nanotechnology, which synthesises novel proteins for 
specific functions. However, as a first step, there will still be deficiencies in such organic 
machines:  
Protein machines quit when dried, freeze when chilled, and cook when heated. We 
do not build machines of flesh, hair, and gelatin; over the centuries, we have 
learned to use our hands of flesh and bone to build machines of wood, ceramic, 
  
265 
steel, and plastic. We will do likewise in the future. We will use protein machines to 
build nanomachines of tougher stuff than protein. (p. 11) 
To construct the nanomachines of the future, then, first entails controlling the 
nanomachines that already exists – cellular machines – to create more sturdy successors. 
 
Information in nanotechnology 
Drexler’s visions for molecular nanotechnology seems outlandish, but his technological 
proposal is thoroughly reasoned. He envisions nanotechnology to be a general category 
of technologies that do what living organisms already are capable of, namely building 
themselves up, molecule by molecule, from a template contained in DNA. This is what 
life is for Drexler: machines that copy themselves by using the most fundamental 
building blocks in nature. Molecular biology thus forms the template for 
nanotechnology, and his understanding of biological evolution is clearly taken from the 
popular writings of Richard Dawkins. The Selfish Gene, Dawkins’s most famous book, is 
mentioned numerous times in the course of Engines of Creation; but more evidence is 
given by the centrality Drexler gives to the replicator, which is quite literally a term lifted 
straight from Dawkins’s book. 
The ‘replicator,’ as Dawkins explains, has ‘the extraordinary property of being able 
to create copies of itself’: 
Think of the molecule as a mould or template. Imagine it as a large molecule 
consisting of a complex chain of various sorts of building block molecules. The 
small building blocks were abundantly available in the soup surrounding the 
replicator. Now suppose that each building block has an affinity for its own kind. 
Then whenever a building block from out in the soup lands up next to a part of 
the replicator for which it has an affinity, it will tend to stick there. The building 
blocks that attach themselves in this way will automatically be arranged in a 
sequence that mimics that of the replicator itself. It is easy then to think of them 
joining up to form a stable chain just as in the formation of the original replicator. 
This process could continue as a progressive stacking up, layer upon layer. This is 
how crystals are formed. On the other hand, the two chains might split apart, in 
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which case we have two replicators, each of which can go on to make further 
copies.94  
Here, Dawkins is describing the self-replication of crystals as a less sophisticated 
precursor to DNA, in a broad comparison that recalls Schrödinger’s definition of the 
replication of life (as aperiodic crystals). More importantly, however – even though 
Dawkins does not emphasise this in the book, despite that it is central to his argument 
about the ‘selfish gene’ and the gene-centric view of evolution – is that the theory of the 
replicator is an informational approach. Even as he speaks of moulds and templates, he 
does not acknowledge the debt to the informational language established by the 
molecular biologists. Rather, Dawkins takes it for granted that a pattern of information 
replicating itself is at the essence of all living organisms. Tellingly, he speaks of it not in 
terms of an abstraction, such as Schrödinger’s code-script, but, when referring to moulds 
and templates as the replication of form itself. 
For Dawkins, evolution happens on the genetic level only, in the selection of 
individual alleles, and not at the physiological level of beneficial physical traits: genotype 
trumps phenotype, and this approach entails a particular attitude to how organismic 
growth happens. If genes are the only unit of selection, it follows that the genotype 
completely determines phenotype, since if there were variables in organismic growth that 
were not completely determined by genes, other factors could be in play on selection. 
This means that our bodies are entirely shaped by what is a computation: as our genes 
are processed as information, every single protein in the body is built based on this 
template. The genome, in this view, is a plan that completely determines the construction 
of the body. This view, that the genome represents a plan, template, or blueprint, is both 
controversial and unlikely, yet remains a common understanding: Kurzweil explicitly 
refers to the genome as a blueprint several times. Whereas modern genetics has largely 
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moved away from the simple understanding of the replicator, the blueprint metaphor has 
remained.  
Dawkins’s presentation of how evolution works is thus very similar to the 
technological program which Drexler is presenting. Dawkins did not come up with the 
selfish gene as a self-serving replicator sui generis, however – though Dawkins gives no 
mention of it, the gene-centric view of evolution is a direct descendant of John von 
Neumann’s theory of self-replicating automata which he first began developing at the 
height of cybernetics. In 1948, at the Hixon Symposium held at the California Institute 
of Technology, von Neumann presented a paper on the ‘General and Logical Theory of 
Automata,’ a paper which combined insights from both Alan Turing’s Universal 
Computer, Warren McCulloch and Walter Pitts’s theory of neural nets as a universal 
computer, and the possibility of constructing a machine which would be able to self-
replicate.95 Presenting a formal logical argument, von Neumann intentionally treated it as 
a black box, in order to propose an abstract machine, which, if physically constructed, 
would have components that were formally analogous to his logical theory. 
Von Neumann describes an automaton, or rather an aggregate of several automata 
which, when combined, form a single reproducing entity. First, he supposes a field which 
is filled with the parts necessary for constructing any of the requisite automata, and then 
describes the formal composition of each: automata A can construct any automata on 
the basis of instructions I; automata B can reproduce I; the controlling mechanism C 
controls their behaviour, feeding the instructions I into A and B. The three together, A + 
B + C form D. As von Neumann demonstrates, if D is fed the instructions ID – which 
describes D – it will construct E, a self-reproducing automaton.96 
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Von Neumann’s theory of self-reproducing automata was to be his main 
theoretical preoccupation, alongside his work building computers at the Institute for 
Advanced Studies and during the time he consulted for the American government. 
Before von Neumann died in 1957, he was working on a manuscript that described self-
reproducing automata in greater depth, and gave a series of lectures on the topic which 
was later edited into a book.97 As such, von Neumann’s theoretical exploration of 
automata instigated a sub-field in computer science, automata theory – but it also 
inspired an informational approach in genetics, as Lily E. Kay has shown.98 This was, in 
fact, at least one of von Neumann’s intended purposes with his theory of automata. In 
the conclusion of the 1948 paper he remarks that ‘It is also clear that the copying 
mechanism B performs the fundamental act of reproduction, the duplication of the 
genetic material, which is clearly the fundamental operation in the multiplication of living 
cells.’99 The significance of this formal result was not lost on other cyberneticians; in the 
introduction to the proceedings of the eighth Macy conference, the editors make an 
analogy between the punched cards and nucleic acids, stating that ‘both can be 
considered as “coded” information, the one decoded in the course of a technical 
(cultural) process, the other in the course of embryogeny.’100 Thus, Dawkins’s selfish 
gene and Drexler’s molecular replicators are both versions of von Neumann’s paper 
machine: a theoretical machine first made flesh, then remade as technology. 
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The fact  and f i c t ion o f  nanotechnology  
There has been ample discussion about the feasibility of Drexler’s outline of molecular 
nanotechnology, beyond knee-jerk criticisms and unquestioning fawning (though there 
has been plenty of that as well). Most famously, a public debate was conducted in the 
pages of Scientific American and Chemical & Engineering News between Drexler and Richard 
Smalley, a recipient of the 1996 Nobel Prize in chemistry for the co-discovery of 
buckminsterfullerene (C60), a large, football-shaped molecule which is notable for its 
stability and interesting properties. The final exchange between the two was mutually 
hostile, with Smalley accusing Drexler of not understanding basic chemistry and Drexler 
accusing Smalley of deliberate obfuscation.101 Who won the debate? It has been pointed 
out that Drexler doesn’t even give a proper description of a molecular assembler, the 
cornerstone of his project, only saying what it will be capable of and that it consists of 
roughly 4,000,000 atoms. To others, such details will readily be worked out, and as 
mentioned above, Kurzweil is on Drexler’s side. But in its course towards respectability, 
Drexler’s grandiose vision has diminished. 
In 2000, U.S. president Bill Clinton established the National Nanotech Initiative, 
after Mihail C. Roco testified before congress in 1999 on the necessity of a national 
research initiative. According to the NNI’s inaugural report, which modestly has the 
subtitle ‘Leading to the Next Industrial Revolution,’ the initiative’s research aims are 
lofty, and have universal importance. There, it is stated that the NNI’s research will go 
into developing a  
fundamental understanding and synthesis of nanometer-size building blocks with 
potential breakthroughs in areas such as materials and manufacturing, 
nanoelectronics, medicine and healthcare, environment and energy, chemical and 
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pharmaceutical industries, biotechnology and agriculture, computation and 
information technology, and national security.102 
But whereas Drexler in 1992 testified to congress on the importance of molecular 
nanotechnology and manufacture, there is a distinct difference between his atomically 
precise, deterministic ‘nanofacture’ and the stochastic, probabilistic approach to 
nanotechnology which Roco, the head of NNI, took. As such, the probabilistic approach 
is still the dominating approach to nanotechnology today, rather than Drexlerian atomic 
control. Tellingly, on the timeline of nanotechnology development on the NNI’s website, 
Drexler’s work, which has arguably been the main catalyst for bringing nanotechnology 
into the public eye, is nowhere mentioned.103 
In 2006, the NNI conducted a report on the current condition of nanotechnology 
research entitled A Matter of Size – there, the authors limited their subject to ‘potential 
real risks rather than perceived risks pertaining to nanotechnology,’104 by which they were 
effectively dismissing the scenarios proposed by Drexler and his supporters:  
As a result of its reflections on and discussion of what is regarded as the more 
futuristic aspects of nanotechnology – such as the use of nanotechnology in 
developing artificial intelligence, and similar topics popularized in science fiction – 
the committee decided that an assessment of such topics in the context of a need 
for standards and guidelines would be premature and speculative at best.105 
In other words, even if the NNI’s stated aims regarding nanotechnology are lofty and 
possibly unrealistic, they are still unwilling to associate with Drexler’s molecular 
assembly, dismissing them and their associated risks as ‘topics of science fiction.’  
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Kurzwei l ’ s  nanotechnology 
Kurzweil is confident that Drexler’s vision of nanotechnology is not only feasible, but, 
per his ideas on progressive technological evolution, that it is inevitable, and represents 
the most important bridge towards achieving the complete technologisation of the 
human body. One of Kurzweil’s proposals for using nanotechnology in enhancement is 
to ‘upgrade’ the cell nucleus, a ‘conceptually simple proposal to overcome all biological 
pathogens except for prions’.106 Even as Kurzweil understands the genome to be an 
informational code-script, and that the rest of the cell is a set of molecular computers 
which assembles proteins from a blueprint, he nevertheless believes that evolution has 
come up with a suboptimal solution. Future technological development will outright 
replace the cells’ nuclei by the early 2020s – which is to say that he suggests we replace 
the nuclei of our several trillions of somatic cells with nanocomputers. This, as he says, 
‘could eliminate any remaining obstacles and create a level of durability and flexibility 
that goes beyond the inherent capability of biology’ (p. 233). The opportunities for 
enhancement do not stop there, of course; Kurzweil imagines a redesign and 
improvement of our entire set of internal organs, thinking that by the 2030s we will have 
‘eliminated the heart, lungs, red and white blood cells, platelets, pancreas, thyroid and all 
the hormone-producing organs, kidneys, bladder, liver, lower esophagus, stomach, small 
intestines, large intestines, and bowel. What we have left at this point is the skeleton, 
skin, sex organs, sensory organs, mouth and upper esophagus, and brain’ (p. 307). These 
last, outer vestiges of our humanity are also subject to improvement, replacement, or 
complete redesign, of course. These changes, which he tellingly in the language of the 
software developer calls the ‘Human Body Version 2.0’, will eventually make way for the 
natural evolutionary and software progression to version 3.0: ‘a more fundamental 
redesign.’ Kurzweil sees that with nanotechnology, we ‘will have the opportunity to 
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revamp our bodies,’ to the degree that ‘we’ll be able to rapidly alter our physical 
manifestation at will’ (p. 310). 
 Molecular nanotechnology, then, envisions a future in which complete 
morphological freedom is possible. Moreover, it is a clear illustration of how form is 
inextricably linked to information, as information is construed to take the role of 
substantial form, that which gives matter its form. As such, it demonstrates how a 
metaphysical concept has been reintroduced, if unintentionally, into scientific 
epistemology with the rise and success of information theory. But with Kurzweil, this 
hylomorphism is not just about the description or computation of a hylomorphism, but 
spans across his entire computational framework of the Singularity. 
 
Conclusion:  Tipler ’ s  eschato logy 
Information technologies underpins the whole of Kurzweil’s enhancement apparatus, 
down to the fibres of his cosmology. The singularity, evolution, artificial intelligence, 
uploading and nanotechnology are all computational technologies. The consequence, then, 
is that if reality is computational – if our minds, evolution and matter all arise out of a 
computation – it is possible to take matter, as it were, into our own hands. This is 
symptomatic of how the informational discourse allows everything to be reduced into 
one unifying abstraction. But paradoxically, the increased precision of modern science, 
which has partially been enabled by the information discourse, leads to a move towards 
abstraction. Modern technology, according to Kurzweil, will not only allow us to have 
the material, morphological freedom of our bodies; the implication is that we will be 
freed from the body altogether, that we escape from the prison of our flesh. The 
consequence, for Kurzweil, is that the more concrete scientific description becomes, the 
more ethereal the object of description is.  
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In The Physics of Immortality, Frank Tipler connects several of the topics that have 
already been introduced.107 Tipler, a physicist, is perhaps best known for his work on the 
‘anthropic principle’ with John D. Barrow, where they argue that, firstly, the universe is 
fine-tuned for life, but secondly, that the evolution of life is somehow compelled to 
eventually create intelligent life.108 Tipler, a self-professed Christian, came to religion via 
physics, having been an atheist when he was a student. In the spirit of Teilhard, he 
attempts to synthesise his scientific training with his eschatological beliefs. The results 
are quite interesting.  
Based on his view of cosmology, in which the universe is set to contract once it 
reaches its end (a view which is contested) and propped up with the computational 
musings of Hans Moravec and the physical calculations of Freeman Dyson, Tipler arrives 
at the conclusion that, when the universe contracts, it reaches a point where temperature 
approaches infinity, hence energy and computational speed also approach infinity. This 
state is, for Tipler, functionally equivalent to the Christian idea of Heaven. Firstly, he 
argues, all human intelligence will have migrated to computers, simply because it is a 
necessity for life to continue its existence. Secondly, the personalities of everyone who 
has ever been alive will be possible to reconstruct through artificial intelligence. Since 
computation reaches infinite speeds, following on Moravec’s reasoning that the 
perception of time is a function of computational capacity, time will, in effect, stop. 
Everyone who has ever lived will be reconstructed to live in a computational reality 
which can take any form imagined. And so, humankind reaches true immortality, living 
in computational Heaven. While the line of reasoning comes across as tenuous, Tipler 
bombards the reader with mathematical proofs, assuring us that the calculations are 
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correct (the appendix, a large part of the book, is ‘for scientists’ and consists mostly of 
equations). A chapter is spent on disproving Nietzsche’s eternal return. 
 How different is Tipler’s vision from Kurzweil’s? As Kurzweil presents a 
syncretistic spiritualism, his computational vision is easily construed as a religious 
allegory. Passing through the veil of Maya (the singularity) you reach Nirvana (‘the 
universe wakes up’). Argued from a (pseudo-)scientific point of view, which takes 
information and computation as the universal solvent that brings the ultimate freedom of 
spirit. All that is solid melts into air. 
 In this projection of the future, technological enhancement is not only something 
that is desirable (and that we should invest in along the way). It is a necessary 
development: in the language of the fundamentalist, if you don’t take part, you will be 
left behind. Do you wish that for you children? But that’s not all: in a move that other 
transhumanists have criticised for its element of complacency – Max More has said that 
it hides the fact that a huge amount of work is necessary for his transhumanism to come 
to fruition – the evolutionary progressivism of the Singularity expresses it as a 
progressive necessity. Evolution can’t help itself, it must tend towards greater complexity 
and convergence. Vinge, too, held that view. In Marooned in Realtime, a novel which 
explores his singularity scenario, he felt he had to construct a cataclysmic event, a global 
nuclear war, to slow down accelerating change and postpone the singularity from 
happening until the mid-twenty-third century. 
 
In the course of this thesis, an appeal to a spiritual dimension has been present – if at 
times only implicitly so – throughout the permutations of the project to technologically 
enhance the human. Wrestling with the authoritarian nature of the eugenic project, 
Francis Galton proposed that eugenics should become a new religion, or incorporated to 
existing religion. Demonstrating to the Sociological Society that marriage customs varied 
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immensely by culture, he believed that if eugenic beliefs could become so ingrained as to 
constitute culture itself, eugenic reproductive practices would become accepted to the 
degree that they were accepted as essentially natural. 
 One question that troubled many eugenicists was one of the basic questions that 
philosophers have struggled with for millennia: what is good? It is unclear whether the 
eugenicists were aware that others had wrestled with it for so long. Perhaps it is naïve to 
think otherwise, but that the question had remained unanswered did not appear to 
diminish their attempts at answering it. Yet their wrestling with the question highlighted 
one of the problems of the liberal political project: what is good for the state is not 
always thought of as such by the individuals that comprise it. In that tradition, it is 
recognised that a liberty sometimes must be curtailed for the greater good of the nation, 
and while greater liberty is always an ideal, a balance must be struck. But in the appeal for 
a eugenic religion, there lies a recognition that people do not always readily accept the 
legitimacy for a state to curtail their liberties, but will accept it if the decree comes from a 
higher power. In this, Galton saw religion as instrumental for maintaining, unquestioned, 
the legitimacy of authority, to proscribe reproductive customs according to a higher, 
spiritual authority, actually in service of a national population. In hindsight, the thought 
that a nation could be united in religious customs seems like it was an anachronism even 
then, and even stranger when considering Galton came from a Quaker family. 
 The difficulty of deciding what is good has implications for what constitutes an 
enhancement. Since an enhancement must be a relative measure of improvement, it is a 
constantly moving target. Take a contemporary argument in favour of genetic 
enhancement of offspring: firstly, it is argued that we should have a freedom of choice 
concerning enhancements, whether they are for our children or ourselves. But second, it 
is argued, our children should have the right to the best possible future they can have, 
something which genetic enhancements would give them. So even if one has a choice, 
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the scales balance towards enhancement. But finally, if enough people choose to enhance 
their children, the situation changes: it becomes a moral obligation to ensure that your 
children have opportunities equal to their peers. Over time, a liberty in choice becomes a 
prison of society; perhaps better not to have children at all. The feint in this argument is 
that what at first is construed as a choice is actually an incentive: at first, enhancement 
would give children a competitive advantage, as this would give them a relative advantage 
compared to their peers. But after a while, the advantage disappears, as a new average is 
established, leaving the unenhanced to be left behind. The enhanced are left with no real 
advantage, and have no longer been enhanced from the individual’s point of view. Yet 
the raised average serves the national population. In a move, then, the eugenicist’s 
dilemma has been resolved by something like the neoliberal marketplace. 
 I don’t know if such arguments for enhancement, especially the appeal to 
individual liberty, are particularly effective. The alternative is an appeal not to the calculus 
of ability and efficiency, but to a heightened spirituality: enhancement will open you up 
for experiences beyond our mortal ken. Though Galton proposed the eugenic religion 
because he recognised that religious custom was effective in controlling the reproductive 
habits of its adherents, he also touched at something deeper which became increasingly 
present with subsequent articulations of the enhancement project. The Cyborg, 
especially, seems to have shifted the prospect of technological enhancement from a 
national duty to individual spiritual liberation. Its not too distant precedent, Bernal’s 
chthonic machine-man, seems more like it is constructed for some sort of obligatory 
service in penance for the transgressions of the protracted, carefree youth people of the 
future will enjoy. The Cyborg, however, is explicitly engaged in a spiritual challenge to 
free himself from space itself, while staring blankly into it. Though a spiritual exercise, 
there was apparently little appeal for the idea that the terror of outer space could be 
countered with a dive into inner space. Nevertheless, the Cyborg was part of a larger 
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project of liberation: planetary as well as spiritual, an appeal for both the material and 
mental expansion of a human empire in space. 
 Such an appeal to enhancement’s spiritual dimension is consistent among 
transhumanists, whether in the grandiose eschatology of Kurzweil, or the bioethical 
arguments of Bostrom. Increased intelligence and longevity, Bostrom holds, is a good in 
itself: it opens up for new experiences which are impossible to have now, whether 
aesthetic or moral. Never mind that the measure of intelligence is constructed as a 
measure for the benefit of national intelligence; the general intelligence measure g has 
universal implications for the quality of life. Intelligent people are more moral, can 
appreciate beauty more deeply, have greater empathy and can have more profound 
spiritual experiences in general. The problem of liberty becomes reversed, as 
enhancement itself has developed to be a project that promotes greater spiritual liberty: 
liberty, originally constructed in terms of the relationship between an individual and 
authority, becomes a transcendental, reified category, in some ways a return to a pre-
Enlightenment Christian conception of liberty. In this respect then, the ideational 
development of human enhancement has been consistently situated around liberty: first 
as a problem of how its implementation would lead to coercion; then as an imperative 
for achieving it. While science and technology is typically considered to be a process of 
disenchantment of the world, transhumanism demonstrates that as science and 
technology becomes more precise it has, for some, allowed for a reenchantment of the 
universe.  
 The other aspect of enhancement arguments has been more overt throughout 
the course of this thesis: the relationship between evolution and technology. But again, 
evolution itself is consistently connected with liberty and spirituality in the areas I have 
examined. For Galton, as it was for Darwin, modern, technological society was a 
problem for evolution, since it had created institutions and medicine that advocated the 
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reproduction of those less worthy: modern society had come to threaten the degeneracy 
of the human species. Thus a reorganisation of society would be necessary to get society 
going in the direction it was needed. To some, this meant establishing social institutions 
to ensure the welfare of the population. But for the statistician Galton, it was more 
important to ascertain who should euphemistically marry whom, so that the upwards 
progress of evolution could again be reclaimed, and by the help of the fine minds of 
those not yet degenerated by the evils of modern technological society, possibly sped up. 
 But evolution, even when it is sped up by purposeful breeding, takes too long 
when the species in question is strong-headed, has political rights and takes the entire 
lifetime of a dog to reach sexual maturity. The development here is how enhancement 
has changed the manipulation of abstractions. With eugenics, the abstraction is the 
quantitative representation of populations: the goal of eugenics was to interfere in parts 
of the population that specific parts of the abstraction correlated to, in order to get a new 
projection that portrayed a better population. The curve shifts this way, it benefits all; it 
shifts that, and we all become poorer. The method for doing so is less than appealing, 
but the appeal of manipulating abstractions remains. 
 Technology, of course, does not manipulate abstractions, but it can be 
constructed as being in service of that aim. As such, the way the Cyborg proposed to 
change the body’s metabolic system was in service of an abstraction: adaptation, or the 
apparent correlation of a part of the body’s function to its environment. Adaptation is 
never a one-to-one relationship, as there exists no intrinsic relationship between an 
adaptive trait and the environment it succeeds within. Yet some species thrive more than 
others, and humans seem to be particularly successful. One interpretation is that our 
intelligence and dexterity has given us a general adaptation that gives us the power to alter 
our environment. But we have a host of metabolic adaptations that allow us to survive in 
many environments; and we have even more technologies that allow us to survive in 
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even more environments. The more environments, the better, and the Cyborg can live in 
them all, and the Cyborg’s attempt at a universal adaptation abstracts the body from 
them altogether. 
 The Cyborg’s changing form is just the beginning of the transhumanist project. 
There form becomes the underlying principle, in information, that allows for the 
complete dominion over self and nature. While the Cyborg abstracts us, information 
reveals that we are, at core, abstractions. We are already living in a computer simulation, 
not least since the universe is revealed to be a computer at all levels of scale. Evolution, 
then, is intrinsically technological as everything becomes at once subsumed under the 
computational banner and part of evolution’s intrinsic, purposive progression towards 
spreading the computational mind throughout the universe. Kurzweil claims that the 
endgame of the computational project is that all the matter of the universe itself will be 
retooled for computation, until the universe ‘wakes up.’ But his own premise is that it 
was always awake, if in some much less self-aware manner. It is merely a universal 
retooling, a redirection of all available resources towards complete efficiency: a 
transcendence. Such millennial ambitions cloud the issues of the present and the 
possible. But, importantly, they create a narrative for why one should go along with 
enhancement for reasons that are not overtly to the benefit of national authorities. 
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